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Indeed, one reason monogamy is so important to us is that we are so terrorized by what 
we imagine are the alternatives to it. The other person we fear most is the one who does 
not believe in the universal sacredness of—usually heterosexual—coupledom. 
        —Adam Phillips2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Monogamy and marriage are hot topics at the moment. News sources are replete with 
articles about same-sex couples who want the state to recognize their long-term commitments as 
marriages. And, increasingly, these couples seem to be getting their wish.3 The focus of this 
article is different. Like an “unmannerly wedding guest,”4 this article invites the reader to pause 
amidst the whirlwind of marriage talk, to think about monogamy and its alternatives. 
* * * 
 If Rick Santorum is right, then interesting times lie ahead. Before the Supreme Court 
struck down Texas’s homosexual sodomy law in Lawrence v. Texas5 last June, Senator Santorum 
warned that, “[i]f the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within 
your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the 
right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything.”6 No doubt, 
Santorum does not want the Court to make good his prediction.7 His radical vision is instead an 
example of the oft-noted propensity of opponents of gay rights to claim that the latter leads a 
                                                 
2 ADAM PHILLIPS, MONOGAMY 98 (1996). 
3 In addition to the option of religious marriage available to same-sex couples in various religions and 
denominations, civil marriage has recently become open to same-sex couples in three countries: the Netherlands, 
since April 2001, see Wet wan 21 december 2000 tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband 
met de openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde geslacht (Wet openstelling huwelijk), Stb. 2001, 
nr. 9 (Neth.), translated in Text of Dutch Act on the Opening Up of Marriage for Same-Sex Partners (Kees Waaldijk 
trans.), in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS, app. II, at 455, 455-56 (Robert Wintemute & Mads 
Andenaes eds., 2001); Belgium since early 2003, see Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 
Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and 
Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2004 (2003); and two Canadian provinces, Ontario and British Columbia, since 
summer 2003, see Tying the Knot, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 15, 2003, at A9. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts has also just confirmed that marriage is required by its recent decision in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003). See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate,  
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/sjc_020404/ (Feb. 4, 2004).*  
4 MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 119-20 (1999). 
5 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
6 Sean Loughlin, Santorum Under Fire for Comments on Homosexuality, CNN.COM, Apr. 22, 2003, at 
www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/04/22/santorum.gays/ (quoting Interview by Associated Press with Sen. Rick 
Santorum, Apr. 21, 2003). The Court in Lawrence did not frame the right at issue as the right to engage in gay sex, 
see 123 S. Ct. at 2478, but the result, from Santorum’s perspective, was no doubt the same. 
  
7 Though Santorum is not alone in suggesting that polygamy could be the logical extension of the Court’s decision. 
See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult 
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in 
light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by 
today’s decision . . . .”); Jeffrey Rosen, How To Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2003, at 48 
(“Taken to its logical conclusion, Kennedy’s argument would seem to invalidate all moral restrictions on intimate 
associations that, it could be said, cause no harm to others—restrictions on polygamy, for example.”). 
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parade of horribles such as polygamy.8 Like Santorum, proponents of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA)9 in 1996 warned that same-sex marriage would lead to the legalization of incest,10 
bestiality,11 pedophilia,12 and polygamy.13 And rhetoric about polygamy featured prominently in 
the legal14 and popular15 debates surrounding the 1999 Vermont Supreme Court decision Baker 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. UNIV. 
L. REV. 439, 439 (2003) (noting conservatives’ frequent use of analogies to polygamy when discussing same-sex 
marriage); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW 280 (1999) (same). In the wake of Lawrence and the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusettes decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003), 
numerous opponents of same-sex marriage have also drawn the analogy. See, e.g., George F. Will, Culture and 
What Courts Can’t Do, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20243-
2003Nov28.html. 
9 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2001) (“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required 
to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”); id. § 1748C(3)(a)(7) (“In 
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, . . . the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”). 
10 E.g., William Bennett, Leave Marriage Alone, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1996, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 
274, 275 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) (“On what principled ground can Andrew Sullivan exclude others who most 
desperately want what he wants, legal recognition and social acceptance? Why on earth would Sullivan exclude 
from marriage a bisexual who wants to marry two other people? After all, exclusion would be a denial of that 
person’s sexuality. The same holds true of a father and daughter who want to marry. Or two sisters. Or men who 
want (consensual) polygamous arrangements.”); Hadley Arkes, The Closet Straight, NATIONAL REVIEW, July 5, 
1993, reprinted in part in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra, at 154, 157-58 (“But then, once the 
arrangement is opened simply to ‘consenting adults,’ on what ground would we object to the mature couplings of 
aunts and nephews, or even fathers and daughters—couplings that show a remarkable persistence in our own age, 
even against the barriers of law and sentiment that have been cast up over centuries?”). 
11 E.g., Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 22 
(1996), quoted in David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 58 n.25 (1997) 
(testimony of Gary Bauer, President of the Family Research Council) (claiming that legalizing same-sex marriage 
would mean there was no logical justification for prohibiting polygamy, nor would it be logically defensible to 
continue “the limitation of the [marital] relationship to human beings”); 142 Cong. Rec. H7443 (daily ed. July 11, 
1996) (testimony of Rep. Stephen Largent) (“What logical reason is there to keep us from stopping expansion of that 
definition to include . . . any other odd combination . . . ? [I]t does not even have to be limited to human beings, by 
the way. I mean it could be anything.”). 
12 E.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H7443 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (testimony of Rep. Stephen Largent) (“What logical reason 
is there to keep us from stopping expansion of that definition to include . . . an adult and a child, or any other odd 
combination . . . ?”); Arkes, supra note 10, at 157 (“If there is to be gay marriage, would it be confined then only to 
adults?”). 
13 E.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H7443 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (testimony of Rep. Stephen Largent) (“There really is no 
logical reason why we could not also include polygamy or any other definition to say, as long as these are 
consenting human beings . . . .”); Arkes, supra note 10, at 157-58 (“If there is to be gay marriage, . . . . [a]nd if men 
are inclined to a life of multiple partners, why should marriage be confined to two persons? . . . In traditional 
marriage, the understanding of monogamy was originally tied to the ‘natural teleology’ of the body—to the 
recognition that only two people, no more and no fewer, can generate children. To that understand of a union, or a 
‘marriage,’ the alliance of two men would offer such an implausible want of resemblance that it would appear 
almost as a mocking burlesque. . . . The mockery would be avoided if the notion of marriage could be opened, or 
broadened to accommodate the varieties of sexual experience. The most notable accommodation would be the 
acceptance of several partners . . . .”). 
  
14 E.g., Brief Amicus Curiae by Professors of Law and Jurisprudence at 17, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) 
(No. 98-032, 1009-97CNC) (“There is no argument for elevating homosexual marriage to a fundamental right that is 
not also an argument for affording polygamy fundamental right status, an outcome starkly at odds with Supreme 
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v. State16 and the 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision Goodridge v. Department 
of Public Health.17  
 In response, proponents of same-sex marriage have not said, “So what?”; they have not 
defended polygamy or the other marginal practices in their opponents’ parade of horribles. 
Instead they have chosen to distinguish same-sex marriage from multi-party marriage.18 As 
David Chambers noted about the DOMA debates, “Neither side favored polygamy, and neither 
had any incentive to examine with greater care the actual history or practice of polygamy.”19 In 
short, both sides in the debate over same-sex marriage seem to agree on one thing: Whatever 
happens with gay marriage, multi-party marriage should remain impossible.  
 This article aims to understand why, at a time of serious debate about the different-sex 
requirement of marriage (one man and one woman), eliminating the numerosity requirement (one 
man and one woman) is so widely agreed to be undesirable. The article situates this question 
within the larger puzzle of why mainstream culture seems to accept the numerosity requirement 
of marriage without question, even while so many people practice nonmonogamy either secretly 
(adultery) or serially (divorce and remarriage). 
 A constitutional challenge to anti-polygamy laws may well be foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court’s decisions upholding criminal and civil sanctions on Mormon polygamy;20 however, after 
                                                                                                                                                             
Court precedent.”); see Brief of Amicus Curiae Take It to the People, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 
98-032, 1009-97CNC), http://www.vtfreetomarry.org/tipamicus.htm, at *9-10; Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. Peter 
Brady et al., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 98-032, 1009-97CNC); Brief for Appellee at 73, Baker v. 
State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 98-032, 1009-97CNC). 
15 Responding to a question about polyamory, Beth Robinson, lawyer for the plaintiffs in Baker, said that she has 
spoken all over Vermont about the decision and that polygamy “comes out every time.” Same-Sex Marriage panel, 
Rebellious Lawyering conference, Yale Law School, Feb. 16, 2002. 
16 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
17 440 Mass. 309 (2003). 
18 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 280-81 (1999). 
19 Chambers, supra note 11, at 60. Andrew Sullivan denied any common political ground between homosexuals and 
polygamists, establishing a clear hierarchy between them: “Indeed, few in the same-sex marriage camp have 
anything but disdain for [the] idea [of polygamous marriage].” Andrew Sullivan, Three’s A Crowd, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 17, 1996, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note 10, at 279-80. Representative Barney 
Frank of Massachusetts declared: “[F]or those who pretend not to know the difference between a monogamous 
relationship between two human beings and polygamy, I must say that I think they debase [the] debate when they 
use that kind of analogy. Everyone knows the real difference.” 142 Cong. Rec. H7500 (daily ed. July 12, 1996), 
cited in Chambers, supra note 11, at 60; see id. at H7484. Representative Frank has since backed off of his claim 
about this “real difference.” Meeting with OutLaws: The Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Law Students 
Association, Yale Law School Faculty Lounge, in conjunction with Race, Values, and the American Legal Process 
(Conference Feb. 22-24, 2002), Feb. 23, 2002.  
  
20 See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (rejecting a First Amendment habeas challenge to convictions for 
polygamists’ attempt to register to vote and taking an oath that they were not polygamists); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 
U.S. 15 (1885) (rejecting various procedural challenges to the application of the Edmonds Act which, inter alia, 
denied polygamists the right to vote, even if they were only engaged in plural cohabitation); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1878) (affirming the criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy and 
rejecting the argument that Congress’s prohibition of polygamy violated the defendant’s rights under the Free 
Exercise Clause); see also Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir.) (rejecting a free-exercise and privacy-
rights challenge to a police officer’s termination for polygamy, on the grounds that Reynolds is still good law and 
that “protect[ing] the monogamous marriage relationship” is a compelling state interest); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (“To the extent Davis held that persons advocating a certain practice may be denied the right to 
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Lawrence, some have speculated that anti-polygamy laws are ripe for challenge.21 It is not my 
purpose here to assess the constitutional arguments. My purpose is instead to try to explain why 
people are so opposed to multi-party relationships that the mere idea that such relationships 
might be included in the institution of marriage threatens efforts on behalf of same-sex marriage.  
 Perhaps because of this country’s dramatic relationship to Mormon polygamy, when 
Americans hear the term “polygamy” or try to picture relationships of more than two, they 
typically think of traditional polygyny—one man in a hierarchical relationship to several wives.22 
But there is another model—called “polyamory” by its increasingly vocal practitioners—which 
in principle eschews hierarchy and which encompasses various models of intimate relationships 
of more than two people. 
The lack of serious public debate about the numerosity requirement of marriage is echoed 
in the scant law review literature on polyamory.23 Though some legal scholars mention the 
practice, the only sustained discussion of polyamorous relationships has portrayed polyamory 
negatively, focusing on one particular model.24 The other prominent use of the word 
“polyamory” in legal writing has been as a catch-all term for nearly any sexual or nonsexual 
relationship of three or more adults, including, for instance, the relationship between two lesbian 
parents and the gay male sperm donor for their child.25  
                                                                                                                                                             
vote, it is no longer good law. To the extent it held that the groups designated in the statute may be deprived of the 
right to vote because of their status, its ruling could not stand without surviving strict scrutiny, a most doubtful 
outcome. To the extent Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote, its holding is not 
implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable.” (citations omitted)); id. at 649-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “[t]o the extent, if any, that Davis permits the imposition of adverse consequences upon mere abstract advocacy 
of polygamy, it has, of course, been overruled by later cases. But the proposition that polygamy can be criminalized, 
and those engaging in that crime deprived of the vote, remains good law” (citation omitted)). But see, e.g., 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (predicting that under the reasoning of the 
majority opinion “in time Reynolds will be overturned”); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists out of the Closet: Statutory 
and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 737-57 (2001) (arguing that laws forbidding polygamous marriage are unconstitutional 
under the Free Exercise Clause because marriage is a fundamental right so religious polygamy is a hybrid situation 
requiring strict scrutiny under Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 
(1990), or because current antipolygamy statutes and state constitutional provisions were enacted out of antipathy to 
a particular religion and substantially burden a central tenet of that religion while furthering no compelling 
governmental interest, under Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)). 
21 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).* 
22 See infra text accompanying note 119. 
23 Cf. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the 
State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1711-12 (2003) (noting that, “strikingly, while many politicians bemoan the rise of 
alternative family structures, alternatives posed in the nineteenth century by individuals and communities committed 
to challenging marriage’s hegemony appear as extraordinary and radical today as they did in their own time. 
Deviations from the norm of monogamous marriage . . . remain as absent from the dominant contemporary 
landscape of intimate relations as they were in the late nineteenth century”) (footnotes omitted). 
24 See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 443 (footnotes omitted). 
  
25 See Martha M. Ertman, The ALI Principles’ Approach to Domestic Partnerships, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y, 
Spring/Summer 2001, at 107, 114-17 (discussing the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis 
and Recommendations (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000)) [hereinafter Ertman, The ALI Principles]; Martha M. Ertman, 
Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 85-98 (2001) 
[hereinafter Ertman, Private/Private Distinction]; see also infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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But the practice of polyamory as “ethical nonmonogamy”26 bears serious consideration at 
a moment when the terms and conditions of intimate relationships are such a focus of discussion. 
Polyamory is a lifestyle embraced by a minority of individuals, who exhibit a wide variety of 
relationship models and who articulate an ethical vision that I understand to encompass five main 
principles: self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and privileging love and 
sex over jealousy.27 Contrary to the common view of multi-party relationships as either 
oppressive or sexual free-for-alls, at least some set of individuals—polyamorists, or “polys” for 
short—seems to be practicing nonmonogamy as part of an ethical practice that shares some of its 
aspirations with more mainstream models of intimate relationships.  
 Nonetheless, as the same-sex marriage debate illustrates, most people in this country 
seem to think that sexual relationships among more than two people are beyond the political 
pale. This social hostility sustains various legal burdens on polyamorists, including two-person 
marriage and partnership laws, adultery and bigamy laws, residential zoning laws, and custody 
consequences.28 Before confronting these legal issues, each of which deserves sustained 
attention, we need to understand the practice of polyamory and the opposition to it. Thus, while 
this article addresses the legal issue of adultery laws in Part V, the primary task of the article is to 
lay the groundwork for an ongoing discussion of the relevant legal, ethical, and social issues by 
seriously considering polyamory and its opposition. 
 The societal resistance to the idea of polyamory may merely be an artifact of historical 
associations with patriarchal polygyny, which could be partially or completely ameliorated by 
contemporary accounts of egalitarian polyamorous relationships or of polygynous unions where 
the women feel they benefit from sharing their wifely duties with other women.29 Alternatively, 
resistance to the idea of polyamorous relationships may stem from other concerns, about 
practical inefficiency of such relationships, negative physical or psychological effects, or 
associations with other taboos such as incest or homosexuality. While any of these may 
contribute to mainstream responses to the idea of polyamory, as I discuss in Part IV, I posit that 
something else is fueling that response.  
I argue that a key reason for the opposition to polyamory is, somewhat paradoxically, the 
pervasive or potential failure of monogamy. This argument draws lessons from the theory and 
politics of homosexuality, which demonstrate that the “universalizing” possibilities of a 
particular minority practice may drive allies away, rather than creating the conditions for 
solidarity through common ground.30 Many people engage in nonmonogamous behavior; many 
more have nonmonogamous fantasy lives. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that it is the rare 
person whose sexual thoughts only ever involve his or her partner in monogamy. Paradoxically, 
this mainstream impulse to nonmonogamy helps to explain the position of multi-party 
relationships beyond the pale of the marriage debates. Rather than prompting outsiders to 
identify with polyamorists, the potential of nearly everyone to imagine him or herself engaging 
in nonmonogamous behavior leads outsiders to steel themselves against polyamory and to 
                                                 
26 See infra text accompanying note 124. 
27 See infra Section III.C. 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 417-422. 
29 See infra Section III.B. 
  
30 See infra Part IV. 
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eschew the idea of legitimizing such relationships through law. This I call the paradox of 
prevalence. 
A consideration of “poly” and “mono” identity, on a theoretical level, suggests that few 
people’s desires fall squarely into either camp. In theory at least, a completely poly disposition 
might be understood to involve not only desires for multiple sexual and domestic partners, but 
desires for one’s partner(s) to have multiple sexual and domestic partners. A person with this 
disposition would presumably be happier in nonmonogamous relationships, and perhaps happy 
only in nonmonogamous relationships. By contrast, a completely mono disposition might be 
understood to involve exclusive sexual and domestic desire for just one other person, as well as 
the desire for that person to have only oneself as a sexual and domestic partner. A person with 
this disposition would presumably be happier in—and perhaps happy only in—a monogamous 
relationship. Few people are likely to embody either disposition completely. Rather, most of us 
are probably a complex mix of desires, which results in our choosing, or ending up, living a poly 
or mono lifestyle. And it is my contention that many people simply end up promising 
monogamy, rather than actively choosing between monogamy and other possible relationship 
models, because of the many social and legal pressures towards monogamy.  
Norms strongly urge people toward monogamy, and law contributes to that pressure in 
the various ways listed above, namely criminal adultery laws, bigamy laws, marriage law, 
custody cases, legal workplace discrimination, and zoning laws. To the extent that at least some 
people may be happier in nonmonogamous arrangements, and others are not harmed by these 
arrangements, it would seem that laws should be changed to allow people to find their own path 
among monogamy and its alternatives. But the question of harms is complex and each legal 
realm affecting choices about monogamy raises unique questions and could warrant an article 
unto itself. This article does not aspire to answer all of these complex questions. Rather, the 
purpose of the article is to help promote and frame a discussion by better understanding the 
practice of polyamory and the response to it.  
In the interests of promoting discussion about monogamy and its alternatives, then, the 
article concludes with a thought experiment imagining how certain laws might themselves be 
used to promote discussion about some of these issues. Criminal adultery statutes are, in theory 
at least, a coercive enforcement of monogamy. Repealing these statutes might seem an obvious 
way—the natural starting point—to allow people to make their own choices about monogamy. 
Indeed, repeal may be the best possible result. But there is another possibility: Instead of 
allowing these laws to fall into desuetude, we might try to use them for an affirmative purpose. 
Specifically, instead of repealing these facially coercive laws, we might make them no longer 
coercive. In the language of contract law, we should consider making these immutable rules into 
default rules, that is, rules the parties can contract around. This thought experiment allows us to 
imagine the possibility of law affirmatively encouraging people to discuss their desires with 
regard to monogamy or nonmonogamy.  
  
In particular, using the idea of information-forcing default rules, I propose several model 
adultery statutes that might encourage partners to discuss and agree on relationship rules about 
sexual exclusivity, by criminalizing only nonconsensual adulterous sex. Ultimately, I conclude 
that the potential harms of using the criminal law in this manner probably outweigh the potential 
benefits. But in the process, the article considers how law might be used to encourage people to 
consider non-normative alternatives. By presenting an experiment in using law to prompt 
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dialogue in and around monogamy’s most prominent institution,31 the article aims to lay the 
groundwork for a broader cultural and legal discussion of the important, and largely neglected, 
subject of monogamy’s alternatives. 
This article is divided into six parts. Following this Introduction, Part II frames the article 
by contrasting the fantasy of monogamy with its reality, as both are expressed in the diverse 
realms of statistics, law, literature, and science. Part III offers a novel account of the 
contemporary practice and theory of polyamory by defining key terms, describing four accounts 
of polyamorous relationships, and outlining five principles that seem to me to capture the ethical 
vision espoused by many polys. Part IV discusses various reasons people may be concerned 
about multi-party relationships, then draws on the theory and politics of homosexuality to argue 
that mainstream resistance to the idea of polyamorous relationships is in part driven by the near 
universality of nonmonogamous impulses. Part V puts forward a model for thinking about two 
narrow classes of individuals who might dispositionally desire a mono or a poly lifestyle 
respectively, interrogates why those with mixed desire might variously choose monogamy or 
polyamory, and then proposes a series of information-forcing adultery statutes that might 
encourage individuals and partners to make more affirmative choices about what kind of 
relationships they want to conduct. In conclusion, Part VI returns to an issue raised earlier—the 
same-sex marriage debate—to suggest that we view this historical moment, when same-sex 
couples begin to enter the institution of marriage, as a unique opportunity to question the 
mandate of compulsory monogamy. 
* * * 
When writing about what she called “compulsory heterosexuality,” Adrienne Rich 
offered the following invocation to her readers: 
To take the step of questioning heterosexuality as a “preference” or “choice” for 
women—and to do the intellectual and emotional work that follows—will call for a 
special quality of courage in heterosexually identified feminists but I think the rewards 
will be great: a freeing-up of thinking, the exploring of new paths, the shattering of 
another great silence, new clarity in personal relationships.32  
                                                 
31 Even in theory, adultery laws of course affect situations involving married couples—only those who can marry 
and also choose to marry—and they primarily regulate only the dimension of exclusivity of sexual behavior. 
Monogamy’s law, by contrast, affects more than just the married, and it encompasses many strictures along multiple 
axes, for instance, against fewer than one partner (singleness) as well as more than one partner (polygamy). The 
focus in the thought experiment on a single swath of population, though self-conscious, is not intended to present 
marital nonmonogamy as the paradigmatic model. Rather, the decision to focus on adultery stems from the purpose 
of the experiment and the status of our laws and institutions. Marriage is the key institution of monogamy and 
adultery statutes cleanly target the transgression of monogamy that most prominently defines monogamy—and the 
transgression of which most exercises its adherents—the rule that couples not have sex with anyone outside the 
couple. The thought experiment therefore asks whether a change in the design of the legal rules aimed at enforcing 
this rule with one swath of the population in this prominent institution of monogamy could conceivably be retooled 
to prompt discussions between partners about whether to embrace, reject, or modify that rule in their own 
relationships. 
  
32 Rich, supra note 1, at 648. 
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Rich was criticized by some in the lesbian community for suggesting that those who were not 
actually lesbians, and who had no intention of living a sexually marginal lifestyle, could think in, 
and profit from, a lesbian perspective on heterosexuality.33 Despite the possibility of this sort of 
criticism, this article similarly invites the reader to question the idea of monogamy as a choice, 
indeed as the only viable choice for many, and to engage in the work of thinking critically about 
its margins. Recognizing that readers may come to this point with varied experiences and views 
on monogamy, the article joins Rich in proposing that one need not change one’s sexual 
preferences or practices in order to learn and profit from a careful consideration of alternatives.  
II. COMPULSORY MONOGAMY 
 For many, the fantasy of monogamy is different from its reality. In the normative fantasy, 
exclusive relationships of two people are the romantic ideal that we should and do strive for. At 
times, this ideal is realized, but at other times, for other individuals, desire and behavior betray 
that ideal. That people sometimes behave nonmonogamously is not a novel proposition, but the 
idea that love equals monogamy and jealousy equals love is so pervasive that it seems important 
to frame the overall analysis in the article with a brief and plain look at monogamy. This Part 
therefore uses statistical, legal, literary, and scientific sources to sketch the contemporary 
landscape of monogamy. 
A.  Monogamy’s Mandate 
 The institutions of monogamy loom large in this nation’s social landscape. According to 
the 2000 census, two-thirds of Americans over eighteen are married,34 and seventy-six percent of 
Americans over eighteen are or have been married.35 In addition, seventy percent of those who 
divorce will remarry,36 and over ninety percent of Americans say they want to marry.37 These 
numbers sketch the contours of our drive toward monogamy’s core institution.38 A vivid picture 
of our romance with monogamy, however, requires richer sources. This section will adumbrate 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Amy Goodloe, Lesbian Identity and the Politics of Butch-Femme Roles 1 (1993), 
http://www.lesbian.org/amy/essays/bf-paper.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003); Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for 
a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267 
(Carole S. Vance ed., 1992) (1984). 
34 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 47, tbl. 46 (2002) (reporting data from 
2000) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]; see David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All 
Sorts: A Status Other Than Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1347 (2001); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES 2000, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 2 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2001pubs/c2kbr01-8.pdf (reporting that 51.7% of households are “married-couple households”). 
35 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 34, at 47, tbl. 46. 
36 David L. Weis, Interpersonal Heterosexual Behaviors (United States), in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SEXOLOGY (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1997), http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sexology/ (citing E. Berscheid, Emotion, in 
CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 110 (H. H. Kelley et al. eds., 1983)).  
37 Patrician Donovan, The Decline of the Traditional Family, UB REPORTER, Feb. 4, 1999, available at 
www.buffalo.edu/reporter/vol30/vol30n19/n7.html (quoting sociologist Lynn Magdol).  
  
38 Of course not everyone participates in this cultural norm, as the rest of this article discusses, and there is some 
indication that certain subpopulations—mostly notably, gay men—may to some extent contain a counternorm 
towards open relationships. See, e.g., infra note 328 (citing two studies of gay male couples, more of which had 
agreed to sexually open rather than closed relationships). Commentators disagree as to whether the AIDS epidemic 
led to an increase in monogamous relationships among gay men.* 
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two prevailing discourses of monogamy: the western romance tradition and the scientific defense 
of monogamy.  
1. The Western Romance Tradition 
Psychoanalyst Adam Phillips articulates a perplexing aspect of love—the idea that in 
friendship the lack of jealousy is a virtue, even a prerequisite to true friendship, but in erotic love 
the presence of jealousy is a virtue, even an emblem of true love. Phillips writes: 
We may believe in sharing as a virtue—we may teach it to our children—but we don’t 
seem to believe in sharing what we value most, our sexual partners. But if you really 
loved someone, wouldn’t you want to give them the best thing you’ve got, your partner? 
It would be a relief not to be puzzled by this.39 
Phillips offers a provocative answer to his own question: “Perhaps this is what friendship is for, 
perhaps this is the difference between friends and lovers. Friends can share, lovers have to do 
something else. Lovers dare not be too virtuous.”40 In Phillips’ formulation, jealousy is a form of 
selfishness, a vice it might be brave and generous to overcome. But Phillips sees that his view is 
uncommon, that in reality lovers indulge jealousy, and he is puzzled by this. He hypothesizes 
that lovers act out of fear, implying that they fear loss through abandonment. Like Phillips, 
literary theorist Roland Barthes seems to valorize the rejection of jealousy: “‘When I love, I am 
very exclusive,’ Freud says (whom we shall take here for the paragon of normality). To be 
jealous is to conform. To reject jealousy (‘to be perfect’) is therefore to transgress a law.”41  
Phillips and Barthes identify key aspects of monogamy: first, that jealousy is treated as 
evidence of love, and, second, that jealousy may be understood to define romantic love. Phillips 
highlights how friends and lovers are distinguished by their approach to sharing: Friends may 
share themselves and each other among many; lovers must possess one another.42 This resonates 
with the romantic accounts of couples who were friends first and “discovered” their love only on 
realizing their jealousy of one another’s lovers.43 A key distinction between friends and lovers, 
                                                 
39 PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 15. Phillips’ language of giving is perplexing here; it seems to imply that the partner is a 
possession available for transfer. In the context of Phillips’ overall text, however, this gift metaphor is rare and thus 
seems to appear here to dramatize this particular question about generosity—as opposed to possessiveness—with 
regard to one’s beloved. 
40 Id.  
41 ROLAND BARTHES, Jealousy, in A LOVER’S DISCOURSE: FRAGMENTS 144, 145-46 (Richard Howard trans., 
Penguin Books 1990). Barthes’s epigraph for the Jealousy entry is as follows: “‘A sentiment which is born in love 
and which is produced by the fear that the loved person prefers someone else’ (Littré).” Id. at 144. 
42 See, e.g., Joan Iversen, Feminist Implications of Mormon Polygamy, 10 FEMINIST STUD. 505, 515 (1984) (quoting 
nineteenth-century critic of polygamy Fanny Stenhouse as saying that plural marriage must mean the loss of “true 
love” because “where there is no jealousy there is very little love” (citing MRS. T.B.H. STENHOUSE, EXPOSÉ OF 
POLYGAMY IN UTAH: A LADY’S LIFE AMONG THE MORMONS 75, 123 (2d ed. 1872); MRS. T.B.H. STENHOUSE, TELL 
IT ALL: THE TYRANNY OF MORMONISM, OR, AN ENGLISHWOMAN IN UTAH 213 (repr. 1971))); Kenneth L. Karst, The 
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 629 & n.26 (1980) (noting that “friendship does not involve the 
degree of exclusivity that is present in other kinds of linkage between intimates”). 
  
43 See, e.g., JANE AUSTEN, EMMA III.ix (James Kinsley ed., Oxford World’s Classics 2003) (“Emma's eyes were 
instantly withdrawn; and she sat silently meditating, in a fixed attitude, for a few minutes. A few minutes were 
sufficient for making her acquainted with her own heart. . . . She touched—she admitted—she acknowledged the 
whole truth. Why was it so much worse that Harriet should be in love with Mr. Knightley, than with Frank 
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then, lies in the possessive aspect of romantic love, in the presumption that romantic love is 
possessive but platonic love is not. The operation of jealousy between partners may be 
understood as a related tenet of monogamy’s law: that one partner’s jealousy trumps the other 
partner’s desire for extra-couple sexual experience. 
Of course nonsexual relationships do involve jealousy sometimes. And people, especially 
children, sometimes speak of having one “best friend.” The difference between friendship and 
romantic relationships lies in the normative response to the two forms of jealousy. Jealousy of a 
friend’s other friends is generally considered a problem for the one who is jealous, who should 
thus overcome the jealousy. By contrast, jealousy of a lover’s other lovers is generally 
considered a problem for the one who inspires the jealousy, who should overcome the impulse to 
be unfaithful to the lover. Our toleration of sexual jealousy may be seen vividly in the criminal 
law of homicide: For centuries, sexual jealousy over adultery has been treated as adequate 
provocation to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter; indeed rage over adultery is viewed 
by many courts and commentators as the paradigmatic case of adequate provocation.44 As noted 
above, Phillips is puzzled by the divergence between friendship and romantic love along the axis 
of sexual possession.45 But Barthes displays none of Phillips’s wonder at the normality of 
jealousy. Drawing on Freud, Barthes states the situation simply: Monogamy is the law.46 
 This cultural law is reflected in a range of other actual legal contexts. The most obvious 
forms of monogamy’s law today are proscriptions—against promiscuity,47 against adultery,48 
                                                                                                                                                             
Churchill? . . . . It darted through her, with the speed of an arrow, that Mr. Knightley must marry no one but 
herself!); id. at 432 (“[Mr. Knightley] had been in love with Emma, and jealous of Frank Churchill, from about the 
same period, one sentiment having probably enlightened him as to the other.”); WHEN HARRY MET SALLY 
(MGM/UA Studios 1989). 
44 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 269, 346 (1996); Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 72 (1992). 
45 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
46 See supra text accompanying note 41. Adrienne Rich refers to the “[e]arly female indoctrinations in ‘love’ as an 
emotion” in western culture and the “[t]he ideology of heterosexual romance, beamed at [the young girl] from 
childhood out of fairy tales, television, films, advertising, popular songs, wedding pageantry.” Rich, supra note 1, at 
645. 
47 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 302 (1992) (discussing pejoratively promiscuity in homosexual 
men and noting American disapproval of promiscuity); Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Mentally 
Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 122, 160-61 (1993) (discussing the role of disapproval of sexual 
promiscuity in successful petitions for forced sterilization of women). At least eleven states and the District of 
Columbia penalize fornication. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1602 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (2003); ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ch. 720, § 5/11-8 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (2003); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-08 (2003); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (2003). These 
laws are occasionally enforced in certain contexts, see, e.g., Juhi Mehta, Note, Prosecuting Teenage Parents Under 
Fornication Statutes: A Constitutionally Suspect Legal Solution to the Problem of Teen Pregnancy, 5 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 121 (1998), and some believe their presence on the books sends an important message of disapproval, 
see, e.g., Traci Shallbetter Stratton, Note, No More Messing Around: Substantive Due Process Challenges to State 
Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 797 (1998) (“Keeping fornication statutes on the books and 
informing the public of their existence might not prevent fornication, but it will send a much needed message of 
social disapproval, driving this immoral conduct underground.”).  
  
48 See, e.g., infra note 110 and accompanying text. At least twenty-three states and the District of Columbia still 
have laws criminalizing adultery in some form. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1408 
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against bigamy,49 and against singlehood50—against deviations from what we might call “simple 
monogamy,” the idea of one partner at a time. The significance of this idea is reflected in 
countless contexts, for example, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Potter v. Murray City,51 
upholding the termination of a police officer for bigamy: “Monogamy is inextricably woven into 
the fabric of our society. It is the bedrock upon which our culture is built.”52 And there are signs 
that the marital requirement of sexual exclusivity is becoming ever more visible in the push 
toward same-sex marriage. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,53 holding that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (2000); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2002); IDAHO CODE 18-6601 (2003); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7(a) (2002); KEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-3507(1) (2002); MD. CODE ANN. § 10-501 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (2000); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 750.30 (1991); MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 645:3 (2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2.55.17 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-20-09 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 871 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-
60 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103(1) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE § 61-
8-3 (2003). On November 25, 2003, the District passed a bill, the Elimination of Outdated Crimes Amendment Act, 
which will lead to the automatic repeal of its adultery law if no further action is taken in the subsequent thirty days. 
See John F. Kelly, Virginia Adultery Case roils Divorce Industry: Conviction Draws Attention to Little Used Law, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23789-2003Nov30.html. Although 
prosecutions for adultery are rare, see, e.g., Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the 
Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L., 1991/92, at nn. 5, 54-57; but cf. Kelly, supra, they are vigorously pursued in specialized 
contexts such as the military, see James M. Winner, Comment, Beds With Sheets But No Covers: The Right to 
Privacy and the Military's Regulation of Adultery, 31 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1073, 1073-74 (1998); Melissa Ash 
Haggard, Note, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and State Law and the Controversy This Causes Under 
Our Constitution and Criminal Justice System, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 469, 469-70, 476-77 (1998).  
49 Forty-four states have statutes criminalizing bigamy. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-1 (2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-3606 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-201 (Michie 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 281 (West 2001); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-201 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-190 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 1001 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 826.01 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-20 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 18-
1101 (Michie 2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-12 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-2 (West 2001); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.1 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3601 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.010 
(Banks-Baldwin 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:76 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A, § 551 (West 
2001); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. § 10-502 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.5 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.355 (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-13 (2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.010 (West 2000); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 45-5-611 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-701 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 201.160 (Michie 2001); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:1 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-1 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-1 
(Michie 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-183 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2919.01 (West 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 881 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.515 (1999); 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4301 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-1 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-10 (Law Co-
op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-15 (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-301 (2000); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-7-101 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 206 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.010 (West 2001); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-1 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.05 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-401 
(Michie 2001); see also Ryan D. Tenney, Tom Green, Common-Law Marriage, and the Illegality of Putative 
Polygamy, 17 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 141, 155 (2002) (categorizing state bigamy statutes). 
50 See, e.g., Dubler, supra note 23; Shari Motro, Single and Paying for It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004; Arthur B. 
Shostak, Singlehood, in HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 355, 355-56, 366 (Marvin B. Sussman & 
Suzanne K. Steinmetz eds., 1987).  
51 760 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1985). A lawsuit was recently filed challenging under Lawrence the validity of Utah 
statutes criminalizing bigamy and other extramarital sex. Bronson v. Swensen, No. 02:04-CV-0021 (D. Utah 2004); 
see also Leonard Post, Shades of “Lawrence”: Scalia’s Dissent in Texas Sodomy Case is Echoed in a Utah Action, 
NAT’L LAW J., Jan. 30, 2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1075219833754. 
52 Id. at 1070. 
  
53 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003). 
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prohibition on same-sex civil marriage violates the state constitution,54 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts expressly emphasized this aspect of the protected relationships. The 
opinion uses the word “exclusive” in some form six times,55 for instance in celebrating, in its 
second sentence, “[t]he exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other.”56 This captures 
the essence of simple monogamy. 
 Condemnation of divorce—both historical and extant57—points us towards another, 
stricter model of monogamy: the fantasy of “supermonogamy.” Supermonogamy is the idea of 
one right person ever. Though it pervades popular and high culture,58 and hints of it may also be 
found in the Goodridge opinion,59 the idea of supermonogamy is perhaps most vividly portrayed 
in a classical story, Aristophanes’s tale of originary beings from Plato’s Symposium.60 “[I]n the 
beginning,” Plato writes in Aristophanes’s speech, “[t]here were three kinds of human beings . . . 
male and female [and] a third, a combination of the two.”61 These beings were “completely 
round, with . . . four hands each, as many legs as hands, and two faces, exactly alike, on a 
rounded neck. There were two sets of sexual organs . . . .”62 Offended by the ambitions of these 
beings, the gods split them in two, to diminish their strength. The result was pitiable. The beings 
ran around looking for their other halves, which they clung to, “wanting to grow together” 
again.63 “In that condition they would die from hunger and general idleness, because they would 
not do anything apart from each other,”64 so Zeus took pity on them and moved their genitals 
                                                 
54 The court just rejected the possible solution of civil marriages. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, supra 
note 3.* 
55 Id. at 312, 313, 329, 332, 337, 343. 
56 Id. at 312. 
57 See, e.g., Herman Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and 
Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2081-83 (2000). 
58 See, e.g., ANNE BRADSTREET, To My Dear and Loving Husband, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ANNE 
BRADSTREET 180 (Joseph R. McElrath, Jr. & Allan P. Robb eds., Twayne 1981) (1678) (“If ever two were one, then 
surely we. / If ever man were lov’d by wife, then thee. / . . . Then while we live, in love let’s so persever. / That 
when we live no more, we may live ever.”); LINDA PERLSTEIN, NOT MUCH JUST CHILLIN’ 247 (2003) (quoting a 
seventh-grade Maryland girl as saying in an interview, “The one for you could be two years old right now, or ninety. 
My soulmate could have been Benjamin Franklin”); The Platters, Only You (“Only you and you alone / can thrill me 
like you do / and fill my heart with love for only you. / Only you can make this change in me, / for it’s true, you are 
my destiny. / . . . You’re my dream come true, / my one and only you.”); Lionel Ritchie, Endless Love (“My love, 
there’s only you in my life, / The only thing that’s right. / . . . Oh yes, you will always be, my endless love. / Two 
hearts, two hearts that beat as one. / Our lives have just begun. / Forever, I’ll hold you close in my arms, / I can’t 
resist your charm.”); Anonymous Spammer, Read Each One Carefully and Think About It a Second or Two 
(“Maybe God wants us to meet a few wrong people before meeting the right one, so that when we finally meet the 
person, we will know how to be grateful.”); cf. JANICE A. RADWAY, READING THE ROMANCE (repr. 1991) (reporting 
evidence that the most striking characteristic of female romance readers’ favorite novels is their “resolute focus on a 
single, developing relationship between heroine and hero” (122); RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW 
SCHOOL: FRAGMENTS IN LESBIAN LEGAL THEORY 115 (1998) (noting that “lesbian relationships are deemed subject 
to the same aspirations and expectations as the heterosexual romantic tradition that posits ‘true love’ and defined it 
as ‘forever’ and ‘only’”). 
59 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 332 (“[I]t is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one 
another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil marriage.” (emphasis added)). 
60 PLATO, SYMPOSIUM 25-31 (Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff trans., 1989). 
61 Id. at 25. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 27. 
  
64 Id. 
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around to the front. This allowed them sexual satisfaction which in turn allowed them to “stop 
embracing, return to their jobs, and look after their other needs in life.”65  
Plato first digests this originary myth in a quiet, conclusory tone, observing, “This, then, 
is the source of our desire to love each other. Love is born into every human being; it calls back 
the halves of our original nature together; it tries to make one out of two and heal the wound of 
human nature.”66 He continues, “[e]ach of us, then, is a ‘matching half’ of a human whole.”67 
Plato matter-of-factly offers this story as the origin of three types of beings, which to a modern 
eye look like gay men, lesbians, and heterosexuals, in terms of the sex of their desired object.68  
As Plato proceeds again and again to describe the emotional legacy of this prelapsarian 
state, the romantic intensity of his writing increases. “And so,” he writes, “when a person meets 
the half that is his very own, whatever his orientation, whether it’s to young men or not, then 
something wonderful happens: the two are struck from their senses by love, by a sense of 
belonging to one another, and by desire, and they don’t want to be separated from one another, 
not even for a moment.”69 The climax of the narratives is a fantasy of complete physical reunion, 
a powerful metaphor for supermonogamous romantic love, which merits lengthy quotation: 
 
It’s obvious that the soul of every lover longs for something else [beyond sex], his 
soul cannot say what it is, but like an oracle it has a sense of what it wants, and like an 
oracle it hides behind a riddle. Suppose two lovers are lying together and Hephaestus70 
stands over them with mending tools, asking, “What is it you human beings really want 
from each other?” And suppose they’re perplexed, and he asks them again: “Is this your 
heart’s desire, then—for the two of you to become parts of the same whole, as near as can 
be, and never to separate, day or night? Because if that’s your desire, I’d like to weld you 
together and join you into something that is naturally whole, so that the two of you are 
made into one. Then the two of you would share one life, as long as you lived, because 
you would be one being, and by the same token, when you died, you would be one and 
not two in Hades, having died a single death. Look at your love, and see if this is what 
you desire: wouldn’t this be all the good fortune you could want?” 
Surely you can see that no one who received such an offer would turn it down; no one 
would find anything else that he wanted. Instead, everyone would think he’d found out at 
last what he had always wanted: to come together and melt together with the one he 
loves, so that one person emerged from two.71 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 The story is of course much more complicated for a number of reasons. First, it is deeply questionable whether 
one says anything meaningful at all by applying these terms of sexual orientation to periods before their coining. 
Second, the particular complexities of Greek sexual desire and practices have been the subject of much dispute and 
commentary, and this passage from Plato has received particular attention for its ambiguity. See, e.g., David M. 
Halperin, The First Homosexuality?, in THE SLEEP OF REASON: EROTIC EXPERIENCE AND SEXUAL ETHICS IN 
ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 248-52 (Martha Craven Nussbaum & Juha Sihvola eds., 2002). My purpose here is 
only to point up the salience of this story to the modern audience, such as the courtroom in Romer.  
69 Id. at 28. 
70 In Greek mythology, the “craftsman god.” Id. at 28 n.27. 
  
71 Id. at 28-29.  
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Plato concludes with the question his story answers: “Why should this be so? It’s 
because, as I said, we used to be complete wholes in our original nature, and now ‘Love’ 
is the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire to be complete.”72  
 It should therefore not surprise us that this story—which evades the possibility of 
polyamory (and of bisexuality)—would be the strategic choice of Martha Nussbaum for her 
testimony before the trial court in Romer v. Evans.73 Plato’s tale colorfully captures the potent 
fantasy of absolute monogamy, of supermonogamy, the vision of a unique and permanent bond 
between two individuals. 
2. Stories from Biological Anthropology 
 Biological anthropologists, evolutionary psychologists, and other scientists of human and 
non-human animal behavior have offered various deterministic explanations for “human 
monogamy.” The basic story follows the selfish gene into unexpected territory. Darwinian and 
other adaptive explanations of animal behavior might seem to argue against monogamy: That is, 
wouldn’t adaptive creatures seek to reproduce as much and as widely as possible, giving their 
gene pool the best chance of survival? This view has its adherents,74 but various evolutionary 
scientists also offer explanations for why humans may pair up in order to promote the survival of 
their individual gene pools.75 These types of explanations of human behavior have of course 
been much criticized; they are of interest here primarily as examples of the kinds of stories we 
tell in support of monogamy. 
The basic story of adaptive monogamy is quality over quantity. Due to the relatively 
lengthy human gestation period and childhood,76 the story goes, women want the support and 
                                                 
72 Id. at 29. 
73 Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to Modern 
Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1517-18 (1994). Nussbaum writes: 
On October 15, 1993, I found myself on the witness stand in a courtroom in Denver, Colorado, telling 
Colorado District Judge H. Jeffrey Bayless about Plato’s Symposium. Because I had a very short time to 
testify as an expert witness, I focused above all on the speech of Aristophanes, which I had elsewhere argued 
to be one of the speeches in which Plato expresses views that he wishes his reader to take especially seriously. 
I told the court the story of how human beings were once round and whole—but now, cut in half for their 
overambitiousness, they feel a sense of lost wholeness and run about searching for their “other half.” There 
are, Aristophanes tells us, three types of search, corresponding to three original species of human beings. 
There are males whose other half is male, females whose other half is female, and people whose other half is 
of the opposite sex. The speech describes the feelings of intimacy and joy with which the lost other halves 
greet one another, and describes the activity of sexual intercourse as a joyful attempt to be restored to the lost 
unity of their original natures. This is so no less for the same-sex than for the opposite-sex couples: in all 
cases, lovemaking expresses a deep inner need coming from nature, and in all cases the couples, so uniting, 
have the potential to make a valuable civic contribution. 
Id. 
74 For a review of the scientific accounts of men as inclined to spread their seed as far and wide as possible, see 
Katharine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 807-13 (2000).  
75 See, e.g., SARAH HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MOTHERS, INFANTS, AND NATURAL 
SELECTION (1999); DESMOND MORRIS, THE NAKED APE: A ZOOLOGIST’S STUDY OF THE HUMAN ANIMAL (1967); 
MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE (1993); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE 
MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (Vintage Books 1995) (1994).  
  
76 These features of humans are said to allow the development of “better brains,” which are necessary to their 
survival through hunting. MORRIS, supra note 75, at 63. 
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protection of men during this vulnerable period.77 In addition, being paired with one provider is 
the best way for females to ensure the health, safety, and development of their offspring.78 Thus, 
the idea is that it was advantageous for females “to develop a pairing tendency.”79 The male 
interest in monogamy is less clear, but a number of explanations have been offered.80  
These explanations of male monogamy fall into three types. The first type focuses on the 
males’ relations with each other, interpreting monogamy’s equal distribution of the sexual 
resources (i.e., women) as advantageous to cooperative hunting behavior among males,81 or as 
the result of democratic progress by the less wealthy men who have a harder time obtaining a 
wife under a polygamous system.82 The second type of explanation yokes the males’ interests 
directly to the offspring, whom the males may want to protect or nourish in order to increase 
their chance of survival.83  
The third type of explanation focuses on male-female relations. Here, the males may stay 
close to home to make sure no other male is impregnating the female, and thereby diverting her 
resources or those of the primary male.84 Or, the males may be understood to develop pairing 
tendencies to be more sexually successful with the females who presumptively prefer males who 
will pair.85 This account presents sociobiological explanations of human love and jealousy.86 
                                                 
77 MORRIS, supra note 75, at 63. 
78 “Children with two parents may have had an educational edge over children with only one.” WRIGHT, supra note 
75, at 59. 
79 MORRIS, supra note 75, at 64. 
80 Certainly, the different versions of these stories have also been challenged. For example, Robert Wright roundly 
criticizes Desmond Morris’s versions of the pairbonding thesis, in order to make room for his own thesis about 
political compromises among men leading to monogamy. See WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 55. The internal battles 
over the most successful story are not central to my point, which is that the scientific study of human behavior has 
produced a wide array of explanations and justifications for human monogamy. 
81 MORRIS, supra note 75, at 64 (“Also, if the weaker males were going to be expected to co-operate on the hunt, 
they had to be given more sexual rights. The females would have to be shared out, the sexual organization more 
democratic, less tyrannical.”); id. (asserting that, to facilitate this sharing of the women, “[e]ach male . . . would 
need a strong pairing tendency”). 
82 RIDLEY, supra note 75, at 199 (“Once monogamous men had a chance to vote against polygamists (and who does 
not want to tear down the competitor, however much he might also like to emulate him?), their fate was sealed.”); 
WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 98 (“[T]he most fortunate men still get the most desirable women, but they have to limit 
themselves to one apiece.”). For an example of this type of reasoning reflected in an economist’s predictions, see 
Christopher Westley, Matrimony and Microeconomics: A Critique of Gary Becker’s Analysis of Marriage, 1 J. 
MARKETS & MORALITY, Spring 1998, at 67, 72 (arguing that men might resort to violence in the face of shortages of 
women and a consequent dowry system under legalized polygyny). 
83 RIDLEY, supra note 75, at 206 (explaining that male gibbons tend to be monogamous to prevent infanticide by 
other males, so human males may do the same (citing ROBIN I.M. DUNBAR, PRIMATE SOCIAL SYSTEMS (1988))). 
84 See RIDLEY, supra note 75, at 204 (drawing on the behavior of non-human animals to explain male protection of 
the home base as a way to monitor the females and prevent them from engaging in sexual relations with other 
males). Even on its own terms, of course, something does not quite make sense in this story: In order to assure their 
paternity, men would not need to be monogamous themselves, they would merely need to ensure that the women 
they impregnated behaved monogamously. They would actually need to ensure only that the women they 
impregnated had sex only with them during the relevant time period.  
  
85 WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 63 (observing that, in light of the possibility of male duplicity, “a woman’s genes 
would be well served by her early and careful scrutiny of a man’s likely devotion”). The females develop finely 
honed skills for detecting the tendency to fidelity, thus causing the males to become more faithful, and so on. Of 
course, this may also lead the males to develop better techniques for deception. WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 63. At 
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Alternatively, males pair up because monogamy creates domestic bliss that is beneficial to 
offspring. Sarah Hrdy writes, “Monogamy reduces inherent conflicts of interest between the 
sexes. Her reproductive success becomes his, and vice versa, promoting harmonious relations 
between genetically distinct individuals striving towards a common goal.”87 In sum, “[W]hen it 
works, children benefit.”88 Hrdy is clearly pleased to offer this explanation, because, she 
observes, “Sociobiology is not a field known for its encouraging views for either sex.”89 But, in 
this case, sanguine stories abound. For “over evolutionary time, lifelong monogamy turns out to 
be the cure for all sorts of detrimental devices that one sex uses to exploit the other.”90  
Because there are compelling counter-narratives about nonmonogamy that could be and 
are told from an adaptive perspective,91 the accounts outlined here are particularly interesting for 
their dogged pursuit of an “encouraging”—which is to say, monogamous—explanation of human 
sexual behavior. One can almost hear the sighs of relief emitted by evolutionary theorists when 
they can conclude that humans are basically monogamous,92 and even better yet, when they can 
supply explanations of why this trait is part of human evolutionary “success.” Thus, Matt Ridley 
observes, “The nature of the human male, then, is to take opportunities, if they are granted him, 
for polygamous mating, and to use wealth, power and violence as means to sexual ends in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
this point, the monogamy story begins to unravel, and stories are told about the potential adaptiveness of human 
duplicitousness in sexual behavior.  
86 On the love side, “natural selection appears to have taken this cost-benefit calculus [of children benefiting from 
two parents well bonded] and transmuted it into feeling—in particular, the sensation of love.” WRIGHT, supra note 
75, at 59; see also MORRIS, supra note 75, at 64 (“The naked ape had to develop the capacity for falling in love, for 
becoming sexually imprinted on a single partner, for evolving a pair-bond.”). (This is an example of Wright and 
Morris reaching similar conclusions about love and pair bonding, despite the different paths their arguments take.) 
On the jealousy side, each sex has the interests portrayed above in gaining the exclusive attentions of another. 
Sociobiologists have traditionally understood jealousy as gendered. For example, drawing on the evolutionary 
account of monogamy as the result of female desire for stability and male desire for sexual access, Martin Daly and 
Margo Wilson hypothesized that male and female jealousy would differ: Males would fear sexual infidelity and 
females would fear emotional infidelity. In their study of male versus female responses to imagined sexual and 
emotional infidelity, Daly and Wilson found the answer they expected: Males exhibited increased physiological 
responses to the idea of sexual infidelity whereas women responded relatively more intensely to the idea of 
emotional infidelity. See WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 66-67 (citing Martin Daly, Margo Wilson & S.J. Weghorst, 
Male Sexual Jealousy, 3 ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 11 (1982)). Subsequent research has challenged this thesis, 
offering alternative explanations such as greater male excitement in response to sexual imaginings, relative to 
emotional imaginings, regardless of the infidelity component of the fantasy, see Christine R. Harris, 
Psychophysiological Responses to Imagined Infidelity: The Specific Innate Modular View of Jealousy Reconsidered, 
78 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1082 (2000), and differential excitement according to the subject’s 
beliefs about the likely coincidence of sexual and emotional infidelity, see, e.g., David A. DeStefano & Peter 
Salovey, Evolutionary Origins of Sex Differences in Jealousy?: Questioning the “Fitness” of the Model, in 
EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: ESSENTIAL READINGS 150 (W. Gerrod Parrott ed., 2001). Regardless of the 
outcome for sex differences, the selfish gene story offers a view of jealousy as hardwired and adaptive. Even if 
jealousy “has outlived its [genetic] logic” in the day of contraception, this story supports the conclusion that “the 
basic impulse toward jealousy is very hard to erase.” WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 67. 




91 See supra note 74.  
  
92 RIDLEY, supra note 75, at 204 (“Even in the polygamous societies of pastoralists, the great majority of marriages 
are monogamous ones.”) (citing G.P. Murdock & D.R. White, Standard Cross-Cultural Sample, 8 ETHNOLOGY 329-
69). 
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competition with other men—though not usually at the expense of sacrificing a secure 
monogamous relationship.”93 Fortunately, it seems, the male interests in keeping the 
monogamous relationship secure—though less obvious than the female interests—outweigh his 
polygamous drive. And this is part of what makes humans special: “Even in the most despotic 
and polygamous moment of human history, mankind was faithful to the institution of 
monogamous marriage, quite unlike any other polygamous animal.”94 
B.  Monogamy’s Reality 
This foray into the romantic and scientific story of monogamy leads us back to the data. 
The numbers on actual relationship behavior illustrate the gap between theory and practice. 
1. The Failures of Supermonogamy  
The frequent failure of supermonogamy—the idea of one partner ever—is reflected in our 
high divorce rates. Rates of divorce in the United States have increased dramatically during the 
twentieth century,95 and studies indicate that forty percent of Americans get divorced96 and that 
seventy percent of those who divorce remarry.97 Various commentators have argued that serial 
monogamy may be seen as a form of polygamy,98 but whether rightly called “polygamy,” serial 
monogamy certainly belies the fantasy of one man and one woman forever bound in blissful 
supermonogamy. 
2. The Failures of Simple Monogamy 
First, in light of the above discussion, it is worth noting that serial monogamy may lead to 
a kind of simultaneous parental nonmonogamy from the perspective of children. That is, parental 
recombinations over time may lead to plural parents in the form of blended families. A child may 
                                                 
93 RIDLEY, supra note 75, at 198. 
94 Id. at 200. Ridley is also very defensive about people reading him to endorse adultery:  
By describing adultery as a force that shaped our mating system, I am not “justifying” it. Nothing is more 
“natural” than that people should have evolved the tendency to object to being cuckolded or cheated on, so if 
my analysis were to be interpreted as justifying adultery, it would be even more obviously interpreted as 
justifying the social and legal mechanisms for discouraging adultery. What I am claiming is that adultery and 
its disapproval are both “natural.”  
Id. at 211. 
95 David L. Weis, Interpersonal Heterosexual Behaviors (United States), in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SEXOLOGY (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 1997), http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sexology/ (citing E. Berscheid, Emotion, in 
CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 110 (H. H. Kelley et al. eds., 1983)). Weis reports that the rate of divorce has leveled since 
1980. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: MARITAL 
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS (1985)); P.C. Glick, Marriage, Divorce, and Living Arrangements: 
Prospective Changes, 5 J. FAM. ISSUES 7 (1984); A.J. Norton & J. E. Moorman, Current Trends in Marriage and 
Divorce Among American Women, 49 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 3 (1987); A.B. Shostak, Singlehood, in 
HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 355 (M.B. Sussman & S.K. Steinmetz. eds., 1987). 
96 Weis, supra note 95. (citing Glick, supra note 95; Norton & Moorman, supra note 95). 
97 Id. 
  
98 See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1142 (D. Utah 1984) (noting that the plaintiff fired from his 
job as a police officer for practicing polygamy had sought the admission during discovery that “the high rate of 
divorce in the United States has often turned today's American familial relationships into a form of serial 
polygamy”), 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir.) (affirming district court’s rejection of plaintiff’s Free Exercise and privacy-
based challenge to his termination); MAILLU, supra note 258, at 29. 
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have a mother, a stepfather, a father, and a stepmother. So while the parents are creating 
horizontal relationships of only two at a time, the children may be acquiring horizontal parenting 
structures of more than two. Certainly in some cases serial monogamy leads to rejection by one 
parent of the entire family, including the children,99 but in other cases serial monogamy is 
cumulative relationship-building, at least from the children’s perspective. Moreover, many 
couples must remain in constant contact even after divorce because of their mutual commitment 
to their children.100 The prevalence of divorce and remarriage101 creates this sort of structural and 
psychological deviation from the fantasy of the traditional monogamous marriage.102 
Second, and more importantly here, adultery occurs often enough to undermine even the 
idea of simple, serial monogamy—the idea that people have one sexual partner at a time.103 
“Researchers [of adultery in America] have reported lifetime prevalence rates from as low as 20 
percent (Johnson 1970) to nearly 75 percent (Hite 1981).”104 The most comprehensive study of 
American sexual behavior to date offers figures on the low end of that scale. The National Health 
and Social Life Survey, released in 1994, claims that approximately twenty percent of married 
women and thirty-five percent of married men have had adulterous sex,105 and there is reason to 
think that levels of adultery among those studied are even higher.106 The American data on 
adultery are consistent with those of other major western nations. Dr. Judith Mackay, Senior 
Policy Advisor for the World Health Organization, reports that “40% of sexually active 16-45 
year old Germans admit to having been sexually unfaithful, compared with 50% of Americans, 
42% of British, 40% of Mexicans, 36% of the French, and 22% of the Spanish.”107 And these are 
just the subjects who admit it. 
Not just a private dalliance, adultery is a regular player on the public stage. From 
presidents and politicians to actors and artists, those in the public eye dramatize the prevalence of 
                                                 
99 Judith Stelboum posits that “[s]erial monogamy, facilitating the rejection of one person for the other, has resulted 
in the abandoning of children.” Stelboum, supra note 256, at 44. 
100 E.g., Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance To Call It Property, 17 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 109, 131 (1996) (“The approximately sixty percent of divorcing couples who are parents of 
minor children cannot simply walk away from each other and begin their lives anew. Their parental relationship 
necessitates, or at least contemplates, an on-going relationship between them.”); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, 
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. n.147 (forthcoming Jan. 2004). 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
102 As do alternative parenting relationships of more than two, such as two lesbian mothers and a male biological 
father who is involved in the child’s life, an example discussed by Martha Ertman. See Ertman, Private/Private 
Distinction, supra note 25, at 124-25; infra note 132.   
103 See, e.g., Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics: Regulations Banning Sex 
Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J., Spring 2000, at 1, 20; Martin J. 
Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L., 1991/92, at nn. 68-73.  
104 Weis, supra note 95. 
105 Id. 
106 The reliability of the National Health and Social Life Survey has been called into question, particularly with 
regard to its data on counter-normative behaviors, because some of the subjects were interviewed in the presence of 
another person such as a family member. Weis, supra note 95 (citing I.L. Reiss, Is This the Definitive Sexual 
Survey?, Review of E.O. LAUMANN, J.H. GAGNON, R.T. MICHAEL & S. MICHAELS, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF 
SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 32 J. SEX RES. 77 (1995)). 
  
107 Judith Mackay, Global Sex: Sexuality and Sexual Practices Around the World, Fifth Congress of the European 
Federation of Sexology, Berlin, 29 June-2 July 2000, at http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sexology/. 
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nonmonogamy.108 And where public figures succeed at monogamy, they may admit that this has 
not been their unswaying desire: President Jimmy Carter, who managed to avoid the notorious 
adultery recently associated with Bill Clinton, famously admitted to lusting “in his heart.”109 
Such an admission seems surprising in light of the widespread “normative consensus” among 
Americans about this form of extramarital sex: “[A] series of national surveys indicate that 
[adultery] has been consistently disapproved by 75-85 percent of the adult American 
population.”110 But considered more closely, Carter’s admission speaks directly to the quandary 
of compulsory monogamy: The desire for nonmonogamy is so widespread, and the pressure to 
resist that desire so great, that for a politician to acknowledge it is for him to identify with 
Everyman (and likely Everywoman), and, at the same time, the politician’s resistance to 
nonmonogamous desire is the fulfillment of the fantasy that everyone must feel obliged to strive 
for, in spite of that fantasy’s frequent disappointment. 
* * * 
This Part of the article has outlined the norm of monogamy from two perspectives: the 
ideals of simple monogamy, one partner at a time, and of supermonogamy, one partner ever. The 
discussion has highlighted, through statistics and vivid examples, the contours of these desires, 
and also the frequent gap between their ideal and their reality. The purpose of this Part has not 
been to portray monogamy generally as a failure; though common, monogamy’s failures are far 
from universal. The purpose has also not been to portray all aspects of monogamy; the 
aspirations and purported goods of monogamy have been discussed well and often by others. 
Rather, this Part has meant to frame the following discussion of nonmonogamy by calling 
attention to the pervasiveness of the fantasy of monogamy, by highlighting some of its forms and 
failures, and by acknowledging that its boundaries are policed by law and norms. The ideal of 
monogamy as satisfying and desirable, as the only path for true love—and of jealousy as a 
necessary, even defining, part of love—is so pervasive as to blind us, at times, to its operation as 
law.  
III. CONTEMPORARY POLYAMORY 
 Relationships among more than two partners tend to strike people as “preposterous.”111 
As just discussed, however, monogamy often fails to achieve its goals. The failure of one model 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., Laura Kipnis, Adultery, in INTIMACY 9, 34-35 (Lauren Berlant ed., 2000); Mischler, supra note 103, at 
18 n.84. 
109 See Joy Singer, For Better or for Worse: How the Law and Politics of Gay Marriage Affects Polys, LOVING 
MORE, Winter 1996, at 4, 5. “Joy Singer” is a pseudonym. 
110 Weis, supra note 95; see also Lynn D. Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the “No-Harm” Rule in Custody 
Litigation, CATH. UNIV. L. REV., Fall 2002, at 81, 95 n.57 (“According to the Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard 
Survey Project in 1998, eighty-eight percent of Americans believe that adultery is immoral, while only eleven 
percent find it morally acceptable.”). 
  
111 See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 11, at 59 (emphasis added) (“First, [opponents of alternatives to heterosexual 
monogamous relationships] see them all as preposterous, as something barely imaginable in the world in which they 
live. Marriage just is the union of one man and one woman. And, second, they see these forms of union as moral 
equivalents, each repellant, each the appropriate province of the law to discourage or prohibit.”); cf. Barbara 
Bergmann, Becker’s Theory of the Family: Preposterous Conclusions, 1 FEMINIST ECON. 1 (1995) (characterizing as 
“preposterous” Gary Becker’s theory of how polygamy might benefit women, see infra text accompanying notes 
311-320).  
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does not, in itself, make other models viable. But monogamy’s frequent failure may give us 
reason to pause before dismissing as absurd the possibility of alternatives.112 And as polyamory 
is not frequently in the public eye, we are rarely exposed to its reality.  
 This Part discusses the scope, terms, and structures of polyamory today. Then, since such 
skeletal information does little to enrich our understanding of a practice, this Part also portrays 
several polyamorous relationships. A weaving together of structural aspects and mundane 
details, these portraits aim to capture something of the feeling, the experience, of living inside 
these relationships. How much anyone can understand another’s experience is a question beyond 
the scope of this article, but despite the sage advice that you have to “go there t[o] know 
there,”113 this Section proceeds from the premise that words allow at least the possibility of 
seeing the world through the eyes of another. Finally, this Part discusses the ethical vision of 
polyamory, setting forth five ideas that I derive from writings by its practitioners. 
Before proceeding to discuss polyamory, however, I want to address a certain confusion 
surrounding the term “polygamy.” Charles Krauthammer has identified a key split in the 
responses to polygamy: 
[I]f marriage is redefined to include two men in love, on what possible principled 
grounds can it be denied to three men in love?  
 This is traditionally called the polygamy challenge, but polygamy—one man 
marrying more than one woman—is the wrong way to pose the question. Polygamy, with 
its rank inequality and female subservience, is too easy a target. It invites exploitation of 
and degrading competition among wives, with often baleful social and familial 
consequences. (For those in doubt on this question, see Genesis: 26-35 on Joseph and his 
multimothered brothers.) 
 The question is better posed by imagining three people of the same sex in love with 
one another and wanting their love to be legally recognized and socially sanctioned by 
marriage.114  
The distinction Krauthammer draws here is instructive. American ideas of multi-party 
relationships are shaped by this country’s historical experience with Mormon polygamy, and I 
would go so far as to say this is what most Americans think of first when they think of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 “Preposterous” could be understood as akin to “inversion,” an early term for homosexuality, in that 
preposterous has the sense of “contrary to the order of nature . . . monstrous,” as well as the now-rare, first sense of 
“having or placing last that which should be first; inverted in position or order.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
(1993). 
112 There are of course many alternatives to monogamy, including singleness and committed friendship, as well as 
polyamory. See, e.g., The Alternatives to Marriage Project, http://www.unmarried.org/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) 
(“The Alternatives to Marriage Project (AtMP) is a national nonprofit organization advocating for equality and 
fairness for unmarried people, including people who choose not to marry, cannot marry, or live together before 
marriage.). As discussed in the Introduction, this article focuses heavily on polyamory and on the sexual exclusivity 
axis of monogamy. 
113 ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 183 (Perennial Library 1990) (1937). As Hurston’s 
character Janey spoke these words towards the end of a revealing work of fiction, however, the paradox of their 
content and context suggests they may be somewhat tongue-in-cheek.  
  
114 Charles Krauthammer, When John and Jim Say “I Do,” TIME, July 22, 1996, reprinted in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: 
PRO AND CON, supra note 10, at 282-83. 
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polygamy.115 In addition, the image of polygamy as a Muslim practice undoubtedly adds to its 
negative public image, historically and also particularly in the wake of September 11, 2001.116 
Arguably, one reason Americans oppose multi-party relationships is that these relationships 
evoke the image of a man sanctioned by a patriarchal religious society to have many wives as 
emblems of his power or chosen status. As discussed later,117 there is some disagreement among 
scholars as well as polygynists as to whether this model is necessarily bad for women, but 
certainly it is widely thought to be so.118 Thus, as Barney Frank has said about why people 
oppose plural marriage, “First, it’s almost always polygamy and not polyamory. So a lot of 
women don’t like it.”119  
Frank’s comment highlights a common problem of terminology. The term polygamy is 
often used to mean two different things: 1) marriage to more than one person, regardless of sex; 
and 2) the marriage of one man to more than one woman. As noted above,120 the latter—one man 
with multiple wives—is specifically called “polygyny.” Polygyny is the opposite of “polyandry,” 
one woman with multiple husbands.121 The elision of the two is exemplified, with some 
acknowledgement of the confusion, by the Oxford English Dictionary definition of “polygamy”: 
“Marriage with several, or more than one, at once; plurality of spouses; the practice or custom 
according to which one man has several wives (distinctively called polygyny), or one woman 
several husbands (polyandry), at the same time. Most commonly used of the former.”122 To avoid 
this confusion, the article uses the term “polygamy” to mean several spouses, regardless of sex. It 
is, however, significant that polygamy commonly refers to a man with many wives. I agree with 
Congressman Frank that this is one reason that people object to the idea of plural marriage. To 
try to supplement this perception, this article offers several examples of multi-party relationships 
that are not structured by institutionalized patriarchy. 
                                                 
115 Brigham Young first openly declared polygamy to be the doctrine and practice of the Mormon church in 1852, 
twenty-two years after the church’s establishment, and five years after the Mormons had settled in Utah. See IRWIN 
ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 28, 21 (1996). The incorporation 
of polygamy into Mormon theology was based on a revelation Joseph Smith reported having on the subject in 1843. 
See id. at 27-28. The official Mormon church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), has denounced 
the practice since 1890. Altman and Ginat reported in 1996, however, that “approximately 20,000 to 50,000 
Americans are currently members of Mormon fundamentalist religious groups and believe in the practice of plural 
marriage, or polygamy.” Id. at 2.  
116 See, e.g., infra note 119 (quoting Barney Frank on this point). 
117 See infra text accompanying notes 311-318. 
118 See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Just Marriage: On the Public Importance of Private Unions, in JUST MARRIAGE 16 
(forthcoming Oxford Univ. P. 2004) (on file with author) (noting that “[m]any people are convinced that polygamy 
is profoundly patriarchal”). 
119 Meeting with OutLaws, supra note 19. Frank’s second reason was that it suggests “promiscuity, unfaithfulness, 
foreignness.” Finally, he noted that the animosity is likely to be greater in the wake of the attacks on the World 
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, because the “world’s leading polygamists” are Muslims.  
120 See supra Part I. 
121 See, e.g., William Safire, A Polyandry Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2001, at A17. It is through the heterosexual 
assumption of marriage as including at least one man and one woman that the term “polyandry” (many men) could 
come to mean a group including any women at all; in other contexts, the term has been employed more literally to 
mean simply multiple men. See ALAN HOLLINGHURST, THE SWIMMING-POOL LIBRARY 16 (1988) (“This naked 
mingling, which formed a ritualistic heart to the life of the club, produced its own improper incitements to ideal 
liaisons, and polyandrous happenings which could not survive into the world of jackets and ties, cycle-clips and 
duffel-coats.”). A parallel point could of course be made about “polygyny.” 
  
122 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1382 (1993) (emphasis added). 
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A.  Terms and Models 
 No studies or surveys estimate the number of people currently engaged in polyamory, but 
the national organization Loving More reports a rate of 1,000 hits per day on its website and a 
circulation of 10,000 readers for its eponymous magazine.123 Loving More provides the 
following general definition of polyamory: 
Polyamory (many loves) is a relatively new word created for relationships where an adult 
intimately loves more than one other adult. This includes open couples, group marriage, 
intimate networks, triads and even people who currently have one or no partners, yet are 
open to possibility of more. It is another word for ethical nonmonogamy.124 
This explanation conveys at least four things about polyamory. First, the word is “relatively 
new.”125 Like “homosexuality,” it is a mixture of Greek (poly) and Latin (amor).126 Second, the 
hybridity of the word perhaps points to a feature of polyamory represented in this definition: the 
wide variety of relationships that fall within its ambit.127 Third, the reference to polyamorous 
“people who currently have one or no partners” suggests that people not only practice 
polyamory, people can be “poly.”128 Finally, the last sentence points toward the philosophical 
interests of many of polyamory’s practitioners: Polys have well-articulated views of relationships 
and beliefs about interpersonal ethics.129  
                                                 
123 See John Cloud, Henry & Mary & Janet &...: Is Your Marriage a Little Dull?: The “Polyamorists” Say There’s 
Another Way, TIME, Nov. 15, 1999. The number of reported subscribers to Loving More suggests that a not 
insignificant number of people are practicing or considering polyamory, since there are presumably people who 
have no connection with the organization but engage in the practice.  
124 LOVING MORE, ABOUT POLYAMORY, at http://www.lovemore.com/aboutpoly.html. 
125 Deborah Anapol attributes its origins to Oberon and Morning Glory Zell. DEBORAH M. ANAPOL, POLYAMORY, 
THE NEW LOVE WITHOUT LIMITS 5 (1997) (“The term polyamory was first proposed by Church of All Worlds 
founders Oberon and Morning Glory Zell to replace the awkward expression responsible nonmonogamy. 
Cyberspace conversations via the Internet and the World Wide Web popularized its use all around the world over 
the last several years and helped bring it into general usage.”). Marcia Munson and Judith Stelboum offer a brief 
account of historical antecedents to the term polyamory:  
In the 1980s, the term “non-monogamy” was used to describe multiple concurrent sexual involvements. In 
the 1970s, after the release of Nena and George O’Neil’s book Open Marriage, people referred to “open 
relationships.” In the 1960s, the term “free love” described the uninhibited, outside-of-marriage sexual 
connections suddenly made possible with the invention of the birth control pill, and the new ability of 
medical science to treat all known sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). In the 1950s, sex outside of a 
monogamous couple relationship had simply been referred to as “cheating.” . . . Women who cheated were 
“loose.” Men, less likely to acquire STDs from heterosexual intercourse [than women], and not at all likely 
to become pregnant, were said to be “sowing wild seeds” when they had multiple sexual involvements. 
Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum, Introduction to THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER: OPEN RELATIONSHIPS, 
NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX 1, 2 (Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum eds., 1999). 
126 “Homosexuality” comes from the Greek for same (homo) and the Latin for sex (sexus). See OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 345 (2d ed. 1989) (entry for “homosexuality”); id. at 334 (entry for “homo-”); id. at 115 (entry for 
“sexual”).  
127 See infra text accompanying notes 148-161. 
128 Not all polys agree with this proposition. See, e.g., Elise Matthesen, alt.polyamory Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQ), at http://www.faqs.org/faqs/polyamory/faq/ (last modified Apr. 18, 2002) (“[A]ccording to the philosophy of 
some folks, people aren’t polyamorous, although behavior can be. Some people find that approach useful, and others 
prefer to think of ‘polyamorous people.’”); see also infra Part IV. Moreover, on what level someone is or is not poly 
is also a matter of some dispute. See id. 
  
129 See infra Section III.C.  
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 There are different definitions and innumerable models of polyamory.130 The primary 
definitional disputes about polyamory involve the delineation of its boundaries with regard to sex 
and to love131: In order to be poly, must a relationship involve sex among more than two, love 
among more than two, both, or neither?  
 On the sex side, there is a dispute as to whether polyamory necessarily involves sexual 
relationships among more than two people. For instance, Martha Ertman has recently defined 
polyamory as incorporating all “relationships that include more than one participant” regardless 
of whether the participants are sexually involved with one another.132 Privileging a very general 
definition of polyamory–“‘all forms of multi-partner relating’”–Maura Strassberg also appears to 
side with those polys who consider sex to be an unnecessary part of the equation.133 Among 
polys, there seem to be two impulses pushing towards poly inclusion of nonsexual intimate 
relationships within the definition of polyamory. First, many polys oppose hierarchy and strict 
definitions.134 Like that of “queers,”135 the sensibility of many polys rebels against line-drawing 
and exclusion.136 Polys are therefore inclined to include everyone within polyamory who wants 
to be included.  
 Second, polys who oppose hierarchy or who have alternative definitions of sexuality may 
not want to define their nonsexual relationships as categorically different from their sexual 
relationships. They may not want to privilege certain relationships along the axis of sex; thus, 
they may want to put all their loving relationships under the umbrella of polyamory. By contrast, 
some writers posit that the term polyamory must incorporate sexual non-exclusivity. Deborah 
Anapol writes that “[o]ne thing [polyamorous] relationships have in common is that they are 
                                                 
130 For detailed descriptions of particular relationships, see infra Section III.B. For a vivid fictional account of three 
different forms of triads, see Tara Ayres’s play, Loving More (manuscript on file with author), which was performed 
by the Mercury Players Theatre at the Bartell Theatre in Madison, Wisconsin, during December 2003. See Lue 
Allen, Howdy, Partners: A New Play Argues for Multiple Lovers, ISTHMUS, Dec. 12, 2003, at 24 (reviewing Loving 
More). 
131 I do not define love here because to do so would be to try to pin down something that I think is not so precise 
within the debates I am discussing, where “love” is primarily used in a negative sense: One side argues that 
relationships that entirely lack multi-party love or intimacy (“sport sex”) are not polyamory, and the other side 
replies that such relationships can be poly.  
132 “While polyamory literally means ‘many’ and ‘love,’ the term does not impose additional conditions such as 
sexual relations.” Ertman, Private/Private Distinction, supra note 25, at 124-25. Ertman also writes: “The term 
[polyamory] also includes arrangements with combinations of people who organize their intimate lives together, 
regardless of the extent of the arrangement’s sexual elements. Thus, if a lesbian couple has a child by alternative 
insemination, using a gay man as a known donor to father the child, and the donor remains involved in the child’s 
life, the arrangement is polyamorous. These three individuals love one another, or are bonded by the love for the 
child. The lesbian couple’s relationship is romantic and sexual, and similar to marriage in that the couple lives 
together and jointly parents the child. The two biological parents, in contrast, are neither romantic partners nor even 
involved in the way that cohabitants and co-parents are.” Id. at 125. 
133 Strassberg, supra note 8, at 444 (quoting http://www.lovemore.com/terms.html). Strassberg asserts that “the 
fundamental value of polyamory is relationship, particularly loving relationships,” id. at 452, and supports this 
proposition with the assertion, without qualification, that “[t]he focus of polyamory is on ‘having and maintaining 
loving relationships that may or may not be sexual,’” id. (quoting http://lovemore.com/faq.html, at question #1).  
134 See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
135 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Queering Law: A Queer Theory of Same-Sex Marriage 7-8 (Feb. 4, 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author).  
  
136 See infra note 151. 
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both sexual and loving.”137 According to Marcia Munson and Judith Stelboum, “The term 
‘polyamory’ literally means ‘many loves.’ While loving several people simultaneously is the 
reality of most people’s lives, the term polyamory usually implies sexual involvement with more 
than one person.”138 For some polys, including sex within the term polyamory may be an 
important aspect of the term’s signaling function: Just as a straight person may not want to 
proposition or fall in love with a gay person, a poly person may wish to avoid propositioning a 
person who is not open to sexual nonexclusivity.139 And some polys may feel that a definition of 
polyamory that does not contain sex is a kind of whitewashing or watering-down of this 
nonnormative practice.140  
 On the love side, the dispute is inverted: Must polyamorous relationships include multi-
party love, or can they be primarily or exclusively about sexual nonmonogamy? “Love” is used 
loosely in these discussions because the focus of the dispute is negative; the question is whether 
a relationship can be poly without any love. For example, this issue is often framed in terms of 
whether polyamory includes “swinging,” or casual sex—that is, sexual involvement with 
multiple parties not necessarily based on love or intimacy.141 In this context, then, I think “love” 
should be understood to mean some kind of emotional or intimate attachment beyond the sexual 
connection. On the one hand, Deborah Anapol emphasizes the role of sex and love together 
“with no separation between the sex and the love.”142 She uses the term “sexualoving” to 
demonstrate the unity of the two, and insists that “we’re not talking about casual, indiscriminate 
sport sex.”143 On the other hand, Marcia Munson and Judith Stelboum say that polyamory 
includes “many different styles of multiple intimate involvements, such as polyfidelity or group 
marriage; primary relationships open to secondary affairs; and casual sexual involvement with 
                                                 
137 ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
138 Munson & Stelboum, supra note 125, at 1; cf. Matthesen, supra note 128 (“Polyamory means ‘loving more than 
one.’ This love may be sexual, emotional, spiritual, or any combination thereof, according to the desires and 
agreements of the individuals involved, but you needn’t wear yourself out trying to figure out ways to fit fondness 
for apple pie, or filial piety, or a passion for the Saint Paul Saints baseball club into it.”). But see Matthesen, supra 
note 128 (“Another key in defining polyamory, IMO [In My Opinion], is that it need not involve sex (although it 
often does).” (quoting Stef)). 
139 See infra text accompanying notes 388-390.    
140 Such a view might be compared to that of queers who criticize certain choices to de-sexualize the gay-rights 
movement, see, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER 
LIFE 40 (1999) (“[W]e (or some of us, acting in the name of homosexuals) try to clean ourselves up as legitimate 
players in politics and the media. As a movement we resort to a temporary pretense: “We’re gay,” we say, “but that 
has nothing to do with sex.” And then, too often, this stopgap pretense is mistaken for the desired utopia. No more 
sex! Free at last!”), and to lesbians who reacted against Adrienne Rich’s formulation of the “lesbian continuum” as 
including straight women who resisted patriarchal society in a variety of nonsexual ways, because these lesbians felt 
that Rich’s lesbian-continuum idea trivialized the role of sex in lesbian lives and self-naming. See supra note 33; see 
also Rich, supra note 1, at 648 (“I mean the term lesbian continuum to include a range—through each woman’s life 
and throughout history—of woman-identified experience; not simply the fact that a woman has had or consciously 
desired genital sexual experience with another woman.”); see also id. at 651 (“If we consider the possibility that all 
women . . . exist on a lesbian continuum, we can see ourselves as moving in and out of this continuum, whether we 
identify ourselves as lesbian or not.”). 
141 The conflict over whether swingers “count” as poly can be seen in the slightly defensive, conflicted tone of 
various articles in Loving More, such as one in which an author tries to defend her open marriage as poly, although 
she and her husband have only sexual—but not emotionally intimate—relationships with other people. See Jasmine 
Walston, Am I Poly Enough?, LOVING MORE, Fall 1998, at 28. 
142 ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 6. 
  
143 Id. 
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two or more people.”144 On both the sex side and the love side, then, polyamory may therefore be 
understood to have a narrower definition and a broader definition.  
 Another dispute about the boundaries of polyamory concerns whether traditional 
polygyny, as practiced by, most prominently, fundamentalist Mormons, “counts” as polyamory. 
The sex-based hierarchy of traditional Mormon polygyny seems incompatible with the typical 
poly dedication to principles of equality and individual flourishing, causing some polys and 
commentators to exclude Mormon polygyny from the umbrella of polyamory.145 In this article, 
one of the relationships profiled is a Mormon-type polygynous union, which none of the 
participants calls “polyamorous” but which blends elements of traditional hierarchy with modern 
feminist ideas of female solidarity, satisfaction, and work outside the home, according to the 
accounts given by the female participants.146 By including this relationship, I do not mean to 
resolve the question of whether this relationship “counts” as polyamorous, but mean merely to 
present it as a lesser-known type of the polygyny that most people picture when they think of 
multi-party relationships. 
 Because the number of people in poly relationships has no theoretical limit, the models of 
poly relationships are also theoretically limitless. Some of the more typical models have specific 
names.147 Definitions of these models often rely on the terms “primary relationship,”148 
“secondary relationship,”149 and occasionally “tertiary relationship,”150 although some polys 
                                                 
144 Munson & Stelboum, supra note 125, at 2; see also KEVIN LANO & CLAIRE PARRY, Preface to BREAKING THE 
BARRIERS TO DESIRE: POLYAMORY, POLYFIDELITY, AND NON-MONOGAMY—NEW APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE 
RELATIONSHIPS, at v, vi (1995) (“It is a point of contention in the poly community as to whether ‘swinging’ can be 
regarded as responsible non-monogamy—we think it can, provided that the choices made are negotiated and 
consenting.”). 
145 See, e.g., Strassberg, supra note 8, at 440-41; Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 353, 355 (2003) (citing Ryam Nearing, Mormons on TV, 8 LOVING MORE 35, 35 (1996); Lorraine 
Hutchins, Bisexuality, 11 LOVING MORE 8, 10 (1997)). 
146 See infra Section III.B.3. 
147 For further discussion of polyamory’s many terms, particularly those describing sexually exclusive groups, see 
Strassberg, supra note 8, at 444-65. 
148 See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 7 (“Primary relationship. Lovers who are in a long-term, committed, 
marriage-type relationship are primary partners. Usually primary partners live together and share finances, 
parenting and decision making. Primary partners are not necessarily legal married, but they are bonded together as a 
family.”); Matthesen, supra note 128 (“Primary—word often used in a hierarchal multi-person relationship to denote 
the person with whom one is most strongly bonded. In some cases this bond or commitment takes the form of legal 
marriage. As bigamy is not legal, the option of having two (or more) legally wedded primaries simultaneously is not 
currently practicable, though non-legal ceremonies may certainly be performed. In some cases “primary” refers to 
the lover with the most seniority.”). 
149 See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 7 (“Secondary relationship. Secondary partners may also have a long-term, 
committed sexualoving relationship. But usually they live separately, have separate finances and see themselves as 
close friends rather than immediate family. Secondary partners may take on roles in each other’s families similar to 
those of cousins, aunts and uncles in an extended family of blood relations.”); Matthesen, supra note 128 
(“Secondary—follows from primary, in a hierarchal relationship, denotes a person with whom one is involved 
without the emotional, legal, or economic complexities and commitments of primary bonding.”). 
  
150 See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 8 (“Tertiary relationship. Lovers who spend time together only once in a 
while or for a brief time are tertiary partners. Their contact may be very intimate, but they are not an important part 
of each other’s day to day life.”). 
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object to the hierarchy implied by these terms.151 For example, according to Deborah Anapol, an 
“intimate network” comprises “several ongoing secondary relationships”: “Sometimes all 
members of the group eventually become lovers. Sometimes individuals have only two or three 
partners within the group. The group can include singles only, couples only[,] or a mixture of 
both.”152 The term “line marriage” identifies “a different form of familial immortality than the 
traditional one of successive generations of children”; rather, a line marriage is “a marriage that 
from time to time adds younger members, eventually establishing an equilibrium population 
(spouses dying off at the same rate as new ones are added).”153  
 A term such as “polyfidelity” clarifies the type of commitment among the parties: “A 
lovestyle in which three or more primary partners agree to be sexual only within their family. 
Additional partners can be added to the marriage with everyone’s consent.”154 The idea of 
polyfidelity brings us to a distinction between two aspects of polyamorists’ transgression of 
monogamy: what I call the “exclusivity” axis and the “numerosity” axis.  
 The criminal law helps us to see the distinctiveness and the importance of these two axes. 
“Exclusivity” refers to whether someone has sex with people outside the relationship. As in the 
common phrase “open relationship,” exclusivity concerns whether a relationship is “open” or 
“closed.” In the legal realm, adultery statutes target violations of the exclusivity norm.155 By 
contrast, “numerosity” concerns how many people are in a relationship. From the perspective of 
monogamy, the basic question here is whether a relationship involves two individuals or more 
than two individuals. Thus, bigamy statutes target violations of numerosity norms.156 Within 
polyamory, exclusivity and numerosity define aspects of individual relationship models, such as 
polyfidelity, which is a sexually exclusive model analytically distinct from monogamous 
relationships primarily in the number of the participants. 
Some relationship models are specifically defined by the number of participants. For 
example, an “open marriage” is a “nonexclusive couple relationship[]” in which the two 
“partners have agreed that each can independently have outside sexualoving partners.”157 A poly 
“triad” involves “three sexualoving partners who may all be secondary, all be primary, or two 
                                                 
151 Matthesen, supra note 128 (“Some people also don’t like the terms primaries and secondaries or the concepts 
behind the terms, preferring to have ‘a circle of equals’ as one poly person called it. Stef contributed the term ‘Non-
hierarchical Polyamory’ for this kind of arrangement.”); see also ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 8 (“While some 
polyamorous people object to the whole concept of hierarchies of commitment and rankings of love (as in the old 
Chinese practice of ‘number one wife’), varying levels of affinity can occur naturally. This diversity of form, along 
with the realization that identical forms may result from radically different dynamics, automatically creates a social 
environment different from our familiar homogeneous, avowedly monogamous culture.”). 
152 ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 8. 
153 Matthesen, supra note 128 (attributing the term to Robert A. Heinlein and the definition to M. Schafer). 
154 ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 9. This is the type of polyamory on which Maura Strassberg focuses her work. See 
supra note 8. 
155 See supra note 48. 
156 See supra note 49. Curiously, while both adultery and bigamy laws require the party at issue to be married, some 
bigamy laws do not require an additional marriage or even attempted marriage. In four states, the crime of bigamy 
covers mere extramarital cohabitation by a married person. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-201 (West 2001); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-20 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-1 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (2001). 
  
157 Id. at 8. Whether a sexually nonexclusive couple falls within the definition of polyamory is a question taken up in 
Part IV.  
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may be primary with a third secondary. It can be open or closed. A triad can be heterosexual or 
homosexual, but is often the choice of two same-sex bisexuals and an opposite sex 
heterosexual.”158 Two different types of triads are further distinguished by the types of bonds 
among the three partners: “vees” and “triangles,” each of which may be diagrammed as the 
figure that names it:  
Vee—Three people, where the structure puts one person at the bottom, or ‘hinge’ of the 
vee, also called the pivot point. In a vee, the arm partners are not as commonly close to 
each other as each is to the pivot. Triangle (or equilateral triangle)—relationship where 
three people are each involved with both of the others. Sometimes also called a triad.159  
As these examples indicate, diagrams may help to demonstrate the possible polyamorous 
configurations.160 These are just a few of the poly models with specific names,161 which are in 
turn only a small sample of the possible models of polyamory.  
B. Relationships 
 This Section depicts several models of polyamory through four accounts of contemporary 
relationships. April Divilbiss, Shane Divilbiss, and Chris Littrell are in a polyandrous 
relationship; the details of their relationship became public during their unsuccessful lawsuit in 
1999 to keep April’s daughter in their home after she was removed by court order. Eddie, Adam, 
Amber, and Mike form an open four-person partnership, which Eddie was kind enough to take 
the time to discuss with me at length. Elizabeth Joseph has written about her positive experience 
as a career woman in a “Mormon” polygynous marriage. And Dossie Easton has struggled to 
keep her relationships open to other sexual, loving experiences since she left an abusive partner 
several decades ago.  
1. A Woman with Two Husbands: April Divilbiss 
A 1999 Tennessee juvenile court case involved a custody dispute between a polyandrous 
threesome—a polyfidelitous vee—and the grandmother of their child.162 The facts of the case, as 
well as relevant documents, became widely available because Loving More sponsored a 
campaign to raise money to support the attorney’s fees of the mother, April Divilbiss.163  
                                                 
158 Id. at 8; see also Matthesen, supra note 128 (“Triads—three people involved in some way. Often used in a fairly 
committed sense, in some cases involving ceremonies of commitment, but also used simply to mean ‘three people 
who are connected.’ Example: ‘Jodine, Mischa and Mickey are a FMM triad living in Excelsior.’”). 
159 See, e.g., Matthesen, supra note 128. 
160 See, e.g., Forms Responsible Nonmonogamy Can Take, in RYAM NEARING, THE POLYFIDELITY PRIMER (PEP 
Publishing 3d ed., 1992) (diagram), reprinted in ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 9. 
161 See, e.g., Matthesen, supra note 128 (“Quads, pentacles, sextets and more: There are polyfolk who exist in 
multiple arrangements with more than three members. Geometry can get complicated, and creative nomenclature 
abounds.”). 
162 In the Matter of Alana Moore, No. K1719 (Juvenile Court of Memphis, April 16, 1999), 
http://www.lovemore.com/april/transcript_partone.htm. 
  
163 The April Divilbiss Case, http://www.lovemore.com/april/april_divilbiss_case.htm (last visited April 30, 2002). 
For much of the information that follows, see also Cloud, supra note 123. 
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In 1995, when April became pregnant, the biological father of her child left town with no 
forwarding address. In 1996, April, newly a mother, married Shane Divilbiss, and Chris Littrell 
was the best man at the wedding. By January 1997, April Divilbiss and Chris Littrell had fallen 
in love. On Valentine’s Day, April told Shane that she and Chris were in love. Shane and Chris 
went to a waffle house and discussed the situation. They realized that neither of them wanted to 
lose April, so in March 1997, all three moved in together. April slept with Chris and Shane 
separately, and Chris and Shane were not sexually involved with one another. According to one 
article, they apparently tried a threesome once, but Chris ended the attempt.164  
In November of 1998, when April’s daughter Alana was three, MTV aired a program 
about polyamory, and the triad went on television and talked about their relationship, saying that 
they considered themselves all married.165 The day after the program aired,166 Alana’s paternal 
grandmother, with whom Alana sometimes spent weekends, filed for removal of the child and 
for custody, on the grounds of April’s immoral lifestyle. The judge saw a video of the program 
and subsequently removed the child from April’s care without regard to findings and procedures 
that her lawyer claimed were required by the state.167 Loving More’s fundraising efforts paid for 
April’s legal representation. In the months leading up the hearing, there seemed to be some 
optimism among those involved that the case could be a kind of Stonewall for the poly 
movement.168 
On April 16, 1999, the case was heard in the Juvenile Court of Memphis.169 The judge, 
the Honorable Herbert Lane, refused to hear or read a motion to dismiss submitted by April’s 
attorney claiming violations of April’s federal and state constitutional rights.170 The judge denied 
both sides’ requests to submit their own expert testimony, but at least four court-appointed 
experts reportedly said that the child should be returned to the mother.171 Nonetheless, the judge 
brought the trial to an abrupt halt, midway through April’s attorney’s cross examination of the 
grandmother. He said he understood the case already. 
COURT: What I have got here is a young lady who has decided to have an alternative life 
style and the issue becomes is that life style, in fact, detrimental to this child. You know, 
                                                 
164 Cloud, supra note 31 (“No, the two guys don’t go for each other; the triad tried a menage a trois once but stopped 
because Chris thought it was icky. Instead, they lived as man and wife and man, with April taking turns.”). 
165 The program was called “Sex in the ’90s: It’s a Group Thing.” Id.  
166 See Jim Gerard, Three’s Company; So Is Four or Five,  
http://www.salon.com/health/sex/urge/1999/07/17/polyamory/, at 2 (July 17, 1999). 
167 See Respondent Natural Mother’s Motions for an Immediate Hearing, In the Court of Memphis and Shelby 
County, Tennessee, http://www.lovemore.com/april/motions.htm. 
168 See Gerard, supra note 166, at 2. The Stonewall riots, which took place when New York City police tried to close 
down the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village on June 27, 1969, “[t]oday . . . represent ‘the birth’ of the lesbian and 
gay movement.” The Editors, Introduction: Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 278 (1994). 
169 Transcript, In Re Alana Moore, No. K1719 (Juvenile Court of Memphis, April 16, 1999) (Herbert Lane, J.), 
http://www.lovemore.com/april/transcript_partone.htm. The judge was the Honorable Herbert Lane. 
170 See Respondent Natural Mother’s Motions for an Immediate Hearing, In the Court of Memphis and Shelby 
County, Tennessee, http://www.lovemore.com/april/motions.htm. April filed a motion to dismiss alleging violations 
of her rights under the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article I, § 8 of the Tennessee 
Constitution; a motion to dismiss the complaint “for wrongful deprivation of child without due process”; and 
“alternatively,” a motion “to return child immediately as a result of findings of no harm.” Id.  
  
171 See Cloud, supra note 123. 
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parents oftentimes are called upon to make great sacrifices for their children. And when 
she was faced with that, when some guy came to her and said I’m in love with you too 
although you are married, you know, most people would have said, well, hey, I’m 
married; forget it. But, no, she decides, well, why not. I’ll just—I’ll have both of them. I 
can have my cake and eat it too. Well, parents can’t do that. Parents have to set the 
correct examples for the kids. And part of the statute says that you have to be concerned 
with the moral upbringing of the child.172 
He said the court must intervene on behalf of the child’s best interests:  
COURT: So here is how we are going to resolve this, folks: Custody of the child is going 
to be placed with the Department of Children’s Services with an extended visit in the 
grandmother’s home until such time as the mother resolves her situation.173 
Despite April’s attorney’s protests that April, Shane, and Chris were not all sleeping together, the 
judge concluded:  
COURT: Now I am not about to put that child back into a situation where all three of 
these people are in the same bed. She has got a legal husband. Make a choice. It is just 
that simple.174 
April did not appeal the decision. 
The editors of Loving More offered me a number of explanations for April’s decision not 
to appeal. Brett Hill said that they ran out of money and that the ACLU and other gay rights 
organizations “would not touch” the case.175 Ryam Nearing, the co-editor of Loving More, wrote 
to say that money was not a problem, but that the mother eventually gave up the legal fight and 
allowed her child to remain with the biological grandmother.176 
                                                 
172 See Transcript, In Re Alana Moore, No. K1719, http://www.lovemore.com/april/judges_ruling.htm. 
173 Id. 
174 Id.  
175 Email from Brett Hill, Editor, Loving More, to the author (Nov. 26, 2000) (on file with author). Hill sent the 
following email: 
You want to look up April Divilbiss in, I think, Nashville TN. She dropped the case and let her 
grandmother have custody of the child. The judge ruled that anyone involved in an alternative lifestyle 
could not have children and that the state did not have to wait to show harm. Her cons[tituti]onal rights 
were grossly violated and state law was completely brok[en] in many instances. We ran out of money for 
the case and she eventually dropped trying to get her kid back. The ACLU and gay rights movements 
would not touch it. 
Id. 
176 Email from Ryam Nearing, Editor, Loving More, to the author (Nov. 28, 2000) (on file with author). Nearing’s 
email read as follows: 
Briefly, all the legal folks involved (both lawyers and judge) were ill with various problems—heart 
surgeries, neurological diseases etc which kept delaying proceedings. There was NOT a lack of money for 
legal help. Altho[ugh] it was expensive, donations kept arriving and we (Loving More) handled paying the 
attorney, so he kept us in the loop. 
What happened was that the mother eventually gave up on the legal fight, “deciding” that it was best 
for her daughter to have the financial support the bio grandmother, who was in her early 40s, could provide. 
So she gave up her custody battle. 
  
Id. 
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2. A Four-Partner Family: Eddie Simmons 
Eddie Simmons is part of a four-person partnership: “My family consists of myself, two 
other men, and a woman.”177 The woman and one of the men—Amber and Adam—have the 
oldest relationship of the group. At the beginning of their relationship twenty years ago, Adam 
told Amber that he was bisexual and hoped to have a relationship with a man as well. According 
to Eddie, at that time there was “no word ‘polyamory’ yet,” though “these relationships have 
always been there.”178 Fifteen years ago, Eddie, who is also bisexual, met Adam and Amber 
through the bisexual community in the city where they live; they have been together as a family 
since that time. Eddie, Adam, and Amber had no intention of expanding their family, but about 
three and a half years ago, they met a doctoral candidate named Mike who “adored the concept 
of our family” and wanted to become a part of it.179 Mike first became “involved” with Eddie, 
then with Adam, and then Amber “got to know him.”180  
“There are many flavors of polyamory,” Eddie says; “mine is only one.”181 On the 
emotional level, “each of us [has] a relationship to the other three” and “each two has a 
relationship that is distinctly ours.”182 Eddie, Adam, and Amber also have some history that 
Mike is not yet a part of, so to an extent, there are threes that also have distinct emotional 
relationships. On the sexual level, Eddie, Adam, and Mike all sleep together in various 
combinations, and they “all have outside sexual relationships that we disclose to each other.”183 
Eddie emphasized the importance of disclosing to outsiders that “they are not getting involved 
with someone with whom they are going to have a monogamous relationship.”184 In Eddie’s 
words, Amber “is not poly, and is not bi,” but “she does not need the person she’s with to be the 
same way.”185 On the legal level, Adam and Amber are married, “which was something they did 
to get health insurance basically.”186 No one else in the family has legal ties, and no one else 
could be married under current U.S. marriage laws. For a while, Adam and Eddie considered 
having a “commitment ceremony.”187 Eddie laughs, “My dad imagined that we were about to do 
something illegal, but of course we can’t get married anyway. His brain kind of tipped over. We 
can’t do polygamy because it’s not legal.”188  
                                                 
177 Telephone Interview with Eddie Simmons (Nov. 28, 2000). Eddie is open about his relationships and kindly took 
the time to speak freely with me about his family. He asked that I change the names in this piece, however, because 
other members of his family are open to varying degrees to their families and coworkers. The names in this 
Subsection are therefore fictional, though the individuals represented are not. The difficult issues surrounding the 
dilemma of whether to come out as poly are the focus of the fifteenth issue of Loving More magazine. For an 
overview, see the editors’ introduction. Ryam Nearing & Brett Hill, About This Issue, LOVING MORE, Fall 1998, at 
2, 2. 











188 Id. Eddie’s family has also had other law-related concerns about the arrangement. When his parents’ lawyer 
found out about the relationship, he “blew his top.” The lawyer said that Eddie’s parents need “to protect your son’s 
inheritance” from these “golddiggers.” Id. 
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Though the “media loves sex,” Eddie (like many other polys189) reports that one of the 
biggest issues for polys is scheduling. Eddie says, “If you want to get rid of the press in a hurry, 
tell them that the big issue in your relationship is time-management.”190 Eddie’s family’s 
approach to time management has changed over the years: “It’s looked very different at different 
times.”191 Currently, Eddie, Adam, and Amber live in the same apartment house—with Eddie in 
the apartment directly above Adam and Amber—and Mike lives in a nearby suburb. Eddie sees 
Adam and Amber “several times a week”; he and Amber “go out to lunch or coffee”; and he and 
Adam “have some time together on Sunday afternoon and evenings.”192 Adam sleeps with Eddie 
on Sunday night and other times “depending on what’s going on.”193 Mike and Adam spend 
Thursday evening and nights together, and they often have supper on Wednesday night. 
Sometimes they all “do things as a family on Saturday, or sometimes Sunday.”194 Noting that 
poly relationships are a lot of trouble, Eddie observes, “In my experience, [all] relationships are 
very hard work if they’re going to last.”195 In addition, he found monogamy to be not a 
“panacea” but a “bore.” He is quick to say that is “strictly a statement for myself.”196  
Eddie says the reason the relationship has worked is that they are all people “who are a 
little older,” have different relationships and histories, and have “a clear sense of self.”197 They 
are all “process queens.”198 Therapy forms a crucial part of their lives. They are all in therapy, 
and they do family therapy. They all “come from a perspective that that’s a good thing to do, not 
just something you do because you’re in some kind of crisis.”199 He talks about having met 
another poly family years ago who had one HIV-positive family member, and being impressed 
with the “amount of human resources they had.”200 Eddie feels that two-parent families are not 
“a very good model” for raising children, and something like a kibbutz model would be better. 
He considers himself lucky: “I live in a city where there is an active poly community.”201 
3. A “Mormon” Wife: Elizabeth Joseph 
Elizabeth Joseph is a lawyer who lives in Big Water, Utah, with her husband Alex and his 
eight other wives.202 She writes, “Polygamy, or plural marriage, as practiced by my family is a 
paradox. At first blush, it sounds like an ideal situation for the man and an oppressive one for the 
                                                 
189 See, e.g., Terry Brussel Gibbons, Love on Schedule, LOVING MORE, Summer 1997, at 18. The theme of this issue 
of Loving More is “Time Enough for Love?”  








198 Id. “Process queen” is a term for someone committed to discussing and working out conflicts with other people—





202 The sources for this Section are an article that Joseph published in the New York Times in 1991, Elizabeth Joseph, 
My Husband’s Nine Wives, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at A31, and an article that appeared in Redbook several 
months later, Mary-Lou Weisman, The Tenth Wife, REDBOOK, Nov. 1991, at 90. 
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women. For me, the opposite is true.”203 She depicts her situation as bridging old and new: 
“While polygamists believe that the Old Testament mandates the practice of plural marriage, 
compelling social reasons make the lifestyle attractive to the modern career woman.”204 In 
Joseph’s eyes, monogamous women must make compromises to have it all: 
Pick up any women’s magazine and you will find article after article about the problems 
of successfully balancing career, motherhood, and marriage. It is a complex act that many 
women struggle to manage daily . . . . In a monogamous context, the only solutions are 
compromises. The kids need to learn to fix their own breakfast, your husband needs to 
get used to occasional microwave dinners, you need to divert more of your income to 
insure that your pre-schooler is in a good day care environment.205 
By contrast, she sees polygamy as providing “a whole solution.”206 While it “offers men the 
chance to escape from the traditional, confining roles that often isolate them from the 
surrounding world,” more importantly to Joseph, “it enables women, who live in a society full of 
obstacles, to fully meet their career, mothering and marriage obligations.”207  
 Joseph describes the structure of her life in terms both warm and functional. She writes, 
“When I leave for the 60-mile commute to court at 7 A.M., my 2-year-old daughter, London, is 
happily asleep in the bed of my husband’s wife, Diane. London adores Diane.”208 “When 
London awakes,” Joseph continues, “about the time I’m arriving at the courthouse, she is 
surrounded by family members who are as familiar to her as the toys in her nursery.”209 
According to an article by Mary-Lou Weisman published in Redbook, eight of the nine wives 
work full-time, and the ninth, Leslie, works part-time and gets paid by the others to babysit.210 
Elizabeth Joseph shares a home with another wife, Delinda, and in the evenings they usually eat 
“a simple dinner” together with their three kids: “We’d rather relax and commiserate over the 
pressures of our work day than chew up our energy cooking and doing a ton of dishes.”211 Joseph 
says with an air of solemnity, “Mondays, however, are different. That’s the night Alex eats with 
us.”212 She describes these evenings as “special,” with the kids “excited” and “on their best 
behavior,” because these occasions come “only . . . once a week.”213  
 The sex, Joseph says, is by appointment rather than schedule. “If I want to spend Friday 
evening at his house, I make an appointment. If he’s already ‘booked,’ I either request another 
night or if my schedule is inflexible, I talk to the other wife and we work out an arrangement.”214 
                                                 
203 Joseph, supra note 202, at A31. 
204 Id.  
205 Id.  
206 Id. 
207 Id.   
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Weisman, supra note 202, at 90.  
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She observes, “One thing we’ve all learned is that there’s always another night.”215 She says the 
situation meets her needs: 
Most evenings, with the demands of career and the literal chasing after the needs of a 
toddler, all I want to do is collapse into bed and sleep. But there is also the longing for 
intimacy and comfort that only he can provide, and when those feelings surface, I ask to 
be with him.216 
According to Weisman’s Redbook article, there has been group sex in which “some, but not all, 
of the wives participated.”217 Diane reported that group sex was initially “‘threatening,’ but then, 
in addition to pleasure, she found that the activity had the unanticipated effect of reducing sexual 
jealousy among the women involved.”218 Joanna told Weisman that “group sex is now ‘pretty 
much a thing of the past,’” and Weisman reports that the initial sexual jealousy among the wives 
has dissipated “now that everyone’s an old married couple.”219 Weisman observes that “jealousy 
constellates around issues other than sex,” such as looks, fertility, brains, income, and youth.220  
 Despite any sexual or nonsexual jealousy, the wives appear to cherish their relationships 
with one another. Elizabeth Joseph describes with great satisfaction the simplicity and comfort of 
her home with Delinda.221 According to Weisman, “Female friendship is the great reward that 
lies at the heart of polygamy.”222 Joanna observes, “‘Women in monogamous relationships tell 
me they find it difficult to maintain their female friendships.’”223 By contrast, Weisman presents 
the “friendship between Eli[zabeth] and Lindi” as “an extreme expression of the kind of love that 
can exist between wives.”224 Weisman offers as an example Lindi’s decision to make a baby for 
Elizabeth, who was having trouble conceiving. This is how Elizabeth became the mother of 
London: Lindi conceived the child with Alex. “Lindi says she has no difficulty thinking of 
London as Eli’s child. ‘Giving London to Eli was the proudest thing I did,’ she says.”225 
 Alex is a former fundamentalist Mormon who broke off to start his own church.226 
According to Weisman, “Whatever their religious backgrounds, the invisible cord that binds 
these women to one another and to Alex in what some would call unholy matrimony is their 
                                                 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Weisman, supra note 202, at 90.  
218 Id.  
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Joseph, supra note 202, at A31. 
222 Weisman, supra note 202, at 90. Nineteenth-century writings in support of Mormon polygamy also celebrated 
this aspect of the relationships. See, e.g., Iversen, supra note 42, at 516, 516-18 (reporting that “throughout the 
polygamy literature, one finds extraordinary stories and examples of cooperation among women”). 




226 According to Weisman, Alex Joseph was born into the Greek Orthodox faith, then joined the LDS church as a 
young adult. Four years later, he joined the Fundamentalist Mormons, who still practice polygamy despite the 
teachings of the official LDS church. See supra note 115. Later, he broke off from the Fundamentalists and 
“founded his own church” because “he did not like the way they oppressed their wives and children.” Weisman, 
supra note 202, at 90.  
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extraordinary conviction that he is not just a husband—he is a god.”227 Joseph’s article, by 
contrast, says little about religion. While some wives have obviously not liked the family 
arrangement (Alex has been divorced eight times, which Weisman notes “puts him about even 
with the national divorce rate”228), the current nine wives report satisfaction with sharing him. 
“Eli[zabeth] recalls with a shudder the taste of monogamy she got when she went away with 
Alex on a two-week trip. ‘Little things about him began to grate on my nerves. We ran out of 
things to talk about.’”229 Although none of the wives has ever been in a monogamous 
relationship, “they are convinced that monogamy is monotony.”230 Weisman concludes that 
“[a]ll nine wives are equally convinced that polygamy is God’s gift to modern woman.”231 In her 
account, Elizabeth Joseph is more sanguine: “Plural marriage is not for everyone,” she says. “But 
it is the life style for me.”232 
4. An Ethical Slut: Dossie Easton 
Dossie Easton, co-author of The Ethical Slut,233 describes her poly awakening and her 
current struggles to live a polyamorous lifestyle by explaining her thoughts during one painful 
night with her primary lover, whom Easton does not name but calls her “most beloved partner” 
or simply her “lover.” The night before, Easton had had sex with her longtime friend, co-author, 
and occasional sexual partner, Catherine. Tonight, Easton’s primary lover, with whom she is in 
an expressly nonmonogamous relationship, is struggling to deal with her emotions about 
Easton’s liaison with Catherine. “My lover is late coming home,” Easton writes, “I hope she is 
alright—this morning she left in tears.”234 Easton explains: “I am asking my lover to go through 
the fire for reasons most of the rest of the world consider frivolous if not downright 
reprehensible—I am asking my lover to suffer because I hate monogamy.”235  
Easton rejected monogamy after a brutally possessive relationship: 
  
 I have hated monogamy for twenty-seven years, since I left my daughter’s violent 
father, fighting my way out of the door, bruised and pregnant, promising anything, 
promising I would call my parents for money, lying. After I escaped Joe he sent me 
suicide threats, and threatened murder—one time he almost found us and set fires around 
the house he thought we were in. 
 Joe was very possessive. Initially I found this attractive, proof positive that he really 
cared about me. . . . He would beat me, screaming imprecations, “You slut!” when 
another man looked at me.236 
                                                 
227 Weisman, supra note 202, at 90.  




232 Joseph, supra note 202, at A31.  
233 DOSSIE EASTON & CATHERINE A. LISZT, THE ETHICAL SLUT: A GUIDE TO INFINITE SEXUAL POSSIBILITIES 
(1997). 
234 Id. at 9. 
235 Id. 
  
236 Id. at 9-10. 
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Although she was “perfectly faithful” to Joe, Easton says: “After I left, I decided he was right—I 
am a slut, I want to be a slut, I will never promise monogamy again. . . . I will never be a piece of 
property again.”237 She describes her response to this experience in political and philosophical 
terms: 
Joe made a feminist of me. A feminist slut. This was in San Francisco in 1969, so I 
decided to invent a new lifestyle. . . . I vowed to remain single for five years in order to 
figure out who I am when I am running my own life. I made a life creed out of 
looseness.238  
 Despite her commitment to nonmonogamy, Easton still has doubts about her choices, 
particularly during this difficult night with her lover: “Why did I insist on doing this? I’m in no 
way perishing from unfulfilled lust. I actually wasn’t even particularly horny, or salivating for 
Catherine and Catherine only.”239 Catherine and Easton have had a sexual relationship as long as 
they have known each other; “that is part of how we write books, and how we are the dearest of 
friends.”240 Easton writes that she and Catherine “have been patiently waiting to resume that 
relationship when my newfound and most beloved partner was ready.”241 Easton’s optimism that 
her lover was ready stemmed from her lover’s growing comfort with nonmonogamy:  
My lover has already conquered the terrors of group sex—tomorrow we will have 
another couple over for dinner and my birthday spanking, which she herself arranged 
with no egging on from me. She never was embarrassed at orgies, much to her own 
amazement. Within the last year she has had more new sexual experiences than possibly 
she had in the previous forty-eight years, and taken to it all like a duck to water.242 
Thus, Easton’s lover seemed to be adjusting to nonmonogamy. 
 But this situation—“her lover having a date with one other person”243—was possibly too 
much for Easton’s lover. “She has trouble accepting me having sex that doesn’t include her, has 
trouble feeling left out, has trouble that we are doing it in our home this time, not neutral 
territory.”244 Again, while waiting for her lover to express herself, Easton wonders if she has 
made a mistake, wonders “how could I hurt her like this?”245 She further reflects on her reasons 
for choosing nonmonogamy:  
When I decided to create my new way twenty-five years ago, I figured that I would never 
again take my security from my relationship, particularly not from the sexual exclusivity 
of my relationship. Joe had cheated on me, I knew that, it didn’t even bother me very 
much. I sort of expected it. I resented those cultural values that said that my sense of 
                                                 
237 Id. at 10. 
238 Id. at 10. 
239 Id. at 10-11. 
240 Id. at 11. 
241 Id.  
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security and self-worth were contingent on the status of whatever man I managed to 
attract to me, as if I had no status of my own. So I vowed to discover a security in myself, 
the stable ground of my very own being, something to do, I thought, with self-respect and 
self-acceptance.246  
Easton found love and support in the communal atmosphere of San Francisco of 1969. “I figured 
I would get my support from my extended family, my kinship network that consisted of 
everybody that I was connected to, through friendship, communal living, coparenting, and/or 
sex. And it worked.”247 
 When her lover is finally ready to talk, the process is painful. “I listened,” Easton says, 
“This time I listened, without interrupting, trying only to let her know that I love her, I feel her 
pain, I am here for her—this is very painful. She is furious with me and I am not giving myself 
permission to defend myself, and I hurt.”248 Easton explains: 
This story has no tidy ending—we talked for hours, or maybe I listened, and I heard how 
difficult it was for her, how she felt invaded, how she felt her home was not safe, how she 
feared that my other lover would not like her, how she felt attacked by her and me both, 
how very much she feared I was abandoning her. We came to no pat little answers that 
make good stories for books—we just poured out anguish, and went to sleep exhausted. 
We woke up the next morning feeling better, but still not over it—the issue resurfaced 
occasionally for the next couple of days. The birthday party helped, a subsequent date 
with Catherine and her girlfriend and my lover and me helped, although it was 
difficult.249 
Easton’s conclusion is tentative: “My lover and I are still in love, and still working on it. We are 
committed to this relationship, and to working through our differences with compassion for each 
other and ourselves. I am from time to time terrified that she will leave me, just because I hate 
monogamy.”250 
C.  Theory  
As the preceding narratives suggest, polyamory is not only a practice; for some, it is a 
theory of relationships. In an effort to organize and explain the contours of that theory, this 
Section sketches five principles espoused by contemporary polys. These principles, which I have 
extracted from a range of poly writings and comments, are presented by polys as both 
aspirational and descriptive. That is, experienced polys tend to present these principles as tools 
for making polyamorous relationships work (aspirational), based on their experience in and 
around functioning polyamorous relationships (descriptive). And the principles are aspirational 
in another way. They are offered by polys not only as functional tools for creating and sustaining 
intimacy among multiple people; they also represent an ethical vision of how those relationships 
should be conducted.  
                                                 
246 Id. at 11-12. 
247 Id. at 12. 
248 Id. at 13. 
249 Id. at 13-14. 
  
250 Id. at 14. 
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To my knowledge, there are no studies of the content of contemporary polyamorous 
relationships. For this and other reasons—such as the wide variety of poly relationships—my 
purpose in presenting these principles is not to say that poly relationships all successfully 
embody these ideas. Rather, my purpose is to show the seriousness with which some polys have 
considered the ethical and practical questions of how multi-party relationships should be 
conducted, and to convey something of the content of the answers they have developed thus far.   
The particular five principles come from no one source but instead represent my attempt 
to synthesize the content of many sources. The principles are self-knowledge, radical honesty, 
consent, self-possession, and privileging love and sex. As a general matter, these principles are 
of course not all unique to polys. Arguably, though, the poly privileging of more loving and 
sexual experiences over other activities and emotions, such as jealousy, is at least highly 
particular to polyamory. Moreover, the other principles have some particular applications, 
meanings, and significance in the poly context. This Section considers each principle in turn.   
1. Self-Knowledge 
 Self-knowledge is portrayed by polyamorists not only as valuable, but as necessary. In 
her foundational book, Polyamory, the New Love Without Limits: Secrets of Sustainable Intimate 
Relationships, Deborah Anapol outlines “Eight Steps to Successful Polyamory,” the first of 
which is to “Know yourself.”251 This dictate operates on two levels. The first level involves 
understanding one’s own sexual identity. This no doubt comprises knowledge of one’s “sexual 
orientation” as we typically use the term—as in heterosexual, bisexual, or homosexual—but also, 
more importantly, it encompasses self-knowledge about one’s sexual identity with regard to 
monogamy. As discussed in Part IV, some polys embrace the view that you either are poly or 
you aren’t,252 whereas other poly writings characterize monogamy and polyamory more as 
choices or constructed identities.253 Whether they understand “poly” and “mono” identities as 
hardwired or chosen, though, polys call for an interrogation of one’s own identity. 
 Polys also value self-knowledge as the core structural component, and the daily substrate, 
of healthy, successful relationships. Understanding oneself and listening to one’s own feelings 
are vital to the process of working through the “baggage” of living in a monogamous world. 
Anapol instructs, as another of her eight steps to success, “Let jealousy be your teacher.”254 
Rather than deny the existence of emotions like jealousy, polys encourage an honest 
interrogation of these feelings. Individuals in any form of relationship may of course aspire to 
and attain self-knowledge. But polys, in order to do all that “processing,” have a particularly 
strong need for constant access to their feelings and desires. 
                                                 
251 ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 32. The others are as follows: heal yourself, replace guilt and shame with self-
acceptance and love, open yourself to sexual energy, let jealousy be your teacher, choose a spiritual path, and look at 
the big picture. Id. at 31-48. 
252 See infra notes 385-390 and accompanying text. 
253 See infra notes 349-354, 390 and accompanying text. 
  
254 Id. at 43. 
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2. Radical Honesty 
The poly ethic of honesty also operates on two levels: a broader philosophical position 
and a daily practice of living. The structural critique may be understood partly as a reaction to 
the gap between the fantasy and the reality of compulsory monogamy. The judge in the Divilbiss 
case criticized April for her “immoral” response to a man’s attentions: “When some guy came to 
her and said I’m in love with you too although you are married, you know, most people would 
have said, well, hey, I’m married; forget it.”255 In response, a poly might assert instead: “The 
judge has it wrong. Most people would have said, ‘Well, hey, I’m married, so we’ll have to keep 
this a secret.’”256  
One theory of polyamory views the entire culture as basically polyamorous but dishonest 
about it. In the words of Deborah Anapol, “Lies, deceit, guilt, unilateral decisions and broken 
commitments are so commonplace in classic American-style monogamy that responsible 
nonmonogamy may sound like an oxymoron.”257 The weak form of this claim is that serial 
monogamy is in a sense polyamory. That is, almost no one settles down with the first person she 
has sex with, no one is truly supermonogamous, and so everyone is really polyamorous. The 
stronger claim, however, is that many people are polyamorous in the sense that they feign simple 
monogamy while practicing nonmonogamy. They lie to their partners and to the world.258 Thus, 
radical honesty is a philosophical and practical approach to living that involves admitting and 
embracing nonmonogamy. For many polys, honesty is so central to polyamory that they would 
object to the use of the term polyamory independent of honesty, protesting that honesty is a 
definitional element of polyamory. For example, one posting on a popular polyamory webpage 
says, “A great many people have secret affairs while they’re in a supposedly monogamous 
relationship. I think those people might have the potential to be polyamorous, but I do not think 
they are practicing polyamory.”259 
One of the authors featured on the Loving More marketplace website is Brad Blanton, 
who is praised by some polys for his books on “radical honesty.”260 The website reports that, 
while the book Radical Honesty “is not about polyamory, . . . Brad did live in a group marriage 
and is supportive of our efforts here at Loving More.”261 The “About the Author” page at the 
back of Blanton’s most recent book tells the reader: 
                                                 
255 See supra text accompanying note 172. 
256 Cf., e.g., Judith P. Stelboum, Patriarchal Monogamy, in THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER: OPEN 
RELATIONSHIPS, NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX, supra note 125, at 39, 44 (“In those cultures that regard 
monogamy as ideal, non-monogamy is widely practiced, secretly.”). 
257 ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 3. 
258 Cf. DAVID G. MAILLU, The Whiteman’s Polygamy, in OUR KIND OF POLYGAMY 29 (1988) (making this point in 
an argument for structural polygamy). 
259 Matthesen, supra note 128 (quoting a post to the alt.polyamory newsgroup by Stef). 
260 BRAD BLANTON, RADICAL HONESTY: HOW TO TRANSFORM YOUR LIFE BY TELLING THE TRUTH (1997); BRAD 
BLANTON, PRACTICING RADICAL HONESTY: HOW TO COMPLETE THE PAST, LIVE IN THE PRESENT, AND BUILD A 
FUTURE (2000) [hereinafter BLANTON, PRACTICING RADICAL HONESTY]; see Thomas Burgio, Coming Out/Going 
In: True Confessions of a Polyamorous Bodyworker, LOVING MORE, Fall 1998, at 13, 13. 
  
261 LOVING MORE, ORDER BOOKS, MAGAZINES, AND MORE, at https://www.lovemore.com/secure/order_secure.html 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2002). 
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I’ve been married 4 times and divorced 3 times, and am currently separated from my 
most recent wife. We were together for 21 years. We are on somewhat amicable terms 
and do not know yet whether we will divorce. I am currently sexually and emotionally 
involved with several women and they all know about each other, and some of them 
know each other. I have 5 kids ranging in age from 7 years old to 31 years old. I love 
them with all of my heart. They are the teachers to whom I am most grateful and from 
whom I have learned the very most. They continue to teach me.262 
His books outline a philosophy of absolute honesty and of honesty as a revolutionary way to 
improve oneself and the world. Radical honesty, Blanton tells us, “involves not denying or 
avoiding anything, particularly anger that comes from attachment to the one true way we all 
seem to come up with every fifteen seconds. It involves clearing our way back to contact with 
each other through honesty about what we think and feel and do.”263 Many of the examples of 
life changes made by participants in Blanton’s workshops include spouses who admit their 
affairs, prompting the couples either to turn a failed marriage into a positive honest one264 or to 
split up and lead the honest partner to find new, more honest, relations elsewhere.265 
Whether or not they particularly follow Blanton, polys tend to privilege honesty as the 
foundation of positive relationships. The Loving More mission statement names “honesty” and 
“openness” first among the bases of relationships.266 Another of Deborah Anapol’s core steps to 
successful polyamory is to “Master the art of communicating.”267 Anapol also writes: 
My experience is that neither intentional communities nor intimate networks can survive, 
let alone thrive, without a free flow of information within their boundaries. A withhold is 
just as destructive in a group of intimate friends (whether or not they are sexually 
involved) as it is in a couple or a nuclear family and for the same reasons. Secrets and lies 
destroy intimacy, erode trust, create paranoia, and ultimately strangle the life out of 
relationships. And when sex and love are involved, nothing puts an end to passion more 
effectively than a withhold.268 
Although radical honesty need not mean radical disclosure,269 a wide variety of poly writings 
invokes honesty as a key principle for relationships.270 As Eddie Simmons emphasized, a great 
deal of therapy and communication—the cherished tools of process queens—sustains his 
                                                 
262 BLANTON, PRACTICING RADICAL HONESTY, supra note 260, at 343-44. 
263 Id. at 338. 
264 E.g., id. at 24. 
265 E.g., id. at 25 (“A woman diagnosed by physicians with arthritis told the truth to her husband about an affair she 
had been hiding for a long time. They eventually split up, but her “arthritis” went away. Her next relationship was 
one of more honesty, less pain and illness, and more creativity in a shared life together.”). 
266 LOVING MORE, supra note 124. See infra text accompanying note 291. 
267 ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 37. 
268 Deborah Anapol, Privacy: When Are Secrets Lies?, LOVING MORE, Fall 1998, at 9, 10. The term “withhold” 
apparently describes the action of holding back one’s emotions, of refusing to share them with others. 
269 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 282-284 (describing ways of thinking about privacy and disclosure 
within a relationship that aim to maintain boundaries between individuals). 
  
270 See, e.g., Janet Kira Lessin, The Perils and Pearls of Polyamory, LOVING MORE, Fall 2000, at 26, 27 (“Pearl 6: 
Always be honest.”).  
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family.271 For one contributor to Loving More, expressing her views on honesty is a key reason 
to be out as poly: “I love being in situations where it is respected that we are a group marriage. 
Those are my favorites. There I can really shine about my life’s primary focus, the legitimacy of 
polygamy and the absolute need for honesty in intimate relationships.”272 
 Honesty is certainly not unique to polys. But a heightened emphasis on communication is 
highly characteristic of polys, and openness about nonmonogamy is the most distinctive aspect 
of poly honesty. Indeed, the latter prompts polys to describe their honesty as “radical.” Note, 
however, that if society presumed nonmonogamy, then it might be radical to embrace and admit 
openly a commitment to monogamy. In this way, the radical-ness of poly honesty is contingent.  
3. Consent 
 Honesty is also something more than the transmission of information in polyamorous 
relationships: Honesty forms the basis of consent in this context. The idea of consent—the idea 
that partners in a relationship or a sexual encounter make an informed decision to participate in 
the relationship or the encounter—pervades the writing in this area. While the idea is sometimes 
implicit in the way other values are discussed, such as honesty and communication, some writers 
speak of consent explicitly.273 For instance, Dr. Joy Singer presents “Negotiating and making 
agreements” as one of the key relationship challenges for polyamorous relationships, 
emphasizing that “each agreement is a reminder that consent is at the heart of successful poly 
relating” and that “consent must be given at an explicit and detailed level.”274 Writing as a 
clinical psychologist who works with polyamorous partners, Singer also emphasizes the 
importance of distinguishing between “true consent” and “[c]oerced consent,” noting that 
“[t]herapists may see clients whose relationships reflect manipulation, dishonesty, or other 
dysfunctional patterns that are no more representative of healthy poly than healthy 
monogamy.”275 Though individual poly relationships will vary, true consent is a vital part of the 
relationship models to which polys aspire.  
 Consent is also of vital importance to many nonpoly relationships. In a simple way, the 
poly emphasis on consent is another part of the poly critique of the secretive nonmonogamy 
                                                 
271 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
272 Poohzen’s Perspective, in The Dragon Bear Family, A MultiPlex Perspective on Living Out, LOVING MORE, Fall 
1998, at 14, 14. 
273 See, e.g., EASTON & LISZT, supra note 233. 
274 Joy Davidson, Working with Polyamorous Clients in the Clinical Setting, ELEC. J. OF HUMAN SEXUALITY, Apr. 
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275 Id.; see also Strassberg, supra note 8 (expressing concern that partners in larger polyfidelitous relationships may 
be subject to coercive group practices). 
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practiced by some purported monogamists. But the poly attention to consent runs deeper than 
that. The prominence of the idea of consent also stems from the poly emphasis on freedom of 
choice about relationship norms and the importance of individual, rather than societal, 
relationship expectations. Because no one relationship model provides a blueprint for the 
number, shape, or type of bonds among individuals within and without the relationship, polys 
must develop their own models through the agreement of the partners.  
4. Self-Possession 
A number of prominent poly writers describe their embrace of polyamory as fueled by 
their insights about power and possessiveness in monogamy and by their desire for autonomy 
within their relationships. This aspect of polyamory builds in part on the feminist understanding 
of monogamy as a historical mechanism for the control of women’s reproductive and other 
labor.276 Judith Stelboum writes, “Feminist scholars state that the origins of monogamy have 
their source in patriarchal thinking. Viewed as the possessions of the male, women were used for 
barter and/or procreation. Legitimacy of a child relates to acknowledgement of the child’s father, 
not to the child’s mother.”277 In light of this, Stelboum tries to explain the adoption of 
monogamy by many contemporary lesbians: “The implications of the historical prerogative of 
male inheritance have little relevance for the lesbian community, but the social values and 
behavioral modes of the dominant heterosexual community have been firmly implanted within 
most of the lesbian population.”278 In response, she offers several purposes of nonmonogamy in 
lesbian relationships, including a political statement against the “confining heterosexual models 
of monogamy,” and “a way for two women to define autonomy within a coupled situation and 
avoid the intense bonding typical of some lesbian partners.”279  
In an essay aimed at helping couples lessen jealousy in their relationships, Marny Hall 
paints a similar portrait of polyamory as a useful way to create individual space and autonomy 
within primary relationships. As a general matter, she observes, new couples make decisions 
about what parts of their lives they share and what they keep separate: “When partners first get 
together, they may have different ideas about what is mine, yours, and ours. Time, money, even 
how many daydreams to share are up for discussion. . . . [Ultimately,] for some couples, the ‘us’ 
pile is so huge it dwarfs both the ‘me’ and ‘her’ stacks.” 280 Couples make similar, though often 
tacit, decisions about sex: 
Acknowledged or not, many couples also have three sex stacks. There is ours, yours, 
and my sex. Private sex may consist of a favorite fantasy or a vibrator quickie after a 
girlfriend has gone to work. The erotic activities in one’s private domain are not exactly 
                                                 
276 See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 47 (“Monogamous marriage as we know it today is based on patterns 
established in Biblical times governing men’s ownership of women. In Biblical days the law prescribed that women 
be stoned to death for taking a lover, but men were allowed as many secondary wives or concubines as they could 
afford. For most of recorded history, the absolute authority of the husband over his wife has been taken for granted 
and male violence against disobedient wives has been considered natural and right.”). 
277 Stelboum, supra note 256, at 42.  
278 Id. at 44.  
279 Id. at 45. 
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secret. But just as we don’t divulge the amount we paid for a pair of birthday earrings, we 
don’t announce every time we [masturbate].281  
But, she observes, the privacy about certain aspects of a partner’s sexual self does not typically 
extend to other sexual partners. “Yet,” Hall asks, “what if it did?”282 Hall suggests that this 
approach would require “only [that we] consciously extend the usual cultural rules about 
privacy—the ones that already apply to our fantasies and our vibrator—to other sexual 
partners.”283 She describes several methods that couples use to create such privacy: 
For example, some partners agree to being unaccountable to each other during certain 
specified periods of time. . . . Still other partners prefer the information filter to be partial. 
In other words, they prefer to know about the existence of other sexual partners but want 
to be spared all the details. . . . Another couple consciously made information about 
outside sex optional. Each kept a brief log of her encounters with other women. Both 
partners’ record books, which listed only names, places, and dates, were left on top of the 
bookcase—available for either to check if she so desired. One partner never checked the 
log. After a peek or two, the other stopped. . . . Eager to maintain a high level of privacy 
and intimacy—and avoid the schlep factor of crosstown apartments—[the partners in one 
couple] live in separate flats in the same building [and have been together] for ten years . 
. . .284 
Thus, for these open relationships, the possibility of outside lovers was a way to resist the 
pressure (from either heterosexual tradition or the lesbian “U-Haul Syndrome”285) to merge into 
one being, and thus a way to preserve their own privacy and separateness. In her therapeutic 
practice, Hall does not view polyamory as only a means to strengthening or enhancing primary 
relationships. She also recognizes its potential to instigate transitions out of relationships for 
couples who need to move on and also to create partnerships of more than two.286 
For Dossie Easton and Deborah Anapol, realizations about the strictures of monogamy 
came through experience or study of domestic violence. As described above, Easton devotes 
energy and emotion to preserving the independence made possible by polyamory because an 
abusive relationship opened her eyes to the control exerted in monogamous relationships.287 
Anapol’s Ph.D. in clinical psychology focused on domestic violence, and she identifies 
connections between the possessive claims of monogamy and the cycles of abuse and violence in 
these relationships:  
I married for the second time, trying to fit myself into the traditional mold with an 
ambitious, personable husband and a house with a white picket fence. He too had 
unfinished business with an old lover, but while continued friendships were acceptable to 
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him, extra-marital love affairs were not. I was researching domestic violence for my 
doctoral dissertation . . . and was horrified to realize that the dynamics of domination, 
control, jealousy and dependency that I’d observed in abusive marriages I was studying, 
existed, at a more moderate level, in my own marriage.288  
These realizations were part of what led Anapol to reject traditional monogamy and pursue 
polyamory as a tool for more autonomous relationships.  
5. Privileging Love and Sex 
A crucial aspect of poly thinking, and the one most particular to polyamory, is the idea 
that, when it comes to sex and love, more expression and experience may truly be better than 
less. One source of this philosophy is the various free love movements of the 1960s. The science 
fiction writer Robert Heinlein famously said, “Love is that condition wherein another person’s 
happiness is essential to your own.”289 One poly writer asserts that, in light of Heinlein’s 
“foundational premise, jealousy and possessiveness become seen [by our community] not as 
symptoms of love, but as a pathology of insecurity.”290 This idea, that more may be better, 
inspires the name of Loving More, as well as its mission statement, which states that the 
organization has 
a specific vision of relationships based on honesty, openness, respect for the individual, 
love as an infinite resource, the body and sexuality as sacred, and relationship as a path to 
personal & spiritual growth. In this vision, there’s room for more love, more intimacy, 
more possibilities, and more people. Accordingly, there is also more responsibility and 
challenge: a deeply personal challenge to transform ourselves, our lives, and our world 
into a more loving and responsible place.291 
Eddie Simmons expressed a similar idea when he talked to me about his realization some years 
ago that it’s “very important to tell people” you love them, to tell them “now rather than later.”292 
For him, AIDS created the conditions for that understanding. He knows that he loves many 
people, and he tells them so.293  
The more love of “loving more” may also provide the basis for more resources of many 
kinds. Eddie suggested that he thought polyamory was a positive way to raise children because 
polyamory provides so many resources for caring.294 Emphasizing the loving care her daughter 
receives while she is at work, Elizabeth Joseph describes polygyny as a “whole solution” to the 
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modern woman’s juggling act.295 Consistent with these accounts, psychotherapist Marny Hall 
highlights the “resource-intensiveness” of three triads that she interviewed:  
When we think of threesomes, the metaphor of the third wheel—the unwanted extra—
immediately comes to mind. After my exposure to these trios, however, the old metaphor 
never quite recovered its former potency. On the contrary, the extra wheel was usually an 
asset. Whenever a particular need arose, somebody was on hand to take care of it. For 
example, if someone was short of cash that week, someone else pitched in to cover 
household expenses. Ditto for emotional support, sexual energy, child care help, even 
companionship.296 
When a community of people values the expression of love, polys would say, the benefits accrue 
to all its members. 
 Love and sex are of course valued in many relationships so, to an extent, polys share this 
principle with many non-polys. The difference in the poly context is, I think, the extent to which 
poly relationships privilege love and sex over other feelings and activities. On the love side, this 
means that polys tend to prioritize talking and other forms of intimacy creation over other 
activities. They therefore devote much time to processing everyone’s feelings.297 As Hall said of 
the trios she interviewed, “[T]he trios required more time for discussion about everything from 
hurt feelings to chores.”298  
 On the sex side of this principle, polys truly seem distinct from most monos. Contrary to 
the law of monogamy that jealousy trumps outside sexual desires and experiences, discussed 
earlier,299 polys feel that jealousy should be overcome, to make room for more sexual and loving 
possibilities.300 Rather than assuming that a philandering partner should curb her wandering 
                                                 
295 See supra text accompanying note 206. Of course, there are other women with experience in polygynous 
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impulse,301 then, polys more often proceed from the assumption that the jealous partner should 
work through his jealousy. As discussed below, a few polys speak of themselves as lacking in 
jealousy,302 but the more typical discussion of jealousy concerns how to understand and work 
through it. As noted earlier, Anapol advises, “Let jealousy be your teacher.”303 Some poly writers 
use the term “compersion” to describe a particular alternative or supplement to jealousy: 
“Compersion[ is t]he feeling of happiness in knowing that others you love share joy with each 
other, especially taking joy in the knowledge that your beloveds are expressing their love for one 
another. The opposite of jealousy.”304 Polys generally aim to develop and expand their 
compersion, while understanding, working through, and getting past jealous responses. In this 
way, they reject the common belief that jealousy signifies love, and they invert the standard 
hierarchy of jealousy over extra-relational sexual experience.  
IV. THE PARADOX OF PREVALENCE 
 The previous discussion has identified several elements of the puzzle of polyamory’s 
place outside the political debate over marriage. First, the expectation of monogamy has a strong 
hold on this country’s fantasies and institutions. Second, that expectation is widely unfulfilled. 
Third, for some people, polyamory exists as a viable relationship form with an articulated set of 
ethical aspirations. In light of all this, I return to the question that began this article: Why is the 
possibility that same-sex marriage would lead to multi-party marriage such an effective 
rhetorical scare tactic for the opponents of same-sex marriage? In this Part, I argue that the 
widespread resistance to the idea of marriage among more than two people is actually the result 
of monogamy’s failure. The threat of polyamory in a sense stems from its apparent prevalence.  
Before discussing my argument, I consider in Section A some other possible reasons for 
outsiders’ response to polyamory. I conclude that any or all of these reasons may contribute in 
some way to the response, but none adequately explains it. Drawing on sexuality theory 
developed around homosexuality, Section B explains the distinction between universalizing and 
minoritizing conceptions of identity, locates polyamory as a universalizing discourse, and draws 
lessons from gay politics to understand how common ground with the mainstream could be a 
political liability for polyamorists. Section C discusses a strand of poly thinking and writing that 
is minoritizing, and considers the implications of this discussion for disagreements about the 
definition of polyamory.  
A.  Several Possible Factors in the Response to Polyamory 
 There must be some readers who, before reading this article, already believed polyamory 
to be a viable relationship model deserving the same public respect as monogamous dyads. And 
there may be a few readers who, not having heard of polyamory before, now believe that 
polyamorists deserve legal recognition and protection in all imaginable contexts, such as 
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marriage, custody, and employment.305 But I imagine these readers are few. Rather, I suspect that 
most readers have serious reservations about the idea of polyamory as an acceptable social 
practice, and would still hesitate to respond “why not?” or “who cares?” to conservatives’ threats 
that same-sex marriage will lead to legalized polygamy.306 While Part III responded to the 
common perception that polyamory is preposterous and trivial, this Section briefly discusses four 
further reasons for the negative response to the practice. Of varying plausibility, each of these 
deserves more sustained discussion than what follows. The purpose here is not to refute these 
criticisms and concerns, however, but to show why they cannot fully explain the response to 
polyamory. 
  First, some may think that a monogamous couple is the most efficient unit for family 
formation. For instance, some may expect a larger foundational unit to lead to shirking and 
excessive grabbing, much as in a house of college students, where everyone takes more than he 
or she contributes, so important household work never gets done, dishes pile up, and so on.307 To 
                                                 
305 In a recent survey, responding polys reported that employment nondiscrimination was one of their three highest 
priority legal issues. See infra note 402. One lawyer contributor to Loving More suggests that talking about one’s 
poly lifestyle might prompt a hostile environment sex harassment claim. Rita Risser, Is It Harassment If You Say 
You’re Poly?, 1 BEST OF LOVING MORE 34 (1997). She advises that the “safe thing to do” to prevent harassment 
claims “is say nothing and live your life in the closet.” Id. at 35. But since most people are not “comfortable” there, 
she lays out a “continuum of behavior from acceptable to unacceptable.” Id. Speaking philosophically is most 
acceptable. She describes the least acceptable option as follows: “Most unacceptable is to volunteer sexual details, 
invite a co-worker to attend a workshop or party, or invite someone to join you and your partner for a threesome in 
the hottub.” She adds, “It’s probably not poly people who do this, but there are a number of cases with a threesome 
theme.” Id. Based on my research, no federal or state cases support the claim that the suggestion of a threesome is, 
by itself, sufficient grounds for a successful harassment suit. 
306 Contrast the response to the polygamy analogy—i.e., efforts by gay-marriage proponents to distinguish the two, 
further efforts by conservatives to align the two—to the widespread response to Scalia’s threat that Lawrence might 
lead to the invalidation of states proscribing masturbation, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003). See, 
e.g., Ampersand, Passing Though on Scalia’s Dissent, http://www.amptoons.com/blog/000622.html (June 30, 2003) 
(“You know, we live in a remarkable age when a member of the Supreme Court—the member who is probably the 
most admired by conservatives, who is often credited by left and right alike as one of the sharpest conservative 
minds in the nation—writes that the Court shouldn’t have ruled Texas’ anti-Sodomy law unconstitutional because 
such a ruling might get in the way of state laws outlawing masturbation. Why is Scalia worried about preserving the 
states’ rights to outlaw masturbation? Why would anyone worry about that? It’s masturbation, for pity’s sake! Is 
there anywhere a less harmful action, with less reason for government concern, than masturbation?”); Jan Glidewell, 
Let States Unite People and Religions Marry Them, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Aug. 8, 2003, at 1 (“The degree 
of hysteria with which the recent Supreme Court decision striking down antisodomy laws is symbolized by the 
dissenting opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, who feared that the decision would legalize, among other 
horrors, masturbation. Come on. There’s a state where masturbation is illegal? Where?”) ; Roger L. Simon, 
http://rogerlsimon.com/archives/00000242.htm (June 27, 2003) (“Was Antonin Scalia auditioning for Saturday 
Night Live . . . when he wrote in his dissenting opinion to yesterday’s rejection of anti-sodomy laws by the Supreme 
Court that it might lead to the legalization of masturbation?!... Pretty funny, Antonin—you just might open SNL if 
you keep it up!”); This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast, June 29, 2003) (statement of 
Fareed Zakaria) (“George, let me suggest to you this is the same slippery slope argument[—]how do you rule out 
things like bigamy or bestiality[?] And it’s true, whenever draw a line there’s a danger of slippage. There’s also, of 
course, danger of slippage on the other side. That is to say, if you say it is all right for state legislatures to make 
criminal private intimate acts between two gay men, shouldn’t it also be all right for them to make criminal 
masturbation or [miscegenation], interracial sex? This is Kennedy’s point in, in the Supreme Court majority opinion 
and Scalia, to his credit, is honest enough to that, yes, he would like it to be all right and constitutional for states in 
America to say interracial sex is in fact banned and criminal. So, there’s, there’s a slippery slope on both sides of the 
argument.”) 
  
307 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1396 (1993). 
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avoid these deadweight losses, the group may need to engage in a great deal of negotiating and 
monitoring, leading to high transaction costs.308 Particularly given the poly commitment to 
processing everyone’s emotions, polyamory may therefore generate disturbing visions of 
relationship by committee. But the efficiency arguments can also go the other way. Polyamorous 
households can benefit from economies of scale and specialization of labor.309 And to someone 
who enjoys processing,310 this may not be a cost but a valued good.  
 Second, polyamory may prompt an egalitarian objection that the traditional form of 
polygamy involves one man dominating multiple wives.311 From a feminist perspective, 
traditional polygyny looks like the archetype of the oppressive patriarchal family writ large.312 
But economists and legal scholars, as well as practitioners of polygyny such as Elizabeth Joseph, 
have made the opposite claim: that polygyny may actually benefit women.313 Gary Becker has 
argued that, by making women scarcer, polygyny causes men to value them more highly.314 And 
Carol Rose and others have suggested that polygynous marriage could give women more market 
choice, so that none of the women has to marry one of the “loutish” (lazy) men.315 Relatedly, in 
light of the widespread imprisonment and impoverishment of African-American men, Adrienne 
Wing has proposed that some African-American women might prefer polygynous marriages to 
not finding an appealing husband at all.316 Moreover, Bonnie Honig has urged that the institution 
                                                 
308 Id. 
309 See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 202, at A31; Westley, supra note 82, at 71; supra text accompanying notes 203-213; 
see also Strassberg, supra note 8, at 503 (asserting that polyamorous relationships are so economically efficient that 
people may find it financially difficult to exit them); cf. Ellickson, supra note 307, at 1395 (noting the possible 
efficiencies of multi-member households, including efficiencies of scale, specialization of labor, and increased 
dwelling space). 
310 See supra text accompanying note 198. 
311 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
312 See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 111; Iversen, supra note 42, at 518 (observing that “[o]ne cannot truly apply the 
term ‘feminist’ to the Mormon plural wives because feminism and patriarchal religion are incompatible”); Collin 
O’Connor Udell, Intimate Association: Resurrecting a Hybrid Right, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 283 (1998). This 
criticism overlaps with the argument that polygamy necessarily leads to despotism rather than democracy. See, e.g., 
Udell, supra, at 283; Strassberg, supra note 8; Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, 
Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501 (1997).  
313 See supra Section III.B.3. 
314 See GARY S. BECKER, Polygamy and Monogamy in Marriage Markets, in A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 80, 81 
(1991). But cf. Bergmann, supra note 111, at 145 (arguing that Becker’s economic analysis must be “grossly 
incomplete” because it appears to prove a conclusion, that polygamy is better for women than monogamy, that “we 
know to be false”); Westley, supra note 82, at 72 (arguing that Becker ignores various benefits of monogamy such 
as stability and nurturing and fails to recognize the potential pitfalls of a polygynous society in which poor men may 
resort to violence to obtain wives). 
315 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 432 (1992) 
(pointing out that, under a system of one-man/one-woman marriage, some women will end up with “loutish” 
husbands who do not share in household duties, and observing that “even though they phrased it somewhat 
differently, some nineteenth-century Mormons thought that the [men’s] greater propensity for loutishness was a 
pretty good reason for plural marriage, where the more cooperative [men] got lots of wives and the less cooperative 
ones presumably got none”); see also Julie Dunfey, "Living the Principle" of Plural Marriage: Mormon Women, 
Utopia, and Female Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, 10 FEMINIST STUD. 523, 529 (1984) (reporting nineteenth-
century Mormon women’s praise of polygyny’s potential for pairing the few “good men” with the many “good 
women”).  
  
316 Adrienne Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black America: Global Critical 
Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-First Century, 11 J. OF CONT. L. ISSUES 811, 858 (2001) (“In my 
view, African Americans today face conditions in which de facto polygamy can flourish. A disproportionate number 
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of polygamy can sometimes create the conditions for solidarity among women, whereas 
monogamy “isolates women from each other and privatizes them.”317 Feminist arguments 
therefore may cut both ways.318 And even if multiparty relationships may sometimes be 
detrimental to women, particularly in their traditional polygynous form, this must not be true in 
all cases; as discussed earlier, some polyamorists specifically embrace the practice of 
nonmonogamy as a part of a feminist commitment to self-possession.319  In this light, feminist 
objections cannot entirely ground the opposition to multi-party marriage, unless one is also 
inclined to oppose marriage altogether on the ground that its traditional form oppresses 
women.320   
 Third, the negative response to polyamory may also stem from the view that these 
relationships are not physically or psychologically healthy. Polyamory may inspire concerns 
about sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).321 Like other sexually active people, polyamorists 
face risks that a partner is infected, and to the extent that polys have more partners than people in 
couples, they might have more cause for concern about STDs than some sexually active people. 
On the other hand, in a polyamorous subculture that aspires to honesty about sexual practices, 
informed communication about sexual health may be particularly valued,322 and the social 
                                                                                                                                                             
of our men are unavailable for marriage—due to early death, imprisonment, high unemployment, and intermarriage. 
More of our young women have obtained higher educations than the young men. Socially, we as Black women, like 
most women, have been reared to want men of an equal or higher social status. We have also been socialized to 
prefer our own men, to men from other racial/ethnic groups. A wealth of well employed and educated Black women 
seek a small pool of ‘suitable’ men. The net result is that the few men have a surplus of women from which to select. 
They can be either de facto polygamists or womanizers. They can have children with multiple women and support 
none of them. Since the Civil Rights movement, more black men than women have taken advantage of the 
opportunity to date or marry outside the race, an act that could have resulted in a lynching in the past.  The net result 
is that only 39% of Black women are married, compared to 60% of white women, and 67% of Black children are 
born out-of- wedlock compared to 25% of white babies. In the U.S. Constitution, Blacks were counted as three-fifths 
of a person for representation purposes. Today, some lonely women remain ready to have a much smaller piece than 
three-fifths of a man.” (footnotes omitted)). 
317 Bonnie Honig, Complicating Culture, BOSTON REV., Nov. 1997,  
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR22.5/honig.html. 
318 See, e.g., Iversen, supra note 42, at 518-19 (describing how Mormon polygyny was both feminist and anti-
feminist).  
319 See supra text accompanying notes 276-288. 
320 Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 160-61 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books repr. 1985) (1859) (“No 
one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution [of polygamy]; both for other reasons and 
because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, 
being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity 
of obligation towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the 
women concerned in it, and who may be deemed sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage 
institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has as its explanation in the common ideas and customs 
of the world, which, teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a 
woman should prefer being one of several wives to not being a wife at all.”). 
321 See ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 28 (“Many people these days are fearful of choosing a polyamorous lovestyle 
because of concerns about exposing themselves to AIDS or to sexually transmitted diseases such as herpes . . . .”). 
  
322 Cf., e.g., F.C.I. Hickson & P.M. Davies, Maintenance of Open Gay Relationships: Some Strategies for Protection 
Against HIV, 4 AIDS CARE 409 (1992) (reporting, in a study of 387 homosexually active men, that 72.7% of the 
men in nonexclusive relationships (who made up 56.3% of those in relationships) had “some agreement between the 
partners as to the nature of sex with third parties” and the “most common type of rule amongst these couples 
concerned safer sex”). 
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consequences of lying about sexual behavior and sexual health may be particularly great.323 
Moreover, promises of sexual exclusivity in monogamous relationships may give monogamists 
more reason to lie about their sexual behavior or to have unprotected sex.324 People in ostensibly 
monogamous relationships are caught in a bind if they contract infections; even if they want to 
protect their other half from the physical harm of contagion, they risk inflicting emotional harm 
and losing the relationship if they reveal their infected status, and thus their sexual dalliances.325  
 The question of whether polyamory could have negative psychological effects on 
participants is hard to answer. Maura Strassberg has argued that polyamorous relationships may 
be coercive or oppressive, particularly when the relationships are closed (“polyfidelitous”) and 
involve more than three or four people.326 But coercion and oppression of course afflict bilateral 
relationships as well as multi-party ones.327 I have found few studies of the psychological effects 
of open relationships. There are a few studies comparing open relationships and closed 
relationships among gay men, which show equal or greater relationship longevity in open 
relationships and mixed results on whether reported relationship satisfaction is different or the 
same;328 these are, however, early and small empirical efforts. Moreover, it would be hard to 
                                                 
323 See, e.g., Vexen Crabtree, Human Sexuality: Poly, http://www.vexen.co.uk/human/poly.html#pastd (last updated 
Mar. 1, 2001) (“A person is not accepted into a poly group if they do not take issues like pregnancy and protection 
seriously. There is a very high awareness of the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases within poly groups . . . .”).  
324 See, e.g., David J. Mack, Note, Cleansing the System: A Fresh Approach to Liability for the Negligent or 
Fraudulent Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 665 (1999) (reporting the 
finding of a recent study of STD infection that, “because perceived risk is generally lower in monogamous 
relationships, married people are less likely than their single counterparts to use condoms” (citing Betsy Payn et al., 
Men's Behavior Change Following Infection with a Sexually Transmitted Disease, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 152, 153 
(1997))). 
325 See, e.g., ANAPOL, supra note 125, at 28 (“A closed circle, whether of two or six or twenty, healthy, trusted 
partners can make polyamory just as ‘safe’ as monogamy, perhaps more so since the couple who have sworn to be 
monogamous may be more likely to lie about outside affairs and less likely to frankly discuss their sexual histories 
with prospective lovers than those who are openly polyamorous.”); Mack, supra note 324, at 661-62 (discussing the 
role of “secrecy” in the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, according to a recent report by the Sexuality 
Information and Education Council of the United States); see also McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (1998) 
(woman suing former husband for “infect[ing] her with a sexually transmitted disease he acquired through an 
extramarital affair”). 
326 Strassberg, supra note 8, at 496-99, 508-09. 
327 Strassberg cites the example of the Kerista cult that existed in San Francisco from 1971 to 1991, in which certain 
participants tried to urge new members on one another through peer pressure, and the group would punish certain 
members for disagreeable behavior by withholding sex from them. Strassberg, supra note 8, at 497-98. Strassberg 
observes that the costs of withholding sex are not so great in this group situation because the withholders can all still 
have sex with one another, and she therefore finds this situation to be more coercive and unhealthy than a 
monogamous one. Id. at 502. But this reasoning cuts both ways because members of monogamous couples have the 
power to make unilateral and unreasonable decisions to cut out sex for the other person, a decision that only harms 
the withholder if he or she values sex more than the negative emotion fueling the withholding. This is a coercive 
situation that may be avoided in polyamorous relationships, where one person’s decision to withhold sex does not 
deprive another of the possibility of sex. 
  
328 See, e.g., David Blasband & Letitia Anne Peplau, Sexual Exclusivity Versus Openness in Gay Male Couples, 14 
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 395 (1985) (finding, in a study of forty gay male couples of which approximately 
57.5% reported an open relationship and 42.5% reported a closed relationship, no differences between the open and 
closed relationships in reported affection, respect, love, or longevity); Lawrence A. Kurdek & J. Patrick Schmitt, 
Relationship Quality of Gay Men in Closed or Open Relationships, 12 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 85, 95-96 (Winter 
1985/86) (reporting, based on self-report measures by 49 gay male couples in open relationships and 17 gay male 
couples in closed relationships, that inter alia the couples in open relationships lived together significantly longer 
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know the possible effect of living in a nonmonogamous relationship in the context of a culture 
that frowns upon that.  
 Strassberg also worries, like the judge in the Divilbiss case, that children will be damaged 
by exposure to polyamory.329 Some people may well be concerned that polyamorous 
relationships would be less stable or structured than monogamous ones and thus cause harm to 
any children the participants might have. Of course, many people in polyamorous relationships 
may not have children, which would eliminate this concern. But for those who do, more 
information would be needed to evaluate the validity of this concern.330 As with the concern 
about the effects on the participants, there are individual accounts of polyamorous relationships 
that the participants perceive as either healthy or unhealthy for the children involved.331 And 
speculative arguments can be made either way.  
 For instance, relationships might be less stable because there are more participants or 
because participants are open to other relationships. But, on the other hand, openness to other 
possibilities could prevent relationships from ending because of outside attraction or sex and 
might generally permit a flexibility that allows a relationship to survive through changing needs 
and desires. In terms of child-rearing approaches, polyamory might seem loose and unstructured, 
but the aspirations articulated by polyamorists include some structuring concepts like consent 
and honesty, and, as discussed earlier, some polys are highly attentive to boundaries.332 In terms 
of attention to the children, some might worry that polys would be too engaged with one another 
to care adequately for the children. On the other hand, more hearts and hands might contribute 
positively to the care of children; along these lines, some polys have suggested that polyamory 
provides the “village” that Hillary Clinton and others have said it takes “to raise a child.”333 
What harm means in this context, whether it might occur, and what the policy consequences 
might be are all difficult questions, and, without clarifying information, people may well be 
concerned about children in these situations. Since many people never have children and 
discussions of polyamory typically do not center on children, however, I would venture that 
                                                                                                                                                             
than those in closed relationships, that the couples in closed and open relationships reported equal satisfaction on 
some measures (respect/perceived similarity, agreement, satisfaction with affection and sex, and shared activities), 
and that the couples in closed relationships reported greater satisfaction along several measures (greater 
affiliative/dependent need, more favorable attitude toward the relationship, and less tension in the relationship)); see 
also Strassberg, supra note 8, at 497.  
329 See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 509-20; see also Westley, supra note 82, at 72 (arguing that stability and 
nurturing of monogamous family benefit children and thereby help create an effective labor force). 
330 See Strassberg, supra note 8, at 559-60. There is one study of the extent to which parents in open relationships 
disclose their relationship details to their children, which concludes that most parents do not fully inform their 
children of their involvements. See James Watson & Mary A. Watson, Children of open marriages: Parental 
disclosure and perspectives, 5 ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES 54, * (1982).  
331 For a discussion of an interview with a psychologist who felt she was harmed because her parents were 
“swingers” who engaged in casual sex with many different people, see Strassberg, supra note 8, at 511-17 (citing 
Ryam Nearing, But What About the Kids?, 24 LOVING MORE 10, 10-13 (Winter 2001)). For a description of 
interviews with parents in alternative relationships, including polyamorous relationships, who characterize their 
children’s development as healthy, see PATRICK CALIFIA, When the Playroom Becomes a Nursery: S/M-Fetish 
People Who Choose to Parent, in SPEAKING SEX TO POWER: THE POLITICS OF QUEER SEX 46, 50-53 (2002). 
332 See supra Section III.C. 
  
333 Strassberg, supra note 8, at 560 & n. 549 (quoting Lady Alia-anor Ravenhart, Help! I’m Going to Have a Baby! 
Part Two, 9 LOVING MORE 10, 11 (Spring 1997)).  
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possible effects on possible children are not foremost in most people’s minds when they react 
negatively to the idea of polyamory. 
 Fourth, polyamory may tap into anxieties about other social taboos. For instance, Judith 
Butler has suggested that a deep anxiety about incest underlies our response to all sexual and 
familial taboos.334 Comments by the judge in the Divilbiss case indicate that he could not escape 
the image of all three partners in bed together—something that was not part of their 
relationship—and of the child in bed with the three of them.335 Whether or not incest is the taboo 
that many others collapse into, as Butler suggests, one could hypothesize about why incest might 
haunt discussions of intimate group sex within a family. Classically, parents are two, and 
children may be more than two. Our only model for permissible sexual relations within a nuclear 
family is the parents. For this reason, the idea of sex among three or more family members may 
evoke the idea of siblings—the horizontal family relationship that can involve more than two—
rather than parents. In this way, sex within polyamorous families might prompt an image of 
sibling incest. But this is, perhaps to a greater extent than the other concerns, mere speculation. 
 Homosexuality, on the other hand, bears a more concrete relationship to polyamory. 
Mutual sex among three or more people necessarily involves some homosexual or bisexual 
relations, since any group of people larger than two involves at least two of the same sex. Sex 
between two people is either different-sex or same-sex, heterosexual or homosexual. Sex among 
three people (or more)—where all three sleep together, or each of them sleeps with each of the 
others—cannot be strictly heterosexual, since there are only two sexes. If all three are one sex, 
then there is same-sex sex; if two are one sex and the third is another sex, then there is some 
                                                 
334 Butler writes: 
Consider that the horror of incest, the moral revulsion it compels in some, is not that far afield from the 
same horror and revulsion felt toward lesbian and gay sex, and is not unrelated to the intense moral 
condemnation of voluntary single parenting, or gay parenting, or parenting arrangements with more than 
two adults involved (practices that can be used as evidence to support a claim to remove a child from the 
custody of the parent in several states in the United States). These various modes in which the oedipal 
mandate fails to produce normative family all risk entering into the metonymy of that moralized sexual 
horror that is perhaps most fundamentally associated with incest. 
JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE’S CLAIM: KINSHIP BETWEEN LIFE & DEATH 71 (2000). 
335 Over the protests of April Divilbiss’s attorney that the three members of this triad were not actually sleeping 
together, but rather, April was sleeping with each man separately, the judge persisted in asking: 
THE COURT: Well, at some point in time when the child walks into the bedroom and there is mother in 
bed with two guys, now what is the child going to say about that? 
Transcript, In Re Alana Moore, No. K1719, http://www.lovemore.com/april/judges_ruling.htm. And the judge could 
not escape the specter of incest: 
THE COURT: Well, it hasn’t been shown that the child is in bed with everyone but the child is in the same 
household. And if the child is in the same household and seeing this going on, at some point in due time, 
the child is going to become aware of it.  
  
Id. So somehow the idea of the child seeing all of them in bed together is intimately bound up with the possibility 
that “the child is in bed with everyone.” Though one can read the judge to be asserting merely that the child need not 
be in bed with them to walk in on them, the implication of his legal rhetoric—“it hasn’t been shown that . . .”—
suggests the possibility that one could show it, that one might have reason to try to show it. The form of his 
statement evokes a classic form of prosecutorial closing statement, “While it hasn’t been shown that the defendant 
knifed his wife to death, a bloody knife was found next to her body with his fingerprints all over it.” The form of the 
statement answers the question it implies. We may thus read the judge’s comments here to suggest that incest is the 
endpoint feared most in the transgression of “normal” family boundaries. This revulsive turn occurs even in a 
polyamorous family that resists the image of group sex.  
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same-sex sex and some different-sex sex, including what might be called bisexual behavior.336 
Thus, an obvious part of the resistance to polyamory among straight people is disapproval or lack 
of interest in same-sex sex. Gays need not have the same resistance to the idea of polyamory, 
since polyamory can be exclusively gay. (As “monosexuals,” however, gays presumably share 
with straights a lack of interest in multiparty sex among men and women together.337) The gay or 
bisexual element in certain polyamorous relationships may thus help to explain why some 
outsiders do not want to become polyamorous. It does not, however, explain why they would not 
want other people to be so. Any gap between the status of gays and polyamorists must be due to 
something other than the homosexual component of some polyamory.  
 Like the other reasons discussed in this Section, feelings about homosexuality may be a 
factor in some people’s response to polyamory. These different factors warrant further 
discussion, which I hope to help prompt, but these factors do not add up to the whole of the 
response. Something else is going on. As I argue in the next Section, thinking about 
homosexuality does help us to understand the driving force in the response to polyamory after 
all. But it is the theory of homosexuality, rather than the practice, that points us towards the 
missing piece. 
B. The Problem of the Universalizing View of Polyamory 
 This Section takes its cue from insights into sexuality developed in the context of 
homosexuality. In particular, the conceptual distinction between “universalizing” and 
“minoritizing” views of sexual identity—posed by sexuality theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick—
helps to pinpoint the crucial problem for polyamorists.338 
 Sedgwick defines a “minoritizing” view of homosexuality as the view that “there is a 
distinct population of persons who ‘really are’ gay.”339 By contrast, a “universalizing” view of 
                                                 
336 The principle is both obvious and not obvious, as indicated by its presence in the familiar children’s riddle: If you 
have thirty socks in a drawer, twenty black and ten white, what is the maximum number of socks you must pull out 
of the drawer to guarantee a matched pair? The answer is of course three. 
337 A closer look at this aspect of the response to polyamory may illuminate a gender politics of “bisexual erasure.” 
Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000). A comparison between 
two simple models of group sex points toward different perceptions of male and female bisexuality. In the situation 
of a man having sex with two women, I would posit that outsiders are more likely to assume that the women are 
engaging in the threesome for the man’s sake; outsiders often assume the man is getting more out of it. In part 
because people often do not believe people are really bisexual, they are more likely to assume the women are 
straight, and having sex with each other because the man wants it. (Not surprisingly, pornography created for 
straight males reflects and reinforces this assumption.) By contrast, in a scenario of a woman having sex with two 
men, I think outsiders would be more inclined to assume that the men are actually gay, but not yet acknowledging 
their homosexuality, and the woman is an excuse for them to have sex with each other. Thus, bisexual erasure 
resolves itself in favor of heterosexuality in the case of (potentially bisexual) women, whereas in the case of 
(potentially bisexual) men, bisexual erasure results in homosexuality. This peculiarity might be explained by 
assumptions about power and desire: Men are assumed to have more of both. In both situations, the men are seen to 
be getting what they want sexually from the situation. 
338 In her recent article, Maura Strassberg uses the same term —“universalizing”—to invoke a distinct idea taken 
from a different theoretical context: Hegel’s theory that monogamous families prepare individuals to identify with a 
kind of universal rationality represented by the state, rather than with their particular, subjective experience. See 
Strassberg, supra note 8, at 555.  
  
339 EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 85 (1990). 
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homosexuality holds “that apparently heterosexual persons and object choices are strongly 
marked by same-sex influences and desires, and vice versa for apparently homosexual ones.”340 
The concept of minoritizing and universalizing discourses of identity encourages a focus on the 
ways that an aspect of identity is pervasively important in the lives of many people, even those 
who do not identify as sexual minorities. Rather than focusing our attention exclusively on some 
narrow idea of biologically essential identities—or some superficial assessment of identities as 
constructed and therefore deconstructable—the minoritizing/universalizing axis prompts us to 
ask: “‘In whose lives is homo/heterosexual [or nonmonogamous/monogamous] definition an 
issue of continuing centrality and difficulty?’”341 Sedgwick’s categories therefore urge a focus on 
the discourses and perceptions surrounding a particular identity category, rather than on the 
search for any inherent truth of sexual identities.342 
                                                 
340 Id. Earlier in the book, Sedgwick defines the terms in a more tortuous fashion: “[I will be discussing] the 
contradiction between seeing homo/heterosexual definition on the one hand as an issue of active importance 
primarily for a small, distinct, relatively fixed homosexual minority (what I refer to as a minoritizing view), and 
seeing it on the other hand as an issue of continuing, determinative importance in the lives of people across a 
spectrum of sexualities (what I refer to as a universalizing view).” Id. at 1. Sedgwick offers her 
minoritizing/universalizing axis as an alternative model to the essential/constructed view of sexual identity. 
SEDGWICK, supra note 339, at 40. The essential/constructed axis distinguishes between hardwired—or “essential”—
ideas of identity and culturally determined—or “constructed”—ideas of identity. Thus, an essentialist view of 
homosexuality holds that some people are born with the trait of homosexuality, and that these people have a 
homosexual identity, regardless of their time in history or place in the world. By contrast, in the constructionist view 
of homosexuality, people are not born gay; rather, gay identity, as well as straight identity, is a product of cultural 
context and environment. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism in the 
Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (1998) (“Essentialism in this debate represents the belief that 
gayness is an intrinsic property, one that does not vary across history and culture. . . . Constructivism, on the other 
hand, represents the belief that gayness is a property that has meaning only within certain times and cultures. 
Identity categories, constructivists believe, are social creations. They result from social belief and practice, are 
themselves complex social practices, and may be evaluated in terms of whose interests they serve.”). These terms 
arise out of feminist debates about whether various sex and gender characteristics are, on the one hand, hardwired, 
or, on the other hand, culturally produced. The terms have also been applied to—and much disputed in—gay 
contexts. Disputants argue about whether gay identity is essential or constructed, but they also take issue with the 
terms themselves, contesting even whether “essential” and “constructed” are useful ways of understanding and 
speaking about sexual orientation. See, e.g., infra note 341. In addition, some scholars have used the terms 
“mutability” and “immutability” to characterize similar concepts in debates over footnote four of Carolene Products 
and the criteria for suspect class status. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal 
Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 932 (1989); Kenji Yoshino, 
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 
YALE L.J. 485, 509 (1998).  
341 Id. More technically, Sedgwick notes that the terminology of essentialist vs. constructivist tends to conflate 
distinct conceptual questions. In her words, the essential/constructed terminology conflates “ontogeny” with 
“phylogeny.” In other words, essentialist/constructivist debates blur the question of how individual sexual identities 
are formed—i.e. how an individual becomes gay or straight—with the question of how the cultural idea of a sexual 
identity is formed—i.e. how understandings of sexual identity are formed. Id. at 40.  
Daniel Ortiz agrees that the terms blur the distinction between questions of historical development (what 
Sedgwick calls the phylogeny question) and individual development (what Sedgwick calls the ontogeny question 
and Ortiz calls the “nature/nurture” question). Ortiz also identifies a third set of questions incorporated into that 
debate: the question of “determinism” versus “voluntarism.” The determinism/voluntarism question “concerns the 
extent to which people choose their sexual orientation.” Ortiz, supra note 340, at 1837. 
  
342 See id. Sedgwick notes the pervasiveness of the essential/constructed debate, then explains her choice instead to 
frame her work through the minoritizing/universalizing distinction. SEDGWICK, supra note 339, at 40. Sedgwick’s 
choice of terms, in the gay context, is avowedly a political one, since she sees the essentialist/constructivist 
discourse as fueled by an implicit or explicit anti-gay politics, even in “ostensibly or authentically gay-affirmative 
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Sedgwick argues that “[m]ost moderately to well-educated Western people in this century 
seem to share a similar understanding of homosexual definition,”343 one that is marked by “a 
radical and irreducible incoherence.”344 That is, Sedgwick claims that most people hold 
minoritizing and universalizing views of homosexuality simultaneously. For example, many 
people think that there is a distinct minority of people who are immutably gay, but many of these 
same people also don’t want their children exposed to gay role models for fear that it could make 
their children gay. In this sense I agree with Sedgwick about the incoherence in views of 
homosexuality. But I would also posit that the contemporary view of homosexuality is highly 
minoritizing relative to the general view of polyamory.  
 Unlike homosexuals, who are understood by many to possess a distinct and unalterable 
identity, polyamorists are generally not seen as having a distinct identity. In the words of 
Jonathan Rauch,  
 Do homosexuals actually exist? I think so, and today even the Vatican accepts that 
some people are constitutively attracted only to members of the same sex. By contrast, no 
serious person claims there are people constitutively attracted only to relatives, or only to 
groups rather than individuals. Anyone who can love two women can also love one of 
them. People who insist on marrying their mother or several lovers want an additional 
(and weird) marital option. Homosexuals currently have no marital option at all. A 
demand for polygamous or incestuous marriage is thus frivolous in a way that the 
demand for gay marriage is not.345 
Similarly, Andrew Sullivan claims, “Almost everyone seems to accept, even if they find 
homosexuality morally troublesome, that it occupies a deeper level of human consciousness than 
a polygamous impulse.”346 Without directly assessing the truth-value of their allegations about 
gays versus polys, both Rauch and Sullivan comment on the divergence in popular perceptions 
of the depth of these sexual identities. Gay identity is viewed by many to be a deeply rooted 
element of identity; poly identity is seen to be so superficial as to be frivolous. Because a desire 
to be involved with more than one person is not perceived to “occup[y] a deep[] level of human 
consciousness,”347 nor to be a “constitutive[] attract[ion],”348 polys are generally not seen as a 
discrete group of individuals. There is little sense of a distinct group of people who “really are” 
poly.  
 Rather, the desire to be sexually involved with more than one person, or with someone 
other than an existing partner, is viewed as nearly universal. To translate Sedgwick’s definition 
of universalizing homosexuality into an observation about universalizing polyamory: 
“[A]pparently [monogamous] persons and object choices are strongly marked by 
                                                                                                                                                             
contexts.” Id. at 43 (“If I had ever, in any medium, seen any researcher or popularizer refer even once to any 
supposed gay-producing circumstance as the proper hormonal balance, or the conducive endocrine environment, for 
gay generation, I would be less chilled by the breezes of all this technological confidence.”). 
343 Id. 
344 Id. 
345 Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note 10, at 286. 
346 Sullivan, supra note 19, at 279. Sullivan neatly avoids the question of bisexuality here too. 
347 Id. 
  
348 Rauch, supra note 345, at 286. 
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[nonmonogamous] influences and desires.”349 The universalizing account of nonmonogamy may 
seem obvious. Of course most want to sleep with other people, we think; they just resist that 
impulse. From this perspective, polyamory may seem, like bisexuality, to be a form of greed or 
indulgence.350  
 Much thinking and writing from within poly communities also sounds in a universalizing 
register. Most notably, the idea of radical honesty351 is universalizing about people’s 
involvement in nonmonogamous activity—through serial monogamy and adultery. The poly 
ethic of honesty views many more people as engaging in nonmonogamous behavior than own up 
to it. From this perspective, polys are less a distinct minority than outspoken representatives of 
the masses. Poly thinking thus shifts scrutiny to monogamy, asking how it is constructed, and 
why people lie about their nonmonogamous behavior and desires.  
The idea of privileging love and sex352 also seems to offer benefits to anyone willing and 
able to experience them. Rather than proposing that some small subset of people can grow and 
enrich their lives through further sexual and loving relationships, or might want to so grow, a 
commitment to experiencing love and sex seems a credo of expansiveness, a manifesto of living 
that has no obvious stopping point or confinement to those who espouse it. Moreover, the poly 
ethic of self-possession offers a resounding critique of the strictures of monogamy—of its 
jealousy, possessiveness, and patriarchy—a critique that implicates mainstream institutions.353 
In this lengthy excerpt, Deborah Anapol boldly captures the universalizing challenge 
inherent in much poly talk: 
The truth is that most of us are polyamorists at heart whether we are willing to admit it to 
ourselves or not. It is no accident that “serial monogamy,” which is not really monogamy 
at all, is currently the most common relationship form in our culture. Serial monogamy 
can be viewed as being one step closer to who we really are. Unlike lifelong monogamy, 
it allows us to express our polyamorous nature while maintaining a monogamous fiction 
in which our multiple mates are separated by linear time. For some people this marriage-
divorce-remarriage cycle remains the best solution. But divorce increasingly appears to 
be more stressful and disruptive than first thought . . . . Where infidelity or the desire for 
broader sexual expression is the primary cause for dissolution of a marriage, surely we 
can find more imaginative alternatives than divorce. . . . The point is that, ultimately, the 
clash between our nonmonogamous nature and our monogamous tradition must begin to 
be seen as a legitimate reason to develop new forms of relationships. . . . Polyamory, a 
viable alternative for those who wish to expand their social horizons to include 
multipartner relationships, is a concept whose time has come.354 
                                                 
349 SEDGWICK, supra note 339, at 85. Cf. supra text accompanying note 340. 
350 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 336, at 374, 420; see also text accompanying note 172 (quoting the judge in the 
Divilbiss case disparaging April for deciding “I can have my cake and eat it too”). 
351 See supra Subsection III.C.2. 
352 See supra Subsection III.C.3. 
353 See supra Subsection III.C.4. 
  
354 ANAPOL, supra note 125, at viii-ix (emphasis in original).  
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This is classic universalizing language, and it challenges people to admit their own 
transgressions, their own violation of the law of monogamy, and to embrace an alternative open 
to everyone. Anapol’s position is interesting because it actually locates polyamory as somehow 
essential, but essential in most everyone. In a gay context, this might be akin to saying that 
homosexuality is hardwired into everyone.  
 Notably, Anapol initially seems to blur the distinction between nonmonogamy and 
polyamory by suggesting that everyone might be a “polyamorist[] at heart.” Arguably, though, 
she expresses herself in this way for rhetorical impact. By the end of the passage, polyamory 
reemerges as a practice distinct from other forms of nonmonogamy—such as “cheating”—
because she describes “polyamory” as a “viable alternative” involving “multipartner 
relationships.” This is consistent with the distinction I drew at the end of Part III: Polyamory is a 
subset of nonmonogamy, distinguished primarily by its devotion to certain principles, such as 
honesty and privileging sexual and loving experiences over jealousy. 
 Nonetheless, as Anapol’s words point out, polyamorists have something in common with 
much of the population: an impulse towards nonmonogamy. One might contrast the prevalence 
of the capacity to imagine nonmonogamy—to experience desire for someone other than one’s 
primary partner—with the capacity to imagine homosexuality. Arguably, many more people 
have nonmonogamous fantasies than have homosexual fantasies. Even on the Kinsey numbers, 
which have been widely criticized for overstating the extent of homosexual desire and activity 
because of problems such as sample bias, 50 percent of males, and 72 percent of females, 
reported no same-sex desires or experience after adolescence.355 As discussed earlier, somewhere 
between 25 and 75 percent of Americans have engaged in adulterous sex356; no doubt the number 
of people who have felt nonmonogamous desires is much greater.  
 Indeed, though I have not found statistics on this, I think it is a fair assumption that 
almost everyone has at some time felt desire for more than one person. While there certainly may 
be some small subset of people who have never experienced desire for anyone who is not their 
partner, the prevalence of serial monogamy (as indicated by divorce rates) further suggests that it 
is an extremely rare person who cannot imagine feeling desire for more than one person, since he 
can at least think of the two people that he has desired in sequence. Sexual variation is arguably 
infinite, so there may well be some people who exhibit supermonogamous desires par 
excellence: people who have desired one and only one person in their entire lives. However, it 
also seems fair to assume that such people are extremely rare. 
 In this light, polys would seem to have many potential allies—many people who could 
empathize with their desires. Although many people may not actually want multiple sexual 
partners in love, most can presumably empathize with the aspect of poly desire that means more 
than one sexual partner. The sheer ubiquity of nonmonogamous desire, and the prevalence of 
nonmonogamous behavior, could mean a larger constituency and more allies for pro-poly 
politics. I want to argue, however, based on certain lessons from gay theory and politics, that the 
                                                 
355 ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., Homosexual Outlet, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 610, 650 (1948); 
ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., Homosexual Responses and Contacts, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 446, * 
(1953). 
  
356 See supra notes 104-107.  
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universalizing possibilities suggested by Anapol’s words form a basic stumbling block to public 
recognition of poly relationships. 
Rather than empathizing with others who share one’s traits, people often fear or shun the 
people they could become, particularly when the common traits are stigmatized.357 This 
difficulty may be understood through the figure of the self-hating Jew, black, or homosexual.358 
Similarly, the principle behind “homophobia” is that the presence of homosexuality in one’s self 
can create the fear of actual homosexuals.359 Pervasive homophobia may therefore be understood 
as a sign of the pervasiveness of same-sex fantasies or desires. Thus, one lesson from gay politics 
is that the universal potential of an identity trait may engender distance rather than empathy, 
resistance rather than support. 
 In addition, the difficulty of organizing and generating support for an “invisible” group 
has been a longstanding obstacle for gays. The challenge of identifying invisible gay allies, much 
less convincing them to be oppositional rather than to hide in the closet, has inspired political 
fantasies of all gays turning blue.360 That is, if all gays were blue, then gays would have the 
ability—and the need—to seek solidarity and to end the prisoner’s dilemma of the closet.361 The 
invisibility of gays may also contribute to a lack of empathy from nongays, or a lack of avowed 
support from gay-friendly nongays, because those who support gays may be mistakenly deemed 
gay, in a way that supporters of a race- or sex-based group can expect not to be.362 The impulse 
to shy away from those who are like one, rather than forming allegiances based on commonality, 
may also be seen in the different attitudes to homosexuality and bisexuality. Bisexuals share with 
heterosexuals the common ground of a desire for the opposite sex, yet bisexuals are more 
                                                 
357 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 340, at 512. 
358 Id. 
359 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 260 n.231 (1994) (quoting Iris Marion Young as saying that “[h]omophobia is one of the 
deepest fears of difference precisely because the border between gay and straight is constructed as the most 
permeable; anyone at all can become gay, especially me, so the only way to defend my identity is to turn away with 
irrational disgust”; and arguing that homophobia only produces this kind of fear in people whose identity depends 
upon “a certain kind of gender order, one in which sexual penetration connotes the dominance of the male over the 
female” (quoting IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 146 (1990)); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love 
Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REV. 661, 677 n.89 (1995) (explaining that “homophobia 
and homohatred ought more properly to mean self-fear and self-hatred, rather than hatred of homosexuality. Some 
would argue that the notion of substituting ‘self-hatred’ for ‘homophobia’ is not so far from wrong, since 
expressions of homophobia may be a device for cloaking or denying one's own homosexuality”); id. at 685 
(describing Robert Bauman as “[o]ne of the saddest and most conspicuous exemplars of the hypocrisy and self-
destructiveness of a furtive, nonintegrated sexuality” and explaining that Bauman was “at one time a conservative 
congressman from Maryland [who] had an antigay voting record and an inclination to make such public statements 
as, ‘I would not want my children taught or influenced by gay people,’ until his arrest for propositioning a sixteen-
year-old male prostitute brought his legislative career to an abrupt end”). 
360 See, e.g., LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF OUTING 49 (1993) (quoting Nancy 
Walker, Yanking Them Out, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, May 14, 1983, at 5 (“‘I have often wished that all gay people 
would turn blue at the same moment and thereby put an end to our oppression. . . .’”)), quoted in Kenji Yoshino, 
Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1802 (1996). 
361 See id.  
  
362 See, e.g., Halley, supra note 340, at 973 (noting that “one’s mere participation in political action to alter laws 
affecting gays and lesbians can precipitously earn one a public homosexual identity”); Yoshino, supra note 360, at 
1807 (“Finally, just as the closet makes it unclear that gays are gay, it also makes it unclear that straights are 
straight. Because gays can masquerade as straight, every person who holds himself out as ‘straight’ is suspect.”). 
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marginalized than homosexuals.363 If one pictures a straight white politician who has the option 
of supporting the political agenda of African-Americans, gays, or bisexuals, he would have the 
most reason to fear being mistaken for a bisexual, and thus the most reason to fear supporting the 
bisexual agenda, although he seems to have the most in common, along a salient identity axis, 
with the bisexuals. 
Debates about whether homosexuality and heterosexuality, as we understand them, have 
been present throughout history, also reflect, implicitly, the extent to which we now understand 
this aspect of personality to be deeply rooted. A historical-constructivist view of homosexuality 
posits that our contemporary idea of homosexuality is a relatively recent invention. Most closely 
associated with the historian Michel Foucault, historical constructivism is the idea that during the 
late nineteenth century certain medical and legal discourses created our modern belief that 
people have a sexual orientation determined primarily and deeply by the sex of the people they 
desire. Foucault colorfully called this nineteenth-century transformation a “perverse 
implantation,”364 which moved western culture from seeing the sodomite as a “temporary 
aberration” to viewing the homosexual as “a species.”365 Lest anyone think that this 
constructivist view of homosexuality is a fringe theory, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas officially acknowledged it and arguably relied on it to show why Bowers v. 
Hardwick366 warranted reversal.367 As Ed Stein has pointed out, the historical contingency of 
recognition of homosexual and heterosexual identities does not necessarily indicate that the 
identities themselves are not essential;368 nonetheless, theories of the relatively recent vintage of 
homosexuality make less rather than more likely an essential division between heterosexuality 
and homosexuality. And some scholars have argued that because gays are not necessarily seen to 
possess an essential, unchangeable gay identity, they are asked to assimilate in more ways than 
other minority groups, such as those marked by race or sex.369 
But while the constructivist account posits “the mutability of homosexuality,”370 the 
constructivist concept of perverse implantation also sets into relief our rather deep (essentialist) 
intuition that we know what a homosexual is—i.e., that a homosexual is a person who innately 
desires people of his or her own sex. So while “homosexuality as we conceive of it today” is no 
doubt “a space of overlapping, contradictory, and conflictual definitional forces,”371 as Eve 
Sedgwick would have it, the contradictions in our definition of homosexuality are not apparent to 
                                                 
363 See Yoshino, Bisexual Erasure, supra note 337. The question of common ground does cut both ways; as Yoshino 
has pointed out, heterosexuals also share with homosexuals the common ground of being monosexuals. Id. The 
connection between bisexuals and heterosexuals is, I think, more immediately obvious.  
364 MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 36 (Robert Hurley trans., Random House 1978) (1976). “The 
Perverse Implantation” is the name of the chapter in which Foucault describes the transition from the sodomite, as a 
“temporary aberration,” to the homosexual, as “a species.” Id. at 43.  
365 Id. 
366 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
367 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2479-80 (2003) (“[A]ccording to some scholars the concept of the 
homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th century.”). 
368 See EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE 100-104 (1999). 
369 See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 875-79 (2002). By saying race or sex, I do not mean to 
suggest that people are marked only by one of these axes. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).  
370 Yoshino, supra note 360, at 1827 (1996). 
  
371 SEDGWICK, supra note 339, at 45.  
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the naked eye. Instead, key texts in the history of sexuality have had to dig up evidence that 
earlier eras did not share our beliefs about homosexuality, our idea that there is a class of persons 
who are homosexual,372 in order to try to counterbalance our deep belief in the transhistorical 
essence of homosexuality. 
The task of demonstrating polyamory’s constructed aspects has not been undertaken, an 
unsurprising fact in light of the gap between views of homosexuality and of polyamory. 
Polyamory has not undergone a Foucaultian perverse implantation. Instead, as the Sullivan and 
Rauch comments portray so starkly, polyamory is not generally viewed as an identity at all.373 
Polyamorous instincts are widely seen to be universal or nearly so, while specifically 
polyamorous people are not widely understood even to exist as a category of individuals, much 
less an essential one.374 
Thus, many of the problems faced by gay rights advocates—relative to race rights 
advocates—would be multiplied for anyone who tried to gain poly rights.375 As Joy Singer 
observes, “seeking broad societal tolerance for and acceptance of poly lifestyles appears to be 
more difficult than it was for the gay movement . . . [because] our message just hits too much 
‘closer to home’ for the largely heterosexual, married opinion leaders who run the country.”376 
Because “most people may in fact be ‘pre-poly,’”377 Singer says, for them to acknowledge the 
viability of polyamory is to imperil their self-conception, and poly issues therefore “seem much 
more threatening” than gay or lesbian issues.378 Singer’s statement that “most people” may be 
“pre-poly” is, of course, a perfect example of the universalizing challenge of some poly talk. 
Moreover, polys have another, related problem. Not only might an outsider to polyamory 
worry that she is poly because the desire for nonmonogamy is so widespread; an outsider might 
worry that her partner is, or could become, polyamorous.379 The next Part will discuss 
                                                 
372 See, e.g., Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, 16 SOC. PROBS. 182 (1968) (positing the seventeenth-century 
origin of the modern homosexual); Randolph Trumbach, London’s Sodomites: Homosexual Behaviour and Western 
Culture in the Eighteenth Century, 11 J. SOC. HIST. 1 (1977-78) (claiming the eighteenth-century origin of the 
modern homosexual); Robert Padgug, Sexual Matters: On Conceptualizing Sexuality in History, RADICAL HIST. 
REV., Spring/Summer 1979, at 22 n.28 (arguing, with Foucault, for the late-nineteenth-century origins of the modern 
homosexual); Jeffrey Weeks, Movements of Affirmation: Sexual Meanings and Homosexual Identities, RADICAL 
HIST. REV., Spring/Summer 1979, at 164 (same); David M. Halperin, Is There a History of Sexuality?, in THE 
LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 416 (H. Abelove, M. A. Barale & D. M. Halperin eds., 1993) (same). 
373 See supra text accompanying notes 345-346. 
374 In addition, whether polyamory is best conceived as a category, as a spectrum, or on some other model is an open 
question. See infra text accompanying notes 398-399. As the discussion below suggests, see infra text 
accompanying notes 379-382, 391-393, polyamory may be understood as having some distinguishable 
components—such as one’s own desire for more than one sexual partner versus one’s tolerance (or even desire) for 
one’s partner’s having additional partners.  
375 See supra note 305. 
376 Singer, supra note 109, at 5.  
377 Id. Singer also proposes that “many could be seen as being ‘poly’ under the European model.” Id. The “European 
model” appears to be her term for polyamory that is not acknowledged as such by the parties: “with an unspoken (or 
even spoken) agreement that each, or at least the wife, will ‘look the other way’ at extramarital affairs while 
maintaining the marriage.” Id.  
378 Id. 
  
379 For the sake of clarity and brevity, the examples sometimes involve males and sometimes females; nothing is 
intended by the selection of the pronoun in a given example. 
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calculations that individuals may be making in their own lives to balance nonexclusive desires 
and feelings of jealousy.380 But for purposes of this discussion of outsider opposition to 
polyamory and polyamorists, it is important merely to note that many people may fear not only a 
nonmonogamous impulse in themselves, but also, or perhaps more so, in their partners. The mere 
possibility of her partner’s interest in polyamory could cause someone to treat the idea of 
polyamory as absurd and avoid discussion that might increase its legitimacy.  
Relatedly, the norm of compulsory monogamy can be useful to those who wish to have it 
both ways.381 If someone wants to be nonmonogamous but wants his partner to be monogamous, 
then in many cases, his only way to achieve that goal is to pretend to embrace monogamy but 
dishonestly to practice nonmonogamy.382 In other words, he can get what he wants only by 
cheating. Thus, cheaters may have an investment in disparaging the idea of polyamory.   
In light of the above discussion, the rhetorical positioning of multi-party marriage at the 
end of the same-sex marriage slippery slope makes sense. The monogamous aspirations of the 
same-sex marriage campaigners fit well with the nation’s deep cultural commitment to the 
fantasy of monogamy and its equally trenchant resistance to recognizing monogamy’s frequent 
failure.383 The prevalence of the fantasy and the reality of nonmonogamy suggests, however, that 
the rhetorical slippery slope masks the real proximity of nonmonogamy to mainstream reality. 
And for polyamory’s practitioners, this paradox of prevalence stands in the way of mainstream 
social or political support.  
C.  Alternatives and Implications   
 Alongside its universalizing aspect, polyamory has a minoritizing strand internal to its 
contemporary writings. Polys recognize that only a minority of people seek honest, open, and 
autonomous nonmonogamy in the way that polys do, and as discussed earlier, polys value 
knowledge about one’s own desires in this regard. But this type of minoritizing perspective is 
unlikely to reassure an outsider that the group is discrete, since this perspective may seem to 
ascribe false consciousness or cowardice to people who might otherwise be universally similar. 
In fact, this kind of minoritizing may actually be the most radical form of universalizing, along 
the lines of Deborah Anapol’s claims that most (or all) of us “really are” polyamorous “at 
heart.”384  
                                                 
380 See infra Section V.A. 
381 Cf. J. Hughes, Monogamy as a Prisoners Dilemma: Non-Monogamy as a Collective Action Problem (January 
1992), http://hackvan.com/pub/stig/life/Monogamy-as-Prisoners-Dilemma.html (suggesting that the greatest overall 
utility could be gained by widespread nonmonogamy but that each individual may achieve the greatest personal 
utility by having multiple simultaneous partners each of whom is monogamous with him or her). 
382 The exception to this is if he is partnered with someone who does not wish to have other partners but does not 
care if he does. In Part III.B.2, Eddie describes Amber as having that approach to her relationship. See supra text 
accompanying note 185. 
383 And of course, familiar as they are with the political problems of universalizing identity categories, though, most 
gay-rights advocates would be reluctant to make common cause with such a differently threatening minority 
identity. To note this strategic perspective is not to say that same-sex marriage advocates are anything other than 
entirely ingenuous in their desire to enter the core institution of compulsory (for some) monogamy. 
  
384 See supra text accompanying note 354. 
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In contrast to the universalizing quality of mainstream discourse (and of some poly 
writings), a certain strand of poly thought is deeply minoritizing. Certain poly writings discuss 
polyamory as if it is hardwired. A statement such as the following is not unusual in the pages of 
Loving More: “I’ve been Bi and Poly since around the age of 13, and always had more than one 
relationship going on as a teenager. . . . [M]onogamy is just not my nature.”385 Similarly, Eddie 
Simmons traced his poly identity to his early years: “When I go and think back on my childhood, 
I begin to think I was probably polyamorous then . . . . Instead of a best friend, I had several best 
friends . . . .”386 One contributor to Loving More writes, “The other major source of objections to 
polyamory is from those who are intrinsically polyamorous, but have partnered with a 
monogamous mate and have pledged, perhaps unwillingly, to be monogamous.”387 Another, who 
initially presents polyamory as “choice,” ultimately seems instead to view it as deep-seated 
aspect of identity: 
Once a person decides: “I am polyamorous;” or “I am monogamous,” they can find 
partners or lifemates who in turn have practiced this kind of self-examination and made a 
genuine choice one way or the other. . . . It’s better to abort a red-hot love affair early on 
with someone who does not share your fundamental orientation than to spend the rest of 
your lives together in bitter conflict over this desperately important issue. . . . I mean, I 
may still fall madly in love with a man who is decidedly gay, but I will learn quickly to 
rechannel my affections into more appropriate directions and you can bet your boots I 
will not propose marriage to him.388  
In light of this poly’s analogy between polyamory and homosexuality, her description of the 
choice to be poly looks more like a choice about how to experience and express one’s true poly 
identity. These writings definitely reflect the view that there are some people who “really are” 
poly.389 Moreover, this view is sufficiently common in poly circles that its alternative—the view 
that relationships can be poly but people cannot—is designated a “contrary view” on the 
alt.polyamory “frequently asked questions” page.390 
                                                 
385 Jeff’s Side, in The Dragon Bear Family, A MultiPlex Perspective on Living Out, supra note 272, at 15, 15. 
386 See supra Telephone Interview with Eddie Simmons, supra note 177. 
387 Zell & Zell, supra note 290, at 26 (from the portion labeled “Oberon”) (interpreting the two main objections to 
come from fear—in “people who are intrinsically monogamous”—that their partners might want nonmonogamy if 
that were an option, and resentment—in “those who are intrinsically polyamorous, but have partnered with a 
monogamous mate and have pledged, perhaps unwillingly, to be monogamous”—that others are doing what they 
want to do). 
388 Id. (from the portion labeled “Morning Glory”). 
389 Cf. supra text accompanying note 339. 
390 Matthesen, supra note 128. Matthesen quotes the following anonymous posting as a “contrary” view:  
  
There aren’t polyamorous and monogamous people; there are polyamorous and monogamous relationships. 
The same person may at various times be happy in both monogamous and polyamorous relationships at 
various times in his/her life. What is right depends on you and your feelings, and the feelings of those you 
are involved in relationships with. You may at some times be involved in a relationship that is 
monogamous, and that may be the right thing for the people in that relationship; at other times, you may be 
in a relationship which works better as part of a polyamorous network of relationships. In any case, the 
important thing is probably to act kindly and responsibly, and to communicate clearly with intimate 
partners and potential partners about these issues. Don’t deny your feelings or the feelings of those that you 
care about. Get in touch with how you and those you care about really feel, rather than how society wants 
you to feel, or how you think it would be logical to feel, or how you’ve been told polyamorous people (or 
monogamous people) should feel. Then behave in ways which are honest, and which make you, and the 
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A vision of poly identity as essential may piggyback on ideas about jealousy as essential. 
From this perspective, an essential poly identity may be determined by the absence of jealousy. 
Polys sometimes reflect on the different amounts of jealousy in different people. For example, 
the alt.polyamory FAQ page says, “Some people seem to have no jealousy; it’s as if they didn’t 
get that piece installed at the factory. Others, including some long-term polyamorists, feel 
jealousy, which they regard as a signal that something needs investigation and care, much as they 
would regard depression or pain.”391 At times, the idea of a hardwired absence of jealousy is 
explicitly tied to an idea of hardwired poly identity. Eddie explained the relative levels of 
intrinsic polyness among his family members through their relative amounts of jealousy. After 
explaining that he thinks he was polyamorous even as a child because he has several best friends, 
he observes: 
the jealousy wasn’t a big piece. . . . Some of us do and some don’t [experience jealousy] . 
. . . [It’s a] grey scale. I think Adam came hard-wired [as poly], even more so than me. 
Amber didn’t; she deals with jealousy. Mike has learned . . . through experience he’s 
discovered . . . . [He’s] in the middle.392 
From this perspective, then, individuals can be described in terms of fixed levels of jealousy, 
which in turn determine fixed levels of polyness.393 It is important to emphasize that the idea that 
poly is defined by a lack of jealousy is just one strand of poly writing; as discussed earlier, much 
poly writing focuses on ways to overcome jealousy, work through it, and supplement or replace 
it with feelings of compersion.394 Nonetheless, we see here some signs of an essentializing view 
of polyamorous identity, and since that fixed polyness only exists in certain people and not 
others, this leads to a minoritizing discourse of poly identity. 
The suggestion of an essential poly identity presents intriguing possibilities for a politics 
based on an ingenuous or a strategic essentialism,395 through which polys could try to build an 
                                                                                                                                                             
people you care about, and the people they care about, happy and fulfilled. If this results in you having 
more than one intimate relationship at the same time, or being involved in a relationship with more than 
two people, those who are big on categorizing and labeling people will label you a “poly person.” 
Id.  
391 Id. The comment continues, “Jealousy is neither a proof of love (and this is where polyamory differs from 
possessive or insecure monogamy) nor a moral failing (and this is where polyamory differs from emotionally 
manipulating one’s partner(s) into relationships for which they are not ready).” Id. 
392 See Telephone Interview with Eddie Simmons, supra note 177. 
393 Of course, there is no theoretical reason why jealousy and the desire for nonmonogamy should be on the same 
axis. Someone could lack jealousy but also lack the desire for nonmonogamy, or possess both jealousy and the 
desire for nonmonogamy; polys tend to combine them, I think, because most people prefer to place the same limits 
on their partners as they place on themselves. 
394 See supra text accompanying notes 300-304. As discussed earlier, compersion is a poly word for taking pleasure 
in a partner’s pleasure, as a preferable alternative or supplement to feeling jealousy.  
  
395 See, e.g., GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography, in IN OTHER 
WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS 205-07 (1987); DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE 
& DIFFERENCE xiv, 18-19, 30-32 (1989); see also FUSS, supra, at 118 (“How are we to negotiate the gap between 
the conservative fiction of experience as the ground of all truth-knowledge and the immense power of this fiction to 
enable and encourage student participation? . . . ‘Essentially speaking,’ we need both to theorize essentialist spaces 
from which to speak and, simultaneously, to deconstruct these spaces to keep them from solidifying.”); cf. Sara 
Danius & Stefan Jonsson, An Interview with Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak, BOUNDARY 2, 1993, at 35 (quoting Spivak 
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image of themselves as a discrete minority. Convincing the mainstream nonmonogamists that 
polyamorists are a recognizable group with a distinct identity may be polys’ best chance of 
overcoming the effects of the paradox of prevalence.  
Several conceptual and practical problems undercut this possibility, however. First, this 
vision of poly identity may not be essential enough. Gays are frequently considered at best the 
outer limit of a spectrum of immutability or essential identity, and even a constructivist view 
considers homosexuality to have undergone the “perverse implantation” discussed above,396 
which fixed homosexuals with a perceived pathology that permeated their entire being in the 
eyes of sexology and ultimately the broader culture. Polys have undergone nothing like this 
perverse implantation, nor is it feasible (or presumably desirable) to recommend that they pursue 
one.397  
Second, this view of polyamory may not be minoritizing enough. The jealousy-poly 
continuum looks more like a sexual-orientation spectrum that recognizes a blurring of categories 
and a wide middle range of bisexuality. Eddie’s “grey scale” of jealousy—and thus of 
polyamory—is reminiscent of Kinsey’s sexual continuum398 and ideas of universal 
bisexuality.399 Like bisexuality, polyamory founded on this idea of a continuum is unlikely to 
reassure its putative outsiders that they are safe from the threat of falling into this state that they 
deem undesirable.  
Third, the impulse to settle upon one view of polyamory—minoritizing or 
universalizing—may be worth resisting for theoretical and political reasons. While elaborating 
the potential benefits of political organizing around acts rather than identities in the aftermath of 
Bowers v. Hardwick, Janet Halley has also suggested that marginalized groups may draw 
strength from a “multiplicity of strategies.”400 Conceptual ambiguity about the origins and scope 
of homosexuality and bisexuality has in some ways been an obstacle for sexual-orientation-based 
rights claims. But it has also been the source of important intellectual and political activity. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this approach may not be radical enough—it may 
go against the meaning of polyness for many polys. The poly philosophies outlined at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
as asserting that “as a phrase, I have given up on” strategic essentialism because it “became the union ticket for 
essentialism,” but equivocating as to whether she has given up on it “as a project”). 
396 See supra text accompanying notes 364-373. 
397 Related to this, some polys have taken the kind of political stand reflected in certain gay and pro-gay writings—
that it simply does not matter whether the identity is essential or constructed. See, e.g., Moon Dragon, Born Poly?, 
http://www.polyamorysociety.org/Born_Poly.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2003) (“I may, or may not, be born poly, 
but I'll die one.”). 
398 Cf. Yoshino, supra note 337, at 356-57 (discussing “the view—powerful in modern American culture from at 
least the publication of the Kinsey studies onward—that sexual orientation arrays itself along a continuum from 
exclusive heterosexuality to exclusive homosexuality” (citing ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY, CLYDE 
E. MARTIN & PAUL GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953))).  
399 See id. at 370; MARJORIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY LIFE 16 
(1996); PAULA C. RUST, BISEXUALITY AND THE CHALLENGE TO LESBIAN POLITICS: SEX, LOYALTY, AND 
REVOLUTION 1 (1995).  
  
400 Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and after Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1721, 1770-71 (1993) (“Any attempt to exploit the rhetorical possibilities created as Hardwick becomes part of our 
legal and extra-legal culture and should embrace the multiplicity of strategies adopted by the Court. Anti-
homophobic strategy should look both to identities and to acts as conceptual locations for opposition.”). 
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beginning of the article do pay a great deal of attention to individual growth and experience, but 
they also articulate visions for others, and for the broader culture, and part of their power on all 
levels comes from their transformative vision.401 This is why goals such as marriage are 
apparently not desirable to a sizable minority of polys, particularly if they come at the expense of 
a more radical vision.402 
* * * 
Many in the mainstream share a certain desire with polys, a desire for more than one 
sexual partner. This leads them to resist, homophobia-style, discussions or acceptance of 
polyamorists and their lifestyle. But does this mean that most everyone wants to be 
polyamorous? To think directly about what people want for themselves, we have to separate 
some different possible aspects of polyamory and monogamy and to pose some different 
questions about what kinds of choices people may (or may not) be making in their own lives. 
Thus begins the final Part of the article.  
 
V. DISPOSITIONS: SEXUAL AND LEGAL 
 The paradox of prevalence focuses largely on perceived identities: how polyamorous 
identity is generally understood and why it is considered by most to beyond the political pale. To 
think about how law may be shaping each of us with regard to monogamy and polyamory, 
however, we must consider what these practices might look like at the level of desire or 
disposition. That is, if we try to imagine desire itself separate from the normative conception of 
desire, we can think more distinctly about how law might be shaping those desires.403 In order to 
frame a provisional discussion of the proper role of law with regard to monogamy, this Part first 
considers the possible components of two contrasting identity possibilities: what we might call, 
so as not to confuse them with the practices of monogamy and polyamory, “mono” and “poly” 
dispositions. To promote discussion about monogamy and its alternatives, the article then 
concludes with a thought experiment imagining how certain laws might themselves be used to 
promote discussion about some of these issues.  
                                                 
401 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 272-291. 
402 The slight data on poly views on marriage suggest that 32% oppose civil group marriage, while 68% support it. 
See Ryam Nearing, Poly Political Animals Speak, LOVING MORE, Winter 1996, at 22 (reporting on a “political 
quiz,” which received over two hundred responses). “Many [respondents] expressed a desire to get the government 
out of the bedroom and people’s intimate lives, except in the case of child welfare, but they also indicated that as 
long as marriage benefits are available for hetero couples, they should be also be there for those in other forms of 
intimate relationships.” Id. at 22. The article about the survey primarily printed individual responses, rather than 
numerical or statistical results. The individual responses printed largely tracked that summary, with tepid support for 
legalization of group marriage, if something more radical—like the abolition of marriage—is unavailable in this 
society. Id. at 22-23. The other key numerical observation offered is that “[t]he three highest priority legal issues as 
ranked by our respondents were: medical rights for poly partners, nondiscrimination in employment, and zoning 
which allows for non-related people to live together.” Id. at 22. 
  
403 I express no opinion here on whether desire could actually exist independent of discourse; I posit only that we 
can usefully try to think about desire as a feeling separate from how a culture or community categorizes that desire.  
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A. A Dispositional Model of Poly and Mono Desire 
 The first purpose of this Section is to try to imagine what a complete desire for 
polyamory or complete desire for monogamy might look like. Put another way, how might we 
conceive of the most “open” (poly) and most “closed” (mono) sexual dispositions? “Disposition” 
here refers to an identity defined by the desires of the participants, rather than, for instance, their 
behavior or their self-identification.404 
 Tables 1 and 2 present one way to think about extreme poly and mono dispositions. The 
rows of each table are defined by the behavioral axes regulated by criminal adultery and bigamy 
laws: As discussed in Part III, polyamory may be seen as the intersection of two types of 
transgression: a transgression of norms and laws requiring exclusivity in sexual relationships 
(regulated by adultery laws) and of norms and laws prescribing the numerosity of domestic 
sexual relationships (regulated by bigamy laws).405 So the first row concerns whether someone 
desires sexual exclusivity (one sexual partner or more than one sexual partner), and the second 
row concerns whether someone desires domestic twoness (one domestic partner or more than 
one domestic partner.)406 
 The two columns—“for oneself” and “for one’s partner(s)”—recognize the possible 
distinction between one’s desires with regard to oneself and one’s desires with regard to one’s 
partner(s).407 For instance, along the exclusivity axis, a person may desire more than one sexual 
partner for himself, but he may desire only one sexual partner for his partner. Or, along the 
numerosity axis, a person may want only one domestic partner for herself, but she may want 
more than one domestic partner for her partner perhaps because she does not want to have to 
fulfill all the needs of her partner.  
 A few caveats are important. First, these charts are not meant to define polyamory or 
monogamy, but rather to show what particular extreme versions of each, from the perspective of 
disposition, might look like. Second, I do not mean these charts to suggest that the relevant 
desires are fixed in people, that they are knowable, or that they exist independent of discourse 
and social practices. Rather, the charts try to capture a hypothetical snapshot of current people 
under current norms if we had access to their desires with respect to sexual and domestic 
partners. Indeed, this exercise aims to help us imagine what aspects of desire are more or less 
malleable under various norms. Third, this approach views polyamory entirely through the lens 
of monogamy’s norms, casting it as the nexus between two transgressions of monogamy. There 
are of course many ways to view polyamory, as discussed in Part III, and this is merely one 
                                                 
404 See STEIN, supra note 368, at 45 (explaining “the dispositional view of sexual orientation . . . . [as the view that] a 
person’s sexual orientation is based on his or her sexual desires and fantasies and the sexual behaviors he or she is 
disposed to engage in under ideal conditions”). As Stein has pointed out, there are significant epistemological and 
methodological problems in trying to gather empirical date on people’s sexual dispositions. See id. at 210-11. My 
purpose here is only to use the dispositional model as a way to think about people’s desires with regard to mono and 
poly. 
405 See supra text accompanying notes 155-156.  
406 These may well be two quite different types of desire; this would be an interesting avenue for inquiry, as to how 
to think about these different wants and desires.  
  
407 Because the primary purpose of these tables, at least in this article, is to discuss people’s disposition towards 
monogamy or an alternative model, I tend to speak in terms of one partner or multiple partner, even though 
exclusivity can be a property of relationships among multiple partners. 
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perspective. Fourth, this approach does not take account of people who themselves want no 
sexual or domestic partners at all or who, out of spite, discomfort, or something else, want their 
partner to have no sexual partners at all. Finally, this characterization does not answer the 
question of what constitutes “sex” for purposes of exclusivity or nonexclusivity. As suggested 
earlier, actual physical contact, and particularly genital contact, is typically considered to be a 
more acceptable prompt for jealousy than non-physical friendship.408 But relationships can take 
many forms, as can jealousy. What is perhaps most relevant for many relationships is what the 
other partner would consider to be sex for purposes of jealousy.   
 
Table 1: Extreme Poly Disposition (most “open” intersection of desires) 
 
 For oneself For one’s partner(s) 
Exclusivity (cf. adultery 
statutes) 
A) 
Poly sexual desire with 
regard to oneself: Desire for 
more than one sexual 
partner 
B)  
Poly sexual desire with 
regard to one’s partner: 
Desire for one’s partner to 
have sexual experiences 
beyond oneself, i.e., the 
opposite of jealousy; cf. 
compersion (the poly term 
for the opposite of jealousy) 
Numerosity (cf. bigamy 
statutes) 
C) 
Poly partnering desire: 




Poly partnering desire with 
regard to one’s partner: 
Desire for one’s partner to 
have more than one ongoing 
domestic/romantic partner 
(oneself)  
Table 1 presents one idea of an extreme poly disposition. We can use this table to imagine an 
individual whose desires tip in the poly direction in each of the four boxes. In Box A, exclusivity 
with regard to oneself, this individual desires more than one sexual partner for herself, perhaps 
out of a desire for sexual variety or because she finds many people sexually attractive. In Box B, 
exclusivity with regard to one’s partner, she desires her partner to have more than one sexual 
partner, that is, she wants her partner to have sex with people in addition to her. Possible 
contributing factors to this desire might be sexual excitement at the idea of her partner’s having 
sex with someone else,409 or the emotion of compersion, the poly term for the opposite of 
jealousy, for empathetic pleasure in one’s partner’s sexual satisfaction.410 
In Box C, where the numerosity row intersects with the self column, the completely poly-
disposed individual would desire more than one ongoing domestic or romantic partner. She 
might want more than one partner because, for instance, she likes having multiple interlocutors, 
prefers pooling domestic resources, enjoys “processing,” or feels her needs are better met by 
                                                 
408 See supra Part II. 
409 Or relatedly, a feeling of pride or flattery in a partner’s sexual attractiveness or “prowess.” 
  
410 See supra text accompanying note 304.  
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multiple people rather than one person. Finally, in Box D, numerosity with regard to one’s 
partner, the poly-disposed individual would want her partner to have more than one domestic or 
romantic partner, perhaps because she prefers that her partner have more than one person to 
fulfill her needs. The distinction between Box C and Box D might also be understood as the 
difference between how a person might feel about being the one woman in a polyandrous 
relationship (Box C) or about being one of several women in a polygynous relationship (Box D). 
In sum, Table 1 presents a portrait of a completely open, completely poly, disposition. It is hard 
to imagine that a person with this disposition would be happy in any relationship other than a 
polyamorous one, in the sense of a relationship open to multiple sexual partners and multiple 
domestic partners.411 
 
Table 2: Extreme Mono Disposition (most “closed” intersection of desires) 
 
 For oneself For one’s partner(s) 
Exclusivity A) 
Mono sexual desire with 
regard to oneself: Desire for 
one and only one sexual 
partner  
B)  
Mono sexual desire with 
regard to one’s partner: 
Desire for one’s partner to 
have sexual experiences 
with only oneself; i.e., 
jealousy at idea of partner’s 
having sex with others or 
perhaps at idea of partner’s 
desiring others 
Numerosity C) 
Mono partnering desire: 




Mono partnering desire 
with regard to one’s partner: 
Desire for one’s partner to 
have only one ongoing 
domestic/romantic partner 
(oneself)  
 Table 2 presents the opposite disposition: complete mono desire. In Box A, an individual 
with this disposition desires sex with one and only one person. Many reasons are plausible. He 
might experience sexual satisfaction only through an exclusive sexual bond; he might obtain 
such tremendous sexual satisfaction from exclusive sexual intimacy that he does not desire 
anyone else; he might be overwhelmed by one particular person; he might have tremendous 
nervousness that is reassured only by one particular person. In Box B, this individual also desires 
that his partner have only one sexual partner—him. His desire for the other person only to have 
him (which might broadly be called jealousy) might be rooted in, for example, anxiety about 
                                                 
  
411 In addition, consistency across rows may indicate something along a particular axis. For example, a person with 
strong affirmative responses in Boxes A and B, such that she desires additional sexual partners for herself and her 
partner, is likely to be content only in a sexually open relationship. A person with strong affirmative responses in 
Boxes C and D, who desires additional domestic partners for himself and his partner, is likely to be happy only in a 
domestic living arrangement of multiple people. (It is an interesting question whether a family with children or other 
dependents might in some way satisfy the latter desire.) 
Monogamy’s Law   p. 68  
Work-in-progress—Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. 
losing the partner or anxiety about being compared to others, a desire to spend all his time with 
the partner and therefore a wish that the partner never be otherwise occupied, or embarrassment 
at the idea of his partner having other sexual partners because others would assume he was being 
betrayed.  
 Along the numerosity row, in Box C he would want only one domestic or romantic 
partner, perhaps because he does not want to divide his resources or energies among multiple 
people. Finally, in Box D, this mono individual would want his partner to have only him as an 
ongoing domestic or romantic partner. He might want the person always to be available to 
address his needs; he might want to feel loved more than anyone else in his partner’s world. This 
is a portrait of a completely closed, completely mono, disposition. It is hard to imagine a person 
with this disposition being happy in anything other than a completely monogamous couple.412 
 Based on the number of people who commit adultery,413 and the presumably greater 
number who desire it, it seems fair to assume that most people are more on the poly side (Table 
1) for Box A. By contrast, the prevalence of jealousy would suggest very few people are in Box 
B of the completely poly table (Table 1), and instead most probably place themselves in Box B 
of the completely mono table (Table 2). That is, most people may desire multiple sexual partners 
for themselves, but desire a partner who is exclusively sexual with them. The rarity of poly 
relationships also suggests that for Boxes C and D, the desire for one domestic partner for 
oneself and one’s partner, most people are on the mono side (Table 2). In sum, viewing current 
desires at face value, we may provisionally conclude that most people seem likely to place 
themselves in Table 1 for Box A, but Table 2 for Boxes B, C, and D. 
 Thus, it seems that most people find themselves with neither a completely poly nor 
completely mono disposition. A sort of “bi” disposition in this regard might be understood as 
conflicting boxes between tables, as described above, or as a bi-directional desire in one or more 
boxes, or, alternatively or also, as a flexibility or indifference in one or more boxes. Thus, most 
people possess some sort of mix of desires—with the largest number perhaps meeting the profile 
described above: a poly-type desire for multiple sexual partners for oneself, but a mono-type 
desire for one’s partner to have only one sexual partner, and then mono-type desires along the 
numerosity axis for both self and partner.      
 People with mixed impulses with regard to sexual exclusivity and numerosity might 
choose to enter either monogamous or nonmonogamous relationships, on these different axes, for 
any number of reasons. One common reason people might choose to embrace monogamy as a 
goal (perhaps even if they are in danger of slipping up occasionally) is that they would prefer 
nonexclusive sexual possibilities for themselves and, due to jealousy, exclusive commitment 
                                                 
412 As with Table 1, see supra note 411, consistency across the rows in Table 2 may also be significant. For 
example, a person with affirmative responses in Boxes A and B (the exclusivity row), but negative responses in 
Boxes C and D (the numerosity row), wants sexual monogamy for herself and her partner, but multiple domestic 
relationships for herself and her partner. This person presumably will be happy only in a sexually exclusive 
relationship, but will also presumably want to live with more people than her partner. As noted above, one wonders 
if living in a house with children or other dependents might partially or fully satisfy this multi-partnering urge. On 
the other hand, a person with affirmative responses in Boxes C and D, but negative responses in Boxes A and B, will 
presumably have a strong desire for a sexually open relationship, but for a domestic partnership of only two. 
  
413 See supra text accompanying notes 104-107. 
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from their partners, but they would prefer exclusive sexual commitment for both over 
nonexclusivity for both. In other words, jealousy trumps sexual desire for additional partners. 
Thus, in the absence of finding a partner who wants to be sexually exclusive and have a partner 
who is nonexclusive, such a person favors exclusivity for herself and her partner.  
 If many people are in this situation, then they might feel that a widespread societal 
commitment to monogamous norms and behavior would help them solve a collective action 
problem for all those who want that compromise. But this approach assumes that jealousy is 
fixed and would not diminish in the face of different norms and possibilities surrounding sexual 
nonexclusivity. This is far from a certain outcome.414 Moreover, if so many want this form of 
relationship, collective action should not be a particular problem even in a world of less 
restrictive norms; social clubs and even identity names (such as “monogamist” or, more 
specifically, “exclusivist” or “dualist”) might be generated to help the many people with this 
preference to find each other. The same might be said for people who might prefer monogamy as 
a kind of precommitment strategy because they have nonmonogamous desires but prefer 
monogamous rules and behavior because of certain beliefs about morality or concerns about 
possible emotional pain stemming from more sexual or romantic relationships. Those preferring 
this precommitment approach could find each other through the type of channels and techniques 
currently used by most individuals to find those with whom they are compatible in a whole range 
of ways.   
 Perceived risk might also be a factor in some people’s decisions about monogamy. 
Concern about risk might be understood as a component of what we call jealousy, or as an 
independent form of rational calculation. Either way, some people might feel that having outside 
sexual experiences—or having the partner have outside sexual experiences—creates a greater 
risk of losing the partner. They may therefore interpret an agreement to have sexual experiences 
outside the relationship as a sign that one or both partners lack concern about losing each other 
and thus feel less love than those who commit to exclusivity. (This logic may explain why 
people sometimes experience pleasure when learning that a partner is jealous: They may 
experience the jealousy as a sign that the partner is risk averse about losing them.)  
But there is also a different possible logic of risk: If a relationship doesn’t permit outside 
experiences, then one or both partners may grow agitated, feel confined, feel bored, feel 
resentful, stop having sex, stop growing, or face similar undesirable consequences. Such risks are 
more apparent if we imagine the outside experiences as nonsexual—i.e., as relationships that 
typically do not violate monogamy’s law, such as friendships. If two partners promised not to 
have any friends outside of the relationship, or dropped all their friends because emotional 
exclusivity made one or both partners feel more special, they would presumably, from a practical 
perspective, decrease the chances that one of them would fall in love with someone else, since 
they wouldn’t be interacting with anyone else. But we might worry that the relationship would 
become cloying and limiting, and that the partners might grow resentful or bored, and might 
                                                 
  
414 There is limited empirical work suggesting that a person may feel less jealousy in response to a partner’s 
“extradyadic” sex if that person has also engaged in extradyadic sex at some point; in addition, a person, particularly 
if female, may experience less disappointment if the partner has engaged in extradyadic sex previously. See Bram P. 
Buunk, Sex, Self-Esteem, Dependenc, and Extradyadic Sexual Experience as Related to Jealousy Responses, 12 J. 
SOCIAL & PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 147, 152 (1995).  
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eventually then break out of this bind by leaving. They might even do this by sneaking around to 
find someone else. In addition, any new friendship would need to be secret, and this very secrecy 
might, by creating frisson and guilt, lead to a shift of loyalties.415 In other words, under a no-
friends rule, simply having a friend in addition to the partner could generate anxiety, drama, and 
secrets from the partner. But if friends were permitted, as they are in most relationships, then the 
picture looks rather different.  
For some, then, concerns about the risks of sex outside the relationship may trump 
concerns about the risks of exclusivity. Given a choice between an exclusivity and a 
nonexclusivity rule, then, these individuals will presumably choose exclusivity. For some others, 
however, concerns about the risks of exclusivity may trump concerns about the risks of outside 
sexual partners. Given the two choices, these individuals will presumably choose nonexclusivity. 
As discussed earlier, some may also choose cheating to try to capture the best of both worlds.416  
 In light of the above discussion, neither monogamy nor polyamory necessarily seems an 
unreasonable choice, depending on individual or partner dispositions, feelings, and priorities. 
That said, all this talk of choices about how to behave in the face of mixed desires suggests that 
people are actively choosing to live one lifestyle or the other. I suspect, however, that 
contemporary norms make this less of a choice than it might be. The next Section will consider 
the current and ideal role of law in shaping those norms. 
B. The Role of Law: A Thought Experiment 
 Law contributes to the norm of compulsory monogamy in many ways. Most obviously, in 
many states, the criminal law penalizes married people who engage in nonexclusive sexual 
behavior, through adultery laws, and also married people who try to marry or cohabit with 
additional partners, through bigamy laws.417 Moreover, the marriage law in all fifty states 
prevents multiple parties from marrying one another, and no U.S. jurisdiction’s domestic 
partnership laws permit multiple partners to register.418 And, appropriately or not under 
applicable custody laws, the power of the state has been used to separate a mother from her child 
based on her polyamorous relationship, as the Divilbiss case demonstrates.419 People living in 
polyamorous relationships worry about losing their jobs due to discrimination based on their 
relationships, and no statute or principle has been held to protect such individuals from job 
discrimination.420 Zoning laws, limiting the number of unrelated persons who may reside 
together, may shape people’s choices about their family arrangements.421 Each of these legal 
issues is complex and warrants its own article. In the remainder of this article, though, I focus on 
                                                 
415 Cf. Kipnis, supra note 108, at 40-43. 
416 See supra text accompanying notes 381-382. 
417 See supra notes 48-49.  
418 With one possible exception, I have seen nothing to indicate that polyamorous relationships, as distinguished 
from traditional polygamy for these purposes, are featuring prominently in the political landscape of any other 
country. Martha Ertman notes that the city of Cork, Ireland, has considered a bill that would extend “domestic 
partnership provisions beyond couples to include polyamorous affiliations, reasoning that intimate partnerships 
sometimes have more than two partners just as business partnerships do.” Ertman, Private/Private Distinction, supra 
note 25, at 116 (citing Jan Battles, Cork Opens Door to Gay Couples, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 2000). 
419 See supra Section III.B.1.  
420 See supra note 305. 
  
421 See id.; cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).  
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one of the more discrete and explicitly coercive forms of legal intervention into decisions about 
monogamy: criminal prohibitions on adulterous conduct.422  
 An obvious legal implication of the analysis thus far—which acknowledges the 
prevalence of nonmonogamous sexual behavior and desires and takes seriously polyamory as a 
viable relationship practice for some—would seem to be that adultery laws should be repealed.423 
Although these laws target only a small part of the sexual, loving universe that polyamory 
comprises, they embody as an absolute rule the normative presumption that underlies 
monogamy’s law: the idea that sexual jealousy is and represents love. The existence of these 
laws threatens to interfere with people’s choices to adopt a lifestyle other than monogamy, and 
thus with any true “choice” of monogamy or of nonmonogamy.424 And there are a number of 
reasons that we might prefer a world in which people chose monogamy or chose open 
relationships or polyamory, at least to a greater extent than they do now. For example, the 
preceding discussion of differing dispositions suggests that some individuals may be happy only 
in a poly or a mono relationship context. If people could choose either monogamy or one of its 
alternatives, rather than being urged into automatic promises of monogamy, there might be fewer 
ugly, painful betrayals. More people who value sexual nonexclusivity or a larger domestic circle 
might find one another, rather than bonding with unlike individuals, at times under false 
pretenses. It might be easier to be confident that one’s monogamous partner really wanted 
monogamy, if that partner had seen viable alternative relationship models and turned them down 
in favor of monogamy.  
 This last scenario might be understood as similar to the contemporary situation with 
regard to homosexuality, in which we are less likely than ever before to think that homosexuals 
and bisexuals may be lurking secretly everywhere, because there are fewer reasons for gays and 
bis not to “come out” under current historical conditions.425 Because the set of poly desires is so 
complex and potentially contradictory,426 the outness model only goes so far in describing 
polyamory and polyamorous desires. But it seems likely that if more people accepted alternatives 
                                                 
422 Bigamy laws are a more complicated issue. Because multi-party marriage is not legal, much of the behavior 
bigamy laws target is fraud—possibly on the other spouse but certainly on the state. As noted earlier, there are four 
states that criminalize bigamous cohabitation, which does not necessarily contain any fraudulent intent, but the laws 
arguably aim to capture Mormons who marry and divorce several wives in order to create a de facto polygamous 
marriage and thereby circumvent the bigamy laws. See, e.g., Tenney, supra note 49. 
423 See Maura Strassberg, supra note 145, at *.  
424 There are two things to note here. First, as I discuss below, adultery statutes are not generally enforced; this fact 
partially prompts this inquiry into whether they should be amended to incorporate a notion of consent or simply 
allowed to fall into desuetude. Second, adultery laws may not directly affect gay people’s lives since gay people 
cannot marry and, at least under some state laws, same-sex extramarital sex does not constitute adultery, see 
Supreme Court: Gay Sex Not Adultery, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 7, 2003. As same-sex couples approach legalized 
marriage, however, such proscriptions may well soon apply. Cf., supra text accompanying notes 53-56 (discussing 
the use of the term “exclusive” in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003)). Although 
adultery statutes are not the most pressing legal concern for polys, it is worth noting that in a context in which gay 
sex was relevant to adultery, a relationship such as Eddie Simmons’s, see supra Section III.B.2, could be subject to 
prosecution. Given the law’s penchant for singling out for prosecution marginal individuals, Eddie’s family might 
have reason to fear being a prime target. 
425 The historical frame of this assertion is the last 150 years, the period of the modern “homosexual” experience, see 
supra text accompanying notes 364-369; as to whether it makes sense to think about tolerance or intolerance of 
homosexual identities prior to that time, I express no opinion here.  
  
426 See supra Section V.A. 
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to monogamy, there would be greater openness on the part of those who valued sexual 
nonexclusivity or multi-party domestic arrangements more than or instead of the contrary 
monogamous values. No doubt there would still be cheaters and people who felt trapped by 
circumstance. But “cheating” might be less painful for some if the world did not assume that the 
extramarital activity was the betrayal of a sacred promise, or if the parties did not establish 
sexual fidelity as the foundational promise of their relationship.427 A world in which both 
monogamy and its alternatives were viable options would be a complex world, but this newly 
complex world might well have virtues to rival the current privileging of monogamy, with its 
sometimes contradictory fantasies and realities. Whether or not the state should actively 
encourage polyamory and open relationships as viable relationship models, the state should 
arguably stop using the coercive power of the criminal law to discourage alternatives to 
monogamy. 
 Thus, the obvious next step would seem to be to repeal the adultery laws that exist in 
twenty-three states.428 These adultery laws are rarely enforced,429 but they always present the 
possibility of enforcement,430 and they stand as emblems of the expectation of monogamy. And 
thus repeal may well be the most desirable path. But here we would do well to pause before 
proceeding, to consider two points. First, if the problem with the adultery laws is that they are 
coercive, then perhaps the solution is not to repeal the laws, but rather to amend them to 
eliminate their coercive element. In the language of contract law, we should consider turning 
these “immutable rules”—rules that the parties must accept as part of their agreements—into 
“default rules”—rules that the parties can contract around.431 I explain this further below.  
 Second, if the aim is to encourage individuals to make affirmative choices, and to choose 
partners with compatible desires, then we should encourage conversations between partners and 
between potential partners. The question then becomes whether law might play an affirmative 
role in that process. More specifically, contract law principles suggest that modifying adultery 
statutes, rather than repealing them, is the best way to encourage those conversations. Under the 
principle of information-forcing default rules, one way to force conversations is to set the default 
at something other than what the parties would have wanted—in other words, to create a penalty 
                                                 
427 The emotion behind jealousy may arguably be due in part or in full to the meaning ascribed to promises of 
monogamy. If a person says explicitly or implicitly that the most hurtful thing his partner could do to him is to have 
sex with someone else, then it is hard to know what part of his hurt over his partner’s cheating is due to the outside 
sexual behavior and what part is due to the partner’s knowingly doing what had been established as the “most 
hurtful thing.” 
428 See supra note 48. [*DC repealing shortly] 
429 See supra note 48. 
430 For example, a prominent lawyer in Virginia was recently convicted of adultery. The hearing on his appeal is 
scheduled for January 27, 2004. See Kelly, supra note 48. 
  
431 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (“The legal rules of contracts and corporations can be divided into two distinct 
classes. The larger class consists of ‘default’ rules that parties can contract around by prior agreement, while the 
smaller, but important, class consists of ‘immutable’ rules that parties cannot change by contractual agreement. 
Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them. Immutable 
rules cannot be contracted around; they govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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for parties who are not explicit about what rules they want to govern their relationship.432 In what 
follows, I first explain what it might mean to amend adultery statutes to make them default rules, 
then I use the idea of information-forcing default rules to consider the best way to set the 
adultery default rule, and finally I conclude by considering whether the criminal law is the proper 
realm for this approach.  
 Adultery statutes, as currently written, are immutable rules. For example, the 
Massachusetts statute provides, “A married person who has sexual intercourse with a person not 
his spouse or an unmarried person who has sexual intercourse with a married person shall be 
guilty of adultery . . . .”433 A married person who engages in extramarital sex in the relevant 
jurisdiction is guilty of adultery, regardless of any agreement by the parties to the contrary.434 
The problem, then, with these laws may not be that they exist, but that they interfere with the 
parties’ ability to make their own agreements about sexual exclusivity.   
 Adultery statutes could instead be written as default rules. For instance, a statute could 
criminalize extramarital sex by married persons only if the spouses have agreed to require 
exclusivity, or only if they have not agreed to permit extramarital sex. In the language of the 
criminal law, the extramarital sex would be criminal adultery unless the other spouse gave his 
“consent.”435 Rape law might serve as a model here, with the caveat that the crimes of rape and 
                                                 
432 See generally id.; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian Versus Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1591 (1999). 
433 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (2000). 
434 The closest these statutes come to a consent-based model is the four state statutes that condition prosecution on a 
complaint by the other spouse, but this is not the same thing as a defense of consent; the spouse could complain after 
the fact even if the adultery was agreed upon in advance, and nothing in the statutes permits the adulterer to offer 
that prior consent as a defense. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1408(B) (2003) (“No prosecution for adultery shall be 
commenced except upon complaint of the husband or wife.”); MINN. STAT. § 609.36(2) (2003) (“No prosecution 
shall be commenced under this section except on complaint of the husband or the wife, except when such husband 
or wife is insane, nor after one year from the commission of the offense.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09(2) 
(2001) (“No prosecution shall be instituted under this section except on the complaint of the spouse of the alleged 
offender, and the prosecution shall not be commenced later than one year from commission of the offense.”); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 21, § 871 (2002) (“Adultery is the unlawful voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with one of 
the opposite sex; and when the crime is between persons, only one of whom is married, both are guilty of adultery. 
Prosecution for adultery can be commenced and carried on against either of the parties to the crime only by his or 
her own husband or wife as the case may be, or by the husband or wife of the other party to the crime: Provided, that 
any person may make complaint when persons are living together in open and notorious adultery.”). Note that the 
Oklahoma statute does not quite fit in this group since it provides for prosecution if the adultery is open and 
notorious and anyone complains, even if the spouse does not want to pursue the complaint. Note also the odd 
exception for insanity in the Minnesota statute, which suggests that it is the complaining spouse’s insanity that is 
relevant.  
 In addition, it is worth noting that Rhode Island’s statute might be deemed ambiguous in this regard 
because it specifically identifies “illicit” sexual intercourse by a married person as penalized. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
6-2 (2002) (“Every person who shall commit adultery shall be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500); and 
illicit sexual intercourse between any two (2) persons, where either of them is married, shall be deemed adultery in 
each.”). By the language of the statute, the second phrase could either be defining adultery to include only illicit 
adultery (i.e., secretive, perhaps even nonconsensual) or it could be expanding outward from the traditional 
definition of adultery to mean open and notorious extramarital sex by a married person. 
  
435 The statute also needs to give content to the term “sex” or “sexual intercourse.” This is another matter for 
consideration. Ideally, perhaps, parties could be urged to define sex in their agreements around it; where they have 
not done so, however, certain defaults would need to be available. I bracket this question, noting that the 
possibilities are numerous but that erotic physical intimacy seems to be an, if not the, key axis for most. See 
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adultery are extremely different. Rape is a useful model, however, because it is a criminal legal 
category defined by the absence of consent. In a certain schematic sense, rape is sex minus 
consent.436 Similarly, under a consent-based model of adultery statutes, adultery is extramarital 
sex minus consent. In the language of analogy, extramarital sex is to adultery as sex is to rape.  
 Consent is obviously a complex and contested concept.437 There might be reason to 
wonder, in any given case, if consent given to a spouse’s extramarital sex is freely given.438 But 
in the context of an adultery statute, the worst that happens if the consent was not freely given is 
that no prosecution occurs. Since the current status quo is for few prosecutions, and the goal of a 
statute is to encourage open and honest communication rather than to prosecute adulterers, then 
some number of false positives on consent should not worry us in the way that it does in other 
contexts.   
 Before proceeding to explain the hypothetical scheme, I briefly pause to address several 
general matters. First, this article does not aim to raise or answer the question whether marriage 
should be viewed as a status, viewed as a contract, or abolished in favor of a contract-based 
system of private relations or an alternative model.439 The principles of penalty defaults 
                                                                                                                                                             
Christina Tavella Hall, Note, Sex Online: Is This Adultery?, 20 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 201, 211-13, 220-21 
(1997) (discussing the views of various courts and commentators as to how broadly sex should be defined in the 
context of adultery as a fault-based ground for divorce, and concluding that the proper definition is “one spouse’s 
physical intimacy with someone other than their marital partner” and should “not be read broadly or explicitly 
expanded to cover the ephemeral sphere of emotional or virtual infidelity”).  
436 The less favorable version of the equation would then be “sex=rape+consent.” Both descriptions are schematic; 
different jurisdictions have different definitions of rape and numerous other terms for nonconsensual sex. See, e.g., 
Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERK. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 72, 78 (2001). But to define rape as nonconsensual sex is not uncommon. See, e.g., Katharine K. 
Baker, Text, Context, and the Problem with Rape, 28 SW. UNIV. L. REV. 297, 302 (1999). As Baker points out, 
however, a great deal of cultural confusion surrounds the question of what exactly nonconsensual (or consensual) 
sex is. Id. (observing that thinkers as diverse as Catherine MacKinnon and Richard Posner seem to agree that rape 
and consensual sex are not so very different from each other). 
437 See, e.g., id. (citing sources on the ambiguities surrounding the concept of consent). 
438 As a general matter, love might prompt people to agree to arrangements that they would not choose; whether this 
rises to the level of nonconsent is a complicated matter. More specifically, one context where genuine consent might 
be a concern is a heterosexual relationship in which the age and encumbrances of the partners means widely 
different statistical prospects of finding a new partner by the man as opposed to the woman. After divorce, women 
are much less likely to remarry than men, and the presence of children affects women’s ability to remarry but not 
men’s. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian 
Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 549 n.96 & 548-50 (1998) (“Although remarriage is popular among both sexes, 
data gathered in the late 1980s indicate that the remarriage rate for women aged 35-44 is about two-thirds the rate 
for men, with the ratio dropping to less than one-half for women over 45. . . . [In addition,] women with children 
remarry at a lower rate than women without children, regardless of age of divorce. Children have no effect on 
remarriage for men. . . . [And], education is inversely correlated with the incidence of remarriage among divorced 
women.” (citing sources)). One might worry that a woman, particularly above a certain age, would not feel she had a 
genuine choice about whether to accept a male partner’s request for nonexclusivity, if she believed her prospects of 
finding another partner were inadequate. This concern would not obtain in many situations of course, and there 
would also be situations where the power was distributed differently among the parties. Moreover, as explained in 
the text, the context of considering criminal law sanctions should help to ease these worries to an extent, since her 
nonconsent means only that his extramarital relationship is not criminally punished, a result that would be the likely 
outcome under the status quo. 
  
439 See, e.g., Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 65, 111-20 
(1998); cf., e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (forthcoming 
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employed here were developed in the realm of contract law, but nothing about these principles 
inherently confines their application to contracts.440 Second, as a thought experiment, this 
discussion need not resolve the matter of the specific harm that would warrant the intervention of 
the criminal law in this context; however, several possibilities present themselves. Adultery may 
be understood as “an abuse of an institution the law protects,”441 and this may be all the more 
true where adultery actually violates the trust of the relationship, as is the case under a consent-
based model. In addition, to the extent that the state might punish adultery because of an “injury 
to a person,”442 such a rationale seems more sensible if the crime targets only those who actually 
injure another person, i.e., only those individuals whose spouses did not consent to the adultery, 
as provided in the statutory schemes that follow. Third, the penalty should be imagined as slight, 
since the intended purpose here is not for the state to express condemnation of adultery, but 
merely for the state to encourage parties to make express agreements about the exclusivity or 
non-exclusivity of their relationships. A small fine seems most appropriate,443 and, since this is a 
thought experiment, perhaps we can imagine that the fine is borne only by the wrongdoer, rather 
than coming out of collective property. If that is unsatisfying to some readers, then perhaps a 
penalty such as a small amount of community service can substitute in the hypothetical. Finally, 
the fact that criminal adultery statutes are rarely enforced against civilians444 is a useful 
background condition for this inquiry. The question here is whether, rather than being repealed 
or falling into desuetude, adultery statutes could and should be amended and reinvigorated in an 
affirmative effort to use law to encourage discussion in this area. The following statutory models 
aim to evaluate the potential utility of that idea.    
 On a consent-based model, a hypothetical amended statute might read as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                             
2004); Shanley, supra note 118; Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage As a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1225 (1998). 
440 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Katharine Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex (Feb. 4, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (applying the principle of information-forcing penalty defaults to propose the crime 
of reckless sexual conduct, i.e., having sex without a condom in a first-time sexual encounter, to which evidence of 
consent to the unprotected aspect of the sex would be a defense); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory 
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002) (applying the idea of information-forcing default rules to statutory 
interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 UNIV. OF 
CHIC. L. REV. 1159, 1189 (2004) (describing the general relevance of the concept of information-forcing default 
rules to contexts in which planners want to force people to make explicit choices).  
441 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003) (“The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, 
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being 
punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the 
meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law 
protects.”); see also Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 54 (forthcoming 
2004) (copy on file with author) (“Like so much of the rest of the majority's prose, this passage is admittedly 
obscure, but my best guess is that the reference is . . . to something akin to the likely continuing validity of laws 
prohibiting bigamy and adultery, which can be seen as abuse of the institution of legal marriage even when 
extraordinary circumstances such as spousal consent allow the acts to take place ‘absent injury to a person.’”). 
442 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
443 Cf., e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996) (observing 
that the sanction of fines does not express a clear message of condemnation, in contrast to imprisonment). 
  
444 See supra note 48. 
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Statute 1: A married person who has sex with a person not his or her spouse is subject to 
prosecution unless the married person’s spouse has consented to the extramarital sex.445 
Under this statute, someone is subject to prosecution for adultery only if his or her spouse had 
not consented to the extramarital sex. Though the question might arise as to whether the consent 
needs to be given prior to the acts, if the idea is to encourage conversations, rather than to have 
people surprised by their partner’s acts, then the consent would need to be obtained beforehand. 
The main difference between consent in this context and consent in the rape context is 
that the power of consent or nonconsent is bestowed on someone other than a participant in the 
relevant sex: In the adultery context, consent is the province of a third party. That is, one spouse 
has the power to transform the other spouse’s criminal extramarital sexual behavior into legal 
sexual behavior through consent.  
Because a third party must consent, the consent will, in most instances, not be 
contemporaneous with the sex. Thus, consent could be understood as a feature of the 
relationship—i.e., general permission that is given as part of the marital agreement—or as 
something closer in time to the nonexclusive sexual activity—i.e., permission that is given with 
regard to a particular extramarital sexual act or relationship. In a sense, then, there are two 
relevant time periods: the prenuptial time during which the relationship agreement is formed, and 
the postnuptial time leading up to the adulterous sex.446 While the most heartache might be 
spared by conversation prior to marriage, concerns of bounded rationality and changed desires 
might make this difficult in many cases.447 At the moment of marrying, when emotions and 
expectations are high, people may be peculiarly poorly suited even to recognize a possible future 
desire for nonmonogamy. As Maitland famously observed, “Of all the people in the world lovers 
                                                 
445 In contrast to the Massachusetts statute, see supra text accompanying note 433, this statute does not criminalize 
the activity of the nonmarried participant in the adultery. This is a complicated issue separate from that of the 
individual participants in the relationship, and one I bracket for purposes of this discussion. 
 The statute also raises the question of what defines “sex”; this is something the parties might ideally define 
for themselves, since their view is most important to the question of injury to the individual and breach of trust in 
the marriage, but if they have no done so, then further consideration must be given to the question of its meaning in 
the statute. As I do not ultimately urge passage of the statute, I reserve this question here, recognizing its 
nonobviousness and complexity.  
446 Note that the model of contemporaneous (or nearly contemporaneous) consent, while allowing more flexibility 
over time, gives one spouse the power to control the other spouse’s sexual options. This seems less consistent with 
the poly value of self-possession and more consistent with the principle of monogamy’s law that jealousy trumps 
outside sexual desires and experiences. Introducing a notion of consent aims, however, to undermine the absolute 
assumption that jealousy will exist and thus trump outside sex. Moreover, the alternative possibility created by the 
statute—of the parties agreeing at the outset to a rule that keeps the criminal law out or provides binding consent, at 
least with regard to criminal intervention—is therefore a more significant departure from the norm. But, because of 
the bounded rationality and signaling concerns discussed in the text, both temporal options for consent seem 
important.  
  
447 See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage: A Proposal, 36 FAM. L. Q. 255, 270 (defining bounded 
rationality as “people's natural inability to calculate rationally or effectively about certain matters” and observing 
that “[t]here is some argument that the problem of bounded rationality might be particularly important for parties' 
bargaining about marriage”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 211, 254-58, 258 (1995) (arguing, on the basis of bounded-rationality concerns, that courts should evaluate 
prenuptial agreements for “whether, in light of all relevant factors, the parties were likely to have had a mature 
understanding that the agreement would apply even in the kind of marriage scenario that actually occurred”). 
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are the least likely to distinguish precisely between the present and the future tenses.”448 As the 
Divilbiss example in Part III shows, an unforeseen adulterous or potentially adulterous affair 
may lead a couple to transition into a polyamorous relationship. The criminal law presumably 
should not interfere with the Divilbisses’ decision to make this transition, even if they did not 
foresee it.  
From this perspective, the statute should deem relevant consent given at any point prior 
to the acts. Nonetheless, to encourage people to have these conversations prior to marriage, 
couples should arguably be permitted to give durable consent—through a marital agreement—to 
nonexclusivity. But, because a spouse should be able to consent to extramarital sex at any point 
up to the time of the sexual act in question (for the reasons discussed above), durable nonconsent 
should not be permitted. This is an asymmetry, but a defensible one, in light of a party’s freedom 
to leave the relationship if he changes his mind and wants an exclusive relationship but cannot 
persuade his spouse to change the terms of their marital agreement.449 A statute that expressly 
permits consent at either point in the relationship—prenuptial or postnuptial—might look like 
this: 
Statute 2: A married person who has sex with a person not his or her spouse is subject to 
prosecution unless the married person’s spouse consented either to nonexclusivity as part 
of the marital agreement or to the particular extramarital sexual act.450  
Statute 2 makes clear that consent may be given prior to or during the marriage, in a blanket or a 
situation-specific manner. The marital agreement may be imagined in any number of ways—as 
the spoken or unspoken understanding of the spouses (hard to enforce), as an optional written 
prenuptial (easier to interpret and enforce, but harder to get spouses to create451), as a mandatory 
written agreement or perhaps even as boxes that spouses must check on their marriage license 
(easier to interpret and enforce, but perhaps raising concerns about paternalism, unless perhaps 
the parties have the option of a box indicating that they make no legal marital agreement about 
exclusivity452). 
 In one respect, Statute 2 is still coercive, however. Statute 2 omits an important 
alternative: the option of leaving the law out altogether. And this is arguably the option most 
                                                 
448 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 369 (2d ed. 1898). 
449 This distinguishes durable consent in this context from durable consent in the context of rape, as does the third-
party nature of the consent. Giving up one’s power to withdraw consent to a spouse’s extramarital sexual activity is 
not like giving up one’s power to withdraw consent to sexual activity with oneself. No nonconsensual physical 
intrusion into the self is involved in the former; durable consent merely means here that the state will not intervene 
and criminalize the activity because one spouse has changed her mind.  
450 A number of questions arise about symmetry. For instance, should the state enforce asymmetrical exclusivity 
agreements, that is, agreements in which one spouse has permission to have extramarital sex and the other does not? 
Similarly, should one spouse’s adulterous sex (with the consent of the other) create a form of implied consent to the 
other spouse’s adultery, at least within a certain time thereafter?  
451 Though data on prenuptial agreements are hard to obtain because couples are not required to register the 
agreements, it is estimated that only five to ten percent of marrying couples sign premarital agreements. See, e.g., 
Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 436, at 1, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2004); Frantz & Dagan, supra note 100, at 2 n.6.   
  
452 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 440, at 1189, 1194-95. 
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people would want: The political trend has been toward repeal of adultery laws, such that fewer 
than half the states still have them and more are considering repeal, and the existing statutes are 
rarely enforced.453 As a legal matter, adultery is typically of little consequence in the criminal 
domain.454 To allow people the option of what their political choices suggest they want, the 
statute might need to look more like Statute 3: 
Statute 3: A married person who has sex with a person not his or her spouse is subject to 
prosecution unless (1) the married person’s spouse consented to nonexclusivity as part of 
the marital agreement, (2) the married person’s spouse consented to the particular 
extramarital sexual act, or (3) the married person’s spouse consented to excluding the 
criminal law from this realm of the marriage.  
 
Statute 3 permits people to choose the option many or most probably want, thus making the 
option of contracting around the default more complete. Moreover, Statute 3 may obviate the 
concern that this statute, which attempts to improve individual welfare, paternalistically forces 
people to make a choice when they may wish not to choose.455 Admittedly, Statute 3 still forces a 
choice, to the extent that it requires people to choose not to have the law involved. But it does 
not force the more emotionally charged decision of what sexual terms should dictate their 
relationship—exclusivity or nonexclusivity. The legal precedents for permitting people to opt out 
of the criminal law are less obvious than those for consent. Some practices with regard to 
prosecution of domestic violence might provide analogous models.456 More abstractly, certain 
legal decisions permit people to opt out of the criminal law. For instance, the decision to marry 
can make legal what would otherwise be criminal sex with a statutory minor.457 Statute 3 may, 
therefore, be a viable statute, which brings together the consent and timing points from Statutes 1 
and 2 and also permits people to opt into the current status quo. 
The second step of the analysis is to determine the best way to set the default to 
encourage constructive conversation. The concept of information-forcing default rules, also 
called penalty defaults, is relevant here. Penalty default rules are an alternative to market-
mimicking default rules. In the contracts context, a traditional approach to setting default rules 
for gaps in contracts has been to try to approximate what the parties would have wanted, in other 
words, to mimic the market.458 Ayres and Gertner have importantly argued, however, that parties 
may be encouraged to reveal more information about their preferences by defaults set to 
something other than what the parties would have chosen.459 That is, penalty defaults could 
                                                 
453 See supra note 48. 
454 A general exception to this is the military context, where prosecutions for adultery occur with much greater 
regularity. See, e.g., Winner, supra note 48, at 1073-74; Haggard, supra note 48, at 469-70, 476-77. 
455 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 440, at 1189, 1194-95. 
456 See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 184-87 (2000) (discussing 
support and opposition among different feminist groups to “the courts’ current practice of dismissing cases when the 
battered woman refuses to participate,” and evaluating alternatives to this practice). 
457 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47, 56 (1995) 
(noting that, for instance in Virginia, a minor of fourteen can retroactively consent to sex with an adult by marrying 
the adult (citing VA.CODE ANN. § 18.2-66 (Michie Supp.1995)).  
458 See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 432, at 90-91 (citing sources on what the authors call the “would 
have wanted” approach).   
  
459 Id. at 127-30. 
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encourage parties to share information, to negotiate over their preferences, and to close gaps in 
their contracts, because there is a penalty to declining to do so. Although Ayres and Gertner 
focus on efficiency as the aim of choices between penalty or tailored defaults,460 they also note 
the relevance of the penalty-defaults idea to non-economic goals,461 and subsequent work by 
them and others has built upon its implications in other contexts.462  
 In the context of adultery laws, if we assume that the current regime is what most people 
want, then an amended adultery statute needs to prescribe a default rule different from the status 
quo to force the expression of preferences. As discussed above, judging by the current 
nonenforcement of adultery laws in most contexts, we may reasonably conclude that complete 
legal indifference to extramarital sex is what most people want from the criminal law. Under the 
idea of information-forcing default rules, then, the theoretical adultery statute should therefore 
set the default at something other than non-punishment of adultery. The last statute discussed, 
Statute 3, is drafted according to this model. 
 The form of Statute 3 seems to suggest a preference for exclusivity, in that it threatens to 
punish adulterers. This might align it with the move to create “super-marriage” through covenant 
marriage.463 From the perspective of penalty default rules, however, the aim is not to compel a 
particular choice—exclusivity or nonexclusivity—but rather to encourage couples to choose one 
or the other. The statute is drafted to encourage the more informed party to reveal the 
information that that party might not otherwise reveal—that is, to encourage the party inclined 
towards extramarital sexual activity to reveal that inclination. Norms provide the exclusivity-
seeking party with an incentive to express his view, but the nonexclusivity-seeking party has a 
disincentive to express her view. Thus, counterintuitively, the pressure of the law should go with 
the norm in order to encourage the non-normative figure to voice the non-normative intention. 
Remember, however, that we are imagining a very small penalty, such as a small fine, because 
the purpose is not for the state to express condemnation of adultery, but to encourage discussion. 
 That said, we still might worry about drafting the statute to require people to opt out of 
criminally enforced exclusivity rather than requiring them to opt into it. We know that default 
rules are often “sticky.”464 That is, people may well fail to take the affirmative communicative 
steps required to opt out of vulnerability to adultery prosecution, even if they and their spouse 
would both prefer nonexclusivity or at least non-prosecution.465 Punishing such inaction with the 
                                                 
460 See, e.g., id. at 128. 
461 Id. at 129-30 (discussing, as one example, Scalia’s penalty default approach to statutory interpretation in Agency 
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 157 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring), where he argued that the 
Court should read no statute of limitations for civil actions for damages into RICO in order to force Congress to 
clarify its intentions). 
462 See supra note 440 (citing examples). 
463 Covenant marriage statutes set stricter criteria for entering into and exiting marriage. E.g., Steven L. Nock et al., 
Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 169, 170-71 (2003). Three states have adopted 
covenant marriage statutes: Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 to § 25-906 (2000); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-274, 9:307, 9:272(A) (1999). 
464 See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 440, at 17-18; Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian, supra note 432, at 1598-
99. 
  
465 Concerns about the marrying couples not knowing about the adultery statutes and the possibility of opting out 
could, however, be addressed by providing informational booklets to parties who wish to marry or by requiring local 
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criminal law seems harsh and might well have a normative effect opposite to that intended. That 
is, people might feel even more pressure to conform to norms of exclusivity.  
 In addition, information-forcing principles might encourage a different solution that that 
reached above. As Ayres and Gertner state in a very different context, “gap filling should grow 
out of one’s substantive theory of why particular contracts are incomplete.”466 As discussed 
above, the person seeking nonexclusivity is more likely both to have private knowledge that we 
want her to communicate, and not to communicate it because of social pressure, among other 
things. But presumably she decides not to communicate a desire for nonexclusivity not because 
there is no later penalty to nonexclusivity or because the penalty is not great enough; rather, the 
potential penalties for nonexclusivity are great: Her partner may be hurt, she may lose the 
relationship, and society may disapprove of her choice. In this way, lack of a penalty is not the 
problem, so further penalties are likely not the solution. And, in this context, penalizing the 
nonexpression means penalizing the non-normative behavior as well. Thus, shifting the 
normative balance of power might be necessary to try to encourage the parties to exchange 
information more openly.467 In order to encourage more open, less coercive, conversations about 
exclusivity and nonexclusivity, then, the statute might need to adopt the nonnormative position, 
and require spouses to opt in to the normative position.468   
 A nonnormative statute also comports with an analysis of the parties’ likely “propensity 
to contract around.”469 Because of normative pressure, bounded rationality, and the potential 
emotional costs of expressing a desire for nonexclusivity before marriage, we may expect more 
parties to be willing to contract around a nonnormative statute than a normative one. Lovers are 
quite inclined to express their eternal and exclusive love for one another, particularly at the time 
of marriage.470 Thus, a statute that assumes nonexclusivity and requires people to opt in to 
exclusivity may lead to more conversations and more relationship agreements that reflect what 
the parties want. An opt-in statute of this sort might be thus drafted: 
Statute 4: Any extramarital sex by a married person will be treated as consensual and 
therefore noncriminal unless (1) the married person and his or her spouse committed to 
exclusivity, enforceable through the criminal law, as part of their marital agreement, and 
(2) the married person’s spouse did not consent to this particular instance of 
extramarital sex.  
                                                                                                                                                             
clerks to inform parties directly. The latter approach has been used in the covenant marriage context, though with 
uncertain success. See Bix, supra note 447, at 270-71. 
466 Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian, supra note 432, at 1592. 
467 Cf. Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian, supra note 432, at 1592 (noting “the distribution of bargaining power” as a 
factor in whether a particular penalty default will lead to efficient contracting behavior). 
468 This approach might also be understood to build on what we know about the effect of framing on people’s 
choices. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 440, at 20-21. Fewer people may be expected to opt out of a regime 
when the frame of the law comports with existing norms, in part because the law does not prompt them to think 
outside of the normative box. The framing literature may perhaps create an additional issue to consider with regard 
to these statutes, however, because that literature highlights the possibility that we do not have pre-formed 
preferences in many areas.  
469 Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian, supra note 432, at 1602. 
  
470 See supra text accompanying note 448. 
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As discussed above, the parties may not give durable nonconsent to extramarital sexual activity, 
so the two requirements here are conjunctive, rather than disjunctive. Statute 4 should be 
information-forcing because it effectively penalizes the exclusivity-seeking spouse if he fails to 
discuss and reach prenuptial agreement with his spouse on exclusivity. The penalty is not a 
criminal sanction, but rather, the express approval by the criminal law of his spouse’s 
extramarital sex.  
 As a theoretical matter, then, Statutes 1 through 4 present models of what an information-
forcing adultery statute might look like. And far-fetched as such a proposal sounds, the criminal 
law seems to offer certain advantages for thinking about how the principle of penalty defaults 
might play out as a conversation-forcing tool with regard to monogamy and its alternatives. First, 
criminal laws create the occasion for possible state intervention during a marriage, rather than 
only on its dissolution. Second, the automatic application of a criminal statute creates the 
occasion for law to affect the behavior of all marrying couples, not just the very few who write 
premarital agreements.471  
 That said, the possible harms of using the criminal law in this way likely outweigh the 
benefits. The criminal law has the capacity to brand people, and sex-crime registries in some 
states force people to carry that branding with them throughout their lives.472 Given the various 
reasons people may have for committing adultery—including the desire to end a failing 
relationship, or the desire to achieve satisfaction through surreptitious behavior, which both 
parties might want but could not do if the law forced them to speak up or face criminal 
prosecution—the state probably should not bring the force of law to bear on people who make 
certain choices in this domain.473  Moreover, after Lawrence, the constitutionality of criminal 
adultery statutes is uncertain.474 Ultimately, then, the criminal law should probably extricate 
itself from this realm.475  
 The principles of consent-based default rules might be applied in other contexts. For 
instance, a civil tort law could perhaps be structured to achieve the advantages of the criminal 
statutes explained above. The civil law of course raises its own host of complex problems, which 
deserve separate and sustained consideration. In addition, we might want to consider using these 
principles to try to urge discussion along the numerosity axis. As noted earlier, the adultery 
statutes reach only a narrow swath of the population affected by monogamy’s law, and these 
                                                 
474 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
471 See supra note 451.  
472 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). At least some 
states include relatively minor offenses, such as adultery and voyeurism, among those for which registration is 
required. See, e.g., Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. 
REV. 885, 888 (1995); Rick Kittel, K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq.—Offender Registration in Kansas, J. KANSAS BAR ASS’N, 
June/July 2000, at 36. 
473 In addition, there may be an argument that promises of monogamy create the conditions for a kind of “efficient 
breach”—if parties tell one another that there is one thing the other person could do that would prompt an immediate 
breach of the relationship, that allows parties to signal an ending to the relationship without much else, other than 
that particular behavior. Moreover, in addition to prompting the end (efficient or not) of many relationships that 
should come to an end, adultery may create opportunities for significant experiences. See Kipnis, supra note 108, at 
42; Emens, supra note 135, at 30. While the injured party may have an interest in preventing that result, the state’s 
decision to side with that partner is more debatable. 
  
475 For additional reasons, see supra text accompanying notes 423-426. 
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laws primarily address only the exclusivity axis of monogamy. The principle that jealousy equals 
love and that loving relationships are therefore exclusive is, however, foundational to 
monogamy’s law, and thus has framed the particular legal discussion here. In the interests of 
addressing the numerosity axis, though, another site for possible application of these principles 
might well be bigamy statutes. In states that prohibit bigamous cohabitation,476 consent-based 
statutes might be used to encourage spouses to make agreements about their openness to future 
domestic partners. The topic of bigamy statutes also raises many complicated issues that deserve 
sustained consideration. It is my hope that this article will help to promote future work in these 
and other areas.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, I wish to return briefly to two topics raised in the Introduction: the issue of 
same-sex marriage, and my invitation, drawing on Adrienne Rich, to monogamous-identified 
individuals to examine the idea of monogamy as a choice for themselves and for others. For 
same-sex couples who are now marrying,477 and those who will marry in greater numbers in 
coming years, this may be a uniquely fertile time to think critically about the kind of intimate 
relationships they are forming: The present moment may someday be revealed as the end of an 
era, the end of a period in which same-sex couples were not subject to precisely the same 
pressures of compulsory monogamy as straight couples. Moreover, for everyone, regardless of 
relationship views or status, this monumental debate about marriage presses the question of the 
proper components—both practical and emotional—of intimate relationships. It is the hope of 
this article that everyone will take this opportunity to question monogamy “as a ‘preference’ or 
‘choice’ . . . and to do the intellectual and emotional work that follows.”478 Monogamy may be 
both more of a choice and less of a choice than we think, but whether the paradox of prevalence 
persists in dictating our views of others’ relationships is undoubtedly a choice. By depicting the 
ways that people frequently fail to achieve the ideal of compulsory monogamy, by tracing the 
ways that polyamorists openly embrace this failure rather than simply falling into it, and by 
beginning to imagine how the law might be used to encourage people to express monogamy-
related preferences to their partners, this article has attempted to shed light on the practice of 




Readers with comments may address them to: 
 
Elizabeth F. Emens 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL 60637 
 eemens@law.uchicago.edu 
                                                 
476 See supra note 156. 
477 See supra note 3. 
  
478 Rich, supra note 1, at 648. 
Monogamy’s Law   p. 83  
Work-in-progress—Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. 
University of Chicago Law School 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series 
1. Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions (November 1999; 
Ethics, v. 110, no. 1). 
2. Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process 
(November 1999; forthcoming Yale Law and Policy Review v.18 #1). 
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? (August 1999; Michigan Law 
Review #3). 
4. Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations 
(November 1999, University of Virginia Law Review, v. 85). 
5. David A. Strauss, Do Constitutional Amendments Matter? (November 1999) 
6. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (November 1999) 
7. Cass R. Sunstein, Culture and Government Money: A Guide for the Perplexed (April 
2000). 
8. Emily Buss, Without Peers? The Blind Spot in the Debate over How to Allocate 
Educational Control between Parent and State (April 2000). 
9. David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle (June 
2000). 
10. Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional 
Consent (May 2000; Pennsylvania Law Review v. 149). 
11. Mary Ann Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the 
Religion Clauses? (May 2001, Supreme Court Review, 2000) 
12. Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa (May, 2000). 
13. Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of 
Parental Relations 
14. Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential Election (May 2001). 
15. Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on the 
Commons (August 2001). 
16. Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches 
(October 2001). 
17. Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? (October 
2001). 
18. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning (November 2001). 
19. Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in 
Congress, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law (December 2001). 
20. Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination (March 2002). 
21. Geoffrey R. Stone, Above the Law: Research Methods, Ethics, and the Law of Privilege 
(March 2002; forthcoming J. Sociological Methodology 2002). 
22. Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone? (March 2002). 
23. Emily Buss, Parental Rights (May 2002, forthcoming Virginia Law Review). 
24. David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike? (May 2002). 
25. David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court (May 2002). 
  
Monogamy’s Law   p. 84  
Work-in-progress—Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. 
26. Jack Goldsmith and Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism 
(June 2002). 
27. Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a 
Difference Sixty Years Makes (June 2002). 
28. Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July 2002). 
29. Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? The Court and the Political Process (August 2002). 
30. Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002). 
31. Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote Twice (November 2002). 
32. Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget (November 2002). 
33. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (November 2002). 
34. Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (November 2002). 
35. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case 
Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education (December 2002). 
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic 
Guarantees? (January 2003). 
37. Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches (January 2003). 
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (January 2003). 
39. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure (February 2003). 
40. Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice (March 
2003). 
41. Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights? Why Less Is More (March 2003) 
42. Emily Buss, The Speech Enhancing Effect of Internet Regulation (March 2003) 
43. Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron 
(May 2003) 
44. Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron (April 2003)  
45. Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003) 
46. Mary Ann Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated Against (May 2003) 
47. Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June 2003) 
48. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies (September 2003) 
49. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Two Fallacies of Interpretive 
Theory (September 2003) 
50. Cass R. Sunstein, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary 
Investigation (September 2003)  
51. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil 
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally 
(November 2003) 
52. Jenia Iontcheva, Nationalizing International Criminal Law: The International Criminal 
Court As a Roving Mixed Court (January 2004) 
53. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004) 
54. Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules (in Legislatures and Elsewhere) (January 2004) 
55. Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the 
World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism (January 2004) 
56. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Directions in Sexual Harrassment Law: Afterword (January 
2004) 
  
Monogamy’s Law   p. 85  
Work-in-progress—Please do not cite or quote without author’s permission. 
  
57. Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown (February 2004) 
58. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous 
Existence (February 2004) 
 
